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„Uu greatest difficulty ties not in persuading 
people to accept new ideas but persuading 
them to abondon the old ones." 
(John M a y n a r d Keynes ) 
FOREWORD 
The immediate roots of the Cold War lay in the intersection between a world 
rendered prostrate by a devastating global conflict and the conflicting recipes 
for international order that United States and the Soviet Union sought to impose 
on that pliable, war-shattered world. Some degree of conflict invariably results 
whenever a prevailing international order and its accompanying balance of 
power system are overturned. One would certainly expect no less when the 
overturning occurs with such shattering suddenness. The tension, suspicion, and 
rivalry that came to plague US-Soviet relations in the immediate aftermath of 
war was, in that elemental sense, hardly a surprise. Yet the degree and scope of 
the ensuing conflict, and particularly its duration, cannot be explained by 
appeals to structural forces alone. History, after all, offers numerous examples 
of great powers following the path of compromise and cooperation, opting to 
act in concert so as to establish a mutually acceptable international order 
capable of satisfying the most fundamental interests of each. Scholars have 
employed the term 'great power condominium' to describe such systems.' 
Despite the hopes of some leading officials in both the United States and the 
Soviet Union, however, that would not be the case this time. The reasons why 
go to the essence of the question of Cold War origins. In brief, it was the 
divergent aspirations, needs, histories, governing institutions, and ideologies of 
the United States and the Soviet Union that turned unavoidable tensions into the 
epic four-decade confrontation that we call the Cold War,2 
' DAVIS, LYNN ETHERIDGE: The Cold War begins. Soviet-American conflict over Eastern 
Europe. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974. X, 427 p. (Hereafter quoted English-
language sources can be read in the Library of Central European University, Budapest.) 
2 The term „Cold War" was coined by British author George Orwell. In an essay Orwell 
wrote: We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the 
slave empires of antiquity. James Burnham's theory has been much discussed, but few people 
have yet considered its ideological implications - this is, the kind of world-view, the kind of 
beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a State which was once 
unconquerable and in a permanent state of „cold war" with its neighbours. ORWELL, GEORGE: YOU 
and the Atomic Bomb. First published: Tribune, London, October 19, 1945. 
1 
4 ~ BÉLA RÉVÉSZ 
The Cold War was characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion, and 
misunderstandings by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the allies of 
each. At times, these conditions increased the likelihood of a third world war, 
which could easily have escalated to nuclear war. The United States accused the 
Soviet Union of seeking to expand its version of communism throughout the 
world. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, charged the United States with practicing 
imperialism (often referred to as „Dollar Imperialism"3) and attempting to stop 
revolutionary activity in other countries. 
The Cold War is usually considered to have occurred approximately from 
the end of World War II until the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s. The Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan were some of the occasions when the tension between those two 
ideologies took the form of an armed conflict, but much of it was conducted by 
or against surrogates and through spies and traitors who were working 
undercover. In those conflicts, the major powers operated in good part by 
arming or funding surrogates, a development that lessened direct impact on the 
populations of the major powers. The major world powers never entered into 
direct armed conflict against each other, but the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 
was the occasion when the Cold War was the closest to escalating into a hot one 
from 1961 to 1989. 
One major hotspot of conflict was Germany, particularly the city of Berlin. 
Arguably, the most vivid symbol of the Cold War was the Berlin Wall. The 
Wall isolated West Berlin (the portion of the city controlled by West Germany 
and the Allies) from East Berlin and the territory of East Germany, which 
completely surrounded it." 
Another major feature of the cold war was the arms race between the Soviet 
Union and NATO, especially the United States but also the United Kingdom, 
France, West Germany, and several other European powers. This race took 
place in a great many technological and military fields and resulted in enormous 
leaps in the state of the art. Particularly revolutionary advances were made in 
the field of rocketry and led to the space race. (Most or all of the rockets used to 
launch humans and satellites and to get to the Moon were originally military 
designs.)5 
In the 1970s, the Cold War gave way to détente and a more complicated 
pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer clearly split 
into two clearly opposed blocs. Less powerful countries had more room to 
3 O n „ D o l l a r I m p e r i a l i s m " s e e OSTROVITANOV, K . V . - MASSLENIKOV, V . A . - RUBISTEIN, M . 
1. (eds.): Agresszivnaja Ideologija i Politika Amerikanszkovo Iniperializma. Goszpolizdat, 
Moszkva, 1950. (Az amerikai imperializmus ideológiája és politikája) Szikra, Bp, 1951, 66-75. p. 
4 „The history of Cold War in Germany proved that a foreign policy lasting (though not 
always respectable) achievements may be realised by insane means." MEZEI, GÉZA: The Division 
of Germany and the Cold War. (Németország és a hidegháború. A szövetséges hatalmak és a 
német kérdés 1945-1961. Új Mandátum, Bp„ 1999, 195. p. 
5 The parallel history of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact see http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/ 
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assert their independence, and the two superpowers were partially able to 
recognize their common interest in trying to check the further spread and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. U.S.-Soviet relations would deteriorate once 
again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but improved as the Eastern bloc started 
to unravel in the late 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Russia lost the superpower status that it had won in World War II.6 
I. 
ARCHIVES AS A PART OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE7 
The partial opening of East-bloc archives has sparked renewed interest in the 
study of ideological influences in Cold War policy. The fall of communism 
dramatically affected archival institutions in Eastern Europe. Access improved 
considerably, and obstacles to publication of the documents found diminished. 
Other countries also benefitted from the increased openness. Decidedly 
sensational changes affected the archival institutions of the Communist parties 
that were suddenly prohibited or forced to adjust.8 Most of these institutions 
were appropriated through incorporation into the various national state archival 
structures to resume operations as regular public archives or archival 
departments following a brief incubation period. 
Archives form an essential and irreplaceable part of the cultural heritage. 
They preserve the memory of nations and the survival of human memory in 
large part depends on them. Therefore a EU Recommendation rules the basic 
elements of accessing to archives.9 
The Committee takes account of interest of the public for history, the 
institutional reforms currently under way in the new democracies and the 
exceptional scale of changes which are taking place in the creation of 
documents furthermore that a country does not become fully democratic until 
each one of its inhabitants has the possibility of knowing in an objective manner 
6 On US policy concerning Eastern Europe, see M.R. BESCHLOSS, S. TALBOTT: At the 
Highest Levels, Boston, Little, Brown, 1993; ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS: American Diplomacy and 
the End of the Cold War. An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe. 1989-1992. The 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, London, 1997; GEORGE BUSH, BRENT SCOWCROFT: A World Transformed. Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1998. 
7 Revised version of the study „Documents and Files of the Dictatorship and Cold War in the 
Hungarian Archives" made for the Cold War History Research Center Budapest, 2005. 
8 JANOS M. RAINER: Opening the Archives of the Communist Secret Police - the Experience 
in Hungary. Paper prepared for the Round-Table „The Opening the Archives and the History of 
Communism 1990-2000" , the 19th Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, 6 - 1 3 August, 2000. 
(Manuscript). 
9 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on a European Policy on Access to Archives (adopted 
by the committee of ministers on 13 July 2000, at the 717th meeting of the ministers' deputies). 
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the elements of their history. For this reason the purpose of the 
Recommendation is to avoid any measure which would permit preference to 
any category of users on the basis of their nationality, level of education, the 
nature of their research or any other criterion whatsoever. The law should not 
make any distinction between categories of users. It underlines the fact that the 
freedom of access without charge to the consultation of records and to finding 
aids constitutes a basic principle underlying any policy in favour of access to 
archives. The competent authority for the granting of special permissions for 
access, should be, according to circumstances, the creation agency after 
consultation with the Archives service, the administration of the Archives on 
the advice of the creating agency, or a single authority responsible for issuing 
authorisations for the whole country. 
„Researchers interested in working in any Hungarian archive are advised to 
contact the director of each archive first. The director will then forward research 
proposals, usually with a recommendation, to the ministry that created the 
documents. If permission to research is secured, however, it does not 
automatically entitle a researcher to publish documents. Special permission is 
almost always needed to publish documents from Party archives, and it is 
sometimes required from other archives. Since legislation governing publication 
of such information is broad, it is important that appropriate permissions be 
obtained. The directors of both the State and Party Archives insist that foreign 
and domestic researchers are treated identically and are governed by identical 
rules" - these words were written by scholar reporting on the condition of East-
European archives in 1992.10 
Opening of the state archives 
The monopoly of information characteristic of the communist dictatorship" was 
broken by the political transition in 1989-1990. A cultural ministerial decree 
was issued in the autumn of 1989, ordering the release of all papers more than 
30 years old and classifying research into official archives as a human right. 
This opened the state archives and their example was followed by the party 
10 P.J. SIMMONS: Post Cold War Sources: report from eastern europe. Cold war international 
history project bulletin. Issue 1 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 
D. C. Spring 1992. 
" The dictatorship of the proletariat according to communist ideology, was to be a temporary 
form of government during the transition to communism, in which the power of the working class 
(proletariat) - dictatorship of the majority - would be attained. Subsequent development of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would ultimately turn „socialist people's unity" into a „universal 
state of the whole people". In practice, the dictatorship of the proletariat gave dictatorial power to 
a narrow communist elite that claimed to represent the working masses. Characteristics of the 
system included the abolition of parliamentary democracy, the amalgamation of legislative and 
executive power, expropriation of the means of production, and intimidation of the masses. 
Original source: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) The State and Revolution. In Lenin Collected 
Works'. Volume 25 Progress Publishers, London, 2002. 
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archives, which were still in the control of the state party at that time, and by the 
military archives. This decree could not apply to records that had never been 
archived and remained in the place of provenance. There were two large groups 
of such sources: the records of the Foreign Ministry and of the Interior Ministry. 
The former handed over many of its documents to the National Archives in 
earlier years, while continuing to restrict research access to them. The Interior 
Ministry a huge volume of documents had accumulated. Those of the greatest 
value as source materials were the records of the regular and political police, 
which both came under the ministry. The latter included the records of the 
political trials, from the investigations of the secret police to the verdict and 
sentence of the court. 
The 3rd group directorate of the 3rd state-main-group directorate of the the 
Ministry of the Interior, dealing with „the interception of internal reaction", was 
disbanded in the spring of 1990.12 However, before the general elections, a 
separate National Security or Information Office was formed out of the 
intelligence, counter-intelligence, military counter-intelligence and technical 
group directorates. This was placed under the supervision of the government 
instead of the Interior Ministry, and included most of the staff from the 
disbanded group. The first task of the new agencies was to take over tens of 
thousands of surviving Interior Ministry files „necessary for their work", 
including 10 000 closed operative files and several thousand recruitment and 
work files. 
The Interior Ministry after 1990 was „purged" of its state-security (national 
security) functions, but it inherited the entire records of the state-security 
system, along with the documents that had survived destruction and had also 
been declared devoid of interest to the new national security system. This meant 
some 3000 metres of shelving, holding over one hundred thousand files, 
including almost all the papers of the political trials between 1945 and 1989, 
operative files, agents" files and so on. This material was not handed over to the 
National Archives by the new ministry either. Some documents were made 
accessible, mainly the political trials, but only if special procedures were 
followed. The state-security documents remained closed, with even their 
existence denied in many cases.13 
In 1996, an amendment to the vetting legislation founded the Historical 
Office (later: Historic Archives of State Security Services14), which was to hold 
the documents of the state-security services. The measure mentioned the 
combining of the records, but it left the execution of this to cooperation between 
12 See more Chapter II. 
13 The Report of the Committee for Document Survey. Central Archives, The Minister of 
Interior's instruction about the survey of documents held by the Interior Ministry and its affiliated 
branches. Belügyminisztérium Központi Irattár (Interior Ministry Central Archives - hereafter IM 
CA) No. 05/1995. M u t . 
14 The Historical Archive of the Hungarian State Security (hereafter HASSS) was founded as 
the legal successor of the History Office according to the Act III of 2003. 
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the office and the national security service. The office was given the task of 
satisfying demands from citizens, based on the principle of „information 
compensation" introduced by the data-protection ombudsman of the Hungarian 
Parliament. 
The relatively complete sets of political trial papers are prime sources for 
the political history of Hungary since 1945. The various forms of resistance by 
the working class, the peasantry, young people and so on all counted as political 
matters, so that social historians find it extremely profitable to look through the 
state-security files. The „building" files, covering the life inside a factory or 
other economic unit, are important sources of economic history. Similar files 
were kept on cultural and scientific institutions. Several thousand people were 
kept under observation for years and decades at a time, without any open 
proceedings being taken against them. The all-embracing state-security function 
of observation and intervention as a whole was an emblem of the communist 
period. The history of that activity, and how it altered and changed, ties in 
closely with the political history of the period. So these documents have 
fundamental historical significance. The problem is that most documents in 
Hungary today are incomplete or not accessible at all. 
The Archives of State Security Services now contains a research department 
that deals mainly with the institutional and organizational history of state 
security. The 1956 Institute in Budapest has launched a several-year research 
programme into the history of state-security activity in the Kádár period.15 Apart 
from that, research is taking place on a variety of detailed questions. 
15 Some works published by or in association with the 1956 institute: - Muddling Through in 
the Long 1960s. Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the Lower Classes of Communist 
Hungary. Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societes No. 16. Edited by János M. 
Rainer and György Péteri 2005. - Memories of the Sixties From the collections of the Oral 
History Archive. Selected and compiled by Adrienne Molnár, 2004. - Hungary 1944-1953, 
Internet history book. Edited by János Rainer M„ Zoltán Lux . 2003. - Everyday events in the last 
century. Studies of the formative period of the Kadar system. Edited by János Rainer M. 2003. -
Oorbacsov's negotiations with Hungarian leaders. Documents from the Archives of the one-time 
Soviet Communist Party and Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Edited by Magdolna Baráth and 
János Rainer M. 1956-os Intézet, 2000. - The former secret services and their files in Germany 
and in Hungary. Minutes of the conference hold on October 8, 1997. Edited by András B. 
Hegedűs. 1998. - Police reports. December 13, 1956 - December 31. Edited by Szakolczai, A. 
and Kajári, E. Jointly published by the Ministry of the Interior and the Institute for the History of 
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 1997. - The 1956 Handbook. I. Vol.: Chronology, II. Vol.: 
Bibliography, III. Reprisals and Memory. Edited by András B. Hegedűs. Contributors: Tibor 
Beck and Pál Germuska. 1996. - About 1956 on the eve of the change of the regime. Edited by 
András B. Hegedűs and Péter Baló. Budapest: Jointly published by Széchenyi István 
Szakkollégium. 1996. - Power and society in twentieth-century Hungarian history. Edited by 
Tibor Valuch. 1995. - The debates of the Petőfi Circle based on authentic minutes. Vol. I—VII. 
Documents arranged, notes written, and edited by András Hegedűs B. 1989-1994. 
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General rules 
Hungarian Parliament enacts an Act in 1995 on the basic rules about protection, 
continuous acquisition and use of archives, which serves as the primary source 
of historical past, being indispensable for the continuous fulfilment of public 
duties, the enforcement of civil rights, as well as forming part of the cultural 
heritage of the nation.16 
The purpose of this Act shall be to ensure that in the course of using 
archival holdings the enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights 
guaranteeing free access to data of public interest and freedom of scientific 
research, be realized together with the protection of fundamental constitutional 
rights related to personality, to personal data and protection of state secrets, 
official secrets or business confidential data be affected. Two basic types of 
archives are: public archives and open private archives. 
Public archives: an archives repository maintained by a public agency, 
which carries out archival tasks - both scientific and administrative - related to 
undestroyable public records. Public archives shall be divided into general 
archives, specialized state archives, archives of local authorities by settlements, 
of public bodies, of public foundations, or of any other public agencies, as 
defined in a legal rule. Specialized state archives are e. g. the Archives of War 
History, the Historic Archives of State Security Services, which are maintained 
by the state. 
Open private archives: an institution established for the permanent retention 
of records with lasting value, which are owned or possessed by a natural person 
or an agency fulfilling other public duties. 
Competence of public archives (scope of competence): that part of the 
current records with permanent value which is obliged by law to be transferred 
to public archives, and the given public archives is bound to take over by virtue 
of provisions of the law, and of decision of the maintainer, respectively. The 
complete and concluded annual volumes of undestroyable public records shall 
be transferred to the competent public archives by the end of the fifteenth year 
from the calendar year of their creation. 
Access to Public Archives: upon request, containing the subject to be 
researched, any natural person may have free of charge access to archives, or 
may obtain at his own cost copies of records released for inspection, and kept in 
public archives, created after 1 May 1990, or archives older than thirty years 
from the calendar year of their creation, archives that were created before 2 May 
1990, if older than fifteen years from the calendar year of their creation as well 
as without any time limitation to archives, which have already been made 
public, and/or the content of which anyone may become familiar with. 
16 Act LXVI of 1995 on Public Records, Public Archives, and the Protection of Private 
Archives. 
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An Advisory Board shall authorize access to archives that were created 
before 2 May 1990 and within fifteen years from the calendar year of their 
creation - including those originally prepared for internal use as well as 
containing preliminaries to decisions - with the consent of the agency which 
handed them over. The Advisory Board is composed of five members, three of 
them appointed by one from each of the National Archives of Hungary, the 
Institute for the History of Politics, and the Documentation and Research 
Institute for the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Public Foundation), as well as two 
members appointed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
Access to archives originally prepared for internal use as well as containing 
preliminaries to decisions, that were created after 1 May 1990 but before the 
expiry of thirty years from the calendar year of their creation, shall be 
authorized by the public archives keeping the records concerned, with the 
consent of the agency, which handed them over. 
Until the expiry of closure period specified by the classifying authority, 
researchers can only have access to archives containing state secrets, official 
secrets or business confidential data or any other secrets defined in an Act, with 
a permission issued by the classifier. No access may be authorized to records 
that were created within the framework of an international commitment, or were 
handed over by a foreign agency or person for the duration specified in the 
international agreement or by the party handing them over or to archives not 
considered public records, which cannot as yet be researched on the basis of 
conditions specified by the agency or natural person handing them over. 
Archives containing personal data shall be disclosed for access by anyone 
thirty years after the year of the data subject's decease. Personal data are „data 
which can be associated with a particular natural person (hereafter person 
concerned), the conclusion, which can be drawn from the data, relating to the 
person concerned". It is apparent that this definition covers a remarkably wide 
range of data. However, a particular group of data (special data) is protected to a 
greater extent and, therefore, are listed separately as follows: racial origin, 
national, nationality and ethnic status, political opinion or party affiliation, 
religious or other conviction, health condition, abnormal addiction, sexual life 
and criminal record. The archives shall also be open for access before the expiry 
of protection period, if research can be carried out - at the cost of the applicant -
through an anonymized copy, or research is required for scientific purposes. 
A short list of archives 
1. Public archives 
1.1. National Archives of Hungary 
The Parliament of the Hungarian Republic passed the Act LXXXIII in 1991 
which decreed that the records of the former state party, the Hungarian Socialist 
ti 
Documents on the dictatorship and the cold war in the Hungarian archives - 11 
Workers' Party, were state possessions, which, accordingly, were transferred 
into the National Archives of Hungary in the first half of 1992. The institution 
preserving more than 68 thousand linear metres of documents. The scope of 
duties and competence of the Archives have been defined in detail by the 
Archives Act.17 
The National Archives preserves the records of the central legislative 
organs - the Parliament - , the executive organs (e.g. the ministries), the 
jurisdictional organs as well as the economic organisations, public bodies and 
foundations of national importance. Records of the former state party are in No. 
XXXII. Main Group of Fonds VII. Department - Records of the Hungarian 
Working People's Party18 and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.19 
17 See above. 
18 Hungarian Working People's Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja), hereafter: HWPP. The party 
came about by what was officially a merger between the Hungarian Communist Party and the 
Social Democratic Party, when the latter, weakened and decimated, was in fact absorbed into the 
former. Although the social democrat Árpád Szakasits became president of the HWP, the real 
leader was Mátyás Rákosi. The membership exceeded a million. Rákosi was dismissed as leader 
in July 1956, but his successor, Ernő Gerő, differed little from him in policy. János Kádár took 
over from Gerő on October 25, 1956, but the party disintegrated when the revolution succeeded. 
The Hungarian party had the same structure as the CPSU, with a Central Committee (known as 
the Central Leadership) of 100-110 members. This was the main decision-making body between 
party congresses, in some ways resembling the legislature in a multi-party democracy. Its 
members were elected by the delegates at the party congress. Resolutions of the Central 
Committee were binding on all lower party organs and the party membership. The Central 
Committee elected from among its own members a smaller, executive body, the Political 
Committee. This, after the pattern in all communist parties in the Soviet bloc, was the supreme 
body, equivalent in some respects to the government of a multi-party democracy. In the HWP's 
case, it consisted of 8-12 members, of which one was the party first secretary. Political 
Committee resolutions were also binding on lower organs and the membership. The Secretariat 
consisted of the secretaries of the Central Committee, who were also members of the Political 
Committee. It organized, orchestrated and controlled the congress, oversaw the implementation of 
Central Committee and Political Committee resolutions, and was in charge of personnel matters. 
It oversaw the administrative work of the Central Committee apparatus. This was organized into 
departments corresponding to the various ministries of government: the Foreign Affairs 
Department of the Central Committee oversaw the Foreign Ministry, the Planning and Financial 
Department the Finance Ministry etc. They also drew up the background materials for the party 
leadership. FEJTŐ, FERENC: Historié des démocraties populaires. I-II. Edition du Seuil, 1972. (A 
népi demokráciák története. Magvető - Párizsi Magyar Füzetek, 1991.) passim. 
19 Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt), hereafter: HSWP. 
The Presidium (Political Committee) of the HWP declared the party dissolved on October 31, 
1956 and founded a new party with this name. It appointed a preparatory committee for the 
founding congress, consisting of Ferenc Donáth, János Kádár, Sándor Kopácsi, Géza Losonczy, 
György Lukács, Imre Nagy and Zoltán Szántó. Sándor Haraszti became the editor of the new 
party's daily paper, the Népszabadság. The leadership continued to hold meetings after 4 
November, in the Yugoslav Embassy, in the absence of Sándor Kopácsi, who had been arrested, 
and of course, of János Kádár. The name was expropriated by the Kádár government for its new 
pro-Soviet party on November 4, 1956. The members of the Kádár government met on November 
7, 1956, after arriving in Budapest, and appointed an HSWP Provisional Executive Committee: 
Antal Apró, Béla Biszku, Lajos Fehér, János Kádár, Gyula Kállai, Károly Kiss and György 
Marosán. (Ferenc Münnich joined on 11 November.) A Provisional Central Committee and 
— — ^ w ^ W j 
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1.1.1. Central Organs of the HWPP 
Only an insignificant amount of documents remained from the Congress, the 
supreme organ of the Party. However, the events of Congress sessions can be 
reconstructed by the edited publications of the time. Between Congress sessions 
the Central Board, which was elected by the Congress and held its meetings in 
every second month, represented and managed the party's organisation. 
Nevertheless, the most important decisions was not taken here but at the 
meetings of the Politburo20 of which members were elected from the Central 
Board to which it was, in theory, subordinated. 
In the beginning (until June 1953) the members of the Secretariat, which 
proceeded as a political managing body, were also elected by the Central Board 
from its own members. This body discussed daily matters at its meetings held 
once a week and submitted its decisions to the Politburo for final approval. The 
scope of duties and competence of the Politburo and the Secretariat was clearly 
defined in June 1953 in a way that the main tasks of the Secretariat, as a 
subordinate body of the Politburo, were the preparation of Politburo meetings as 
well as the management and control of the Party's organisation. As another 
body elected by the Central Board, the Organising Committee held a meeting 
every week and supervised party organs and organisations. The records of 
Politburo Secretaries are arranged by their names. These relatively small 
records provide valuable information on the internal life of the Party as well as 
its managing and supervisory activities. 
At the Archives the records of HWPP committees are arranged by their 
sessions whereas the records of party departments are arranged in the order of 
their organisational structure. The reports of party delegations sent abroad, the 
documents concerning the first and second „five year plans" as well as the 
speeches of state and party functionaries are handled as separate collections. 
The record unit called „The Secretarial Records of Mátyás Rákosi" which 
consists of 6,30 linear metres of documents is one of the most valuable source 
material concerning the period between 1948 and 1956. 
provisional Budapest and provincial bodies were formed during November . Permanent members 
of the leading committees were appointed in June 1957 at a national HSWP meeting. The 
Provisional Executive Commit tee was effectively the Political Committee, which was the name it 
took in June 1957. RlPP, ZOLTÁN: The Legitimitation of HSWP at the Beginning of the Kádár-era. 
In Huszár, Tibor - Szabó, János (eds.): Restauraiion or Correction. Zrinyi, Bp., 199. passim, 
20 Politburo is short for Political Bureau. The term originates either f rom the Russian 
Politicheskoe Byuro, which contracts to Politbyuro, or from the German Politbüro. A Politburo is 
the executive organization for a number of political parties, most notably for Communis t Parties. 
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1.1.2. Central Organs of the HSWP and their Directly Subordinated 
Party Organs 
The records concerning the activities of central party organs are kept in the 
following groups: 
- Congresses and conferences; 
- Meetings of the HSWP's Central Committee (until June 1957 Provisional 
Central Committee); 
- Meetings of the HSWP's Politburo (until June 1957 Executive 
Committee); 
Records of the Organising Committee and the Central Committee 's Secretariat: 
- Documents of ad-hoc votes, circulars, information sheets for members of 
managing bodies, Central Control Commission materials and printed 
resolutions 
- Documents of some working parties subordinated to the Central 
Committee, like the Economic Policy Committee or the Agitprop 
Committee, form independent record groups. The same applies to some 
of the Central Committee's work teams dealing with theoretical 
questions such as the Economic Theoretical Work Team, Work Team 
for Co-operative Policy, Work Team for Cultural Policy or the Physical 
Education and Sports Committee. 
- The relatively small records of Central Committee Secretaries form 
nominal groups. The most frequently researched record unit of this 
category is the secretarial material of János Kádár (1956-1989) which 
includes almost 14 linear metres of documents. 
- The records of the Central Committee's organisation contain information 
on every significant fields of the country's life. 
- Department of Party and Mass Organisations, Agitprop Department, 
Departments of Cadres, Departments of State Economy, Agriculture 
and Co-operatives, Administrative Department, Department of Foreign 
Relations, Department of Party Economics and Administration and the 
Hungarian Institute of Labour Movement. 
- The material of the Department of Party and Mass Organisations contains 
important information on the party's internal organisational structure, 
the composition of party membership as well as the activities of local 
party organisations and mass organisations. The cadre register of the 
Department contains the personal material of functionaries who took 
part in the pre-1945 labour movement and played an important role in 
post-1945 public life. 
The party archives received the material selected and classified on the basis of 
the above criteria: 
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- The material of the Agitprop Department includes information on the 
theoretical theses and practical activities of domestic and external 
propaganda, the methodology of atheistic re-education, experiences of 
political courses and the contents of reports on the prevailing general 
feeling of the society. It also contains data on the activities of the 
Cultural Committee and theoretical work teams, the press, radio and 
TV, as well as the organs which fell within the Department's 
competence. 
- Several departments dealt with certain fields of the national economy, the 
preparation of respective economic concepts, their implementation and 
supervision. Probably the most important one is the material of the 
Department of Economic Policy on the basis of which the decision 
procedure concerning the economy as a whole, the work of economic 
organisations and the development of international economic relations 
can be traced. 
The theoretical and practical questions of the educational administration, 
culture, arts, scientific life, public health and ethnic minorities fell within the 
competence of the Cultural and Scientific Department (1957-1963), the 
Department of Science and Public Education (1964-1968), the Cultural 
Department (1964-1966) as well as the Department of Scientific, Educational 
and Cultural Affairs (from 1967): 
- The Administrative Department (from 1967 Department of Public 
Administration and Management) was responsible for the party control 
and supervision of national defence, state and public security, 
jurisdiction, local and state administration affairs. 
- The Department of Foreign Affairs administered the relations with the so 
called „twin parties", controlled the party organs of Hungary's foreign 
representations, dealt with foreign scholarships and the matters of 
emigrants living in Hungary, etc. 
- The Department of Party Economics and Administration (former 
Economic Department) supervised the budget and management of party 
organs, worked out the system of membership fees, handled the 
registries, supervised the status and payment and social conditions of 
the apparatus. 
- The Central Committee's Office was responsible, among other things, for 
the preparation of the meetings of managing organs, the preparation of 
protocols on the meetings, the distribution of decisions and information, 
etc. This material contains the party's international correspondence, the 
documents concerning the foreign trips of Central Committee 
Secretaries and the registers on party members who fell within the 
competence of the Office. 
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1.1.3. The Budapest Committee and Organisations of the HWPP and 
HSWP (1948-1989) 
The organisational structure of the HWPP and HSWP and the historical value of 
the relevant documents are very similar to each other which makes their one by 
one description unnecessary. The records of the HWPP ' s and HSWP's 
Budapest Committee, the territorial and district party committees as well as 
their subordinate, so called „intermediate" party committees of companies, 
offices, top and direct basis organisations, as well as the district battalions and 
Budapest Headquarters of the Worker's Militia. 
Address: 1014 Budapest Bécsi kapit tér 2-4. Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 225-2800 
Hompage: http://www, mol, gov.hu 
E-mail: info(a),mol. gov, hu 
1.2. Historic Archives of State Security Services 
The Historical Archive of the Hungarian State Security (Historical Archive in 
short) was founded as the legal successor of the Historical Office (founded in 
1997) according to the Act III of 2003. The Historical Archive preserves and 
maintains state security organization documents dated between 21st December 
1944 and 14th February 1990 and the documents of some committees that 
control notable people who hold offices of public confidence or may influence 
public opinion. After taking over, exploring and basically sorting the material it 
was possible to create a homogenous archive system. 
According to the Act the Archive's collection comprises the documents of 
the (State Security) Department III of the Ministry of Home Affairs and their 
legal predecessors, documents referring to the employees, secret employees and 
top secret employees of the Main Division, state security documents of the 
Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian People's Army, and the documents of 
the so called screening committees, which control some prominent personalities 
who hold important offices or offices of public confidence, and posts that form 
the public opinion. 
Address: 1067 Budapest Eötvös u 7 
Telephone (main): (+361) 487-6020 
Hompage: http://www.abtl.hu 
E-mail: in fo(a),abtl.hu 
•jääa 
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1.3. War History Archives (Central Archives) 
The records of the War History Archives concerning the activities from the 
early years of the Cold War, beginning in 1949 untill 1989. They include 
ministerial orders and papers from the Secretariat and various directorates of the 
Home Defense Ministry and the General Staff. 
War History Archives (Central Archives) 
Address: 1014 Budapest Kapisztrán tér 2-4. Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 325-1676 
Hompage: http://www, hm-him. hu/ 
E-mail: HIM. levellar(a)..hm-him. hu 
The Central File Department of the Institute and Museum of Military History 
Address: 1027 Bp., Feketesas u. 4. Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 212-4430 
Hompage: http://www.hm-him.hu/ 
E-mail: HIM. irattor(a>,hm-him. hu 
2. Open private archives 
2.1. Open Society Archives at Central European University2' 
The mission of the Open Society Archives at Central European University 
(OSA) is to: 
- obtain, preserve and make available research resources for the study of 
Communism and the Cold War, particularly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as the issues of human rights; 
- support the goals of Central European University by identifying, 
collecting, preserving and making available university records and 
personal papers of enduring value from its administrators, faculty, and 
students for the use of university staff, students, scholars and the 
general public; 
- support and facilitate the philanthropic goals of the Soros foundations 
network, especially by providing information, records management and 
archival services for all its entities. 
21 Leszek Pudlowski and Iván Székely (eds.): Open Society Archives. Published by the Open 
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest 1999. See more Chapter III. 
m 
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The Open Society Archives' holdings comprise of approximately 3,000 
linear meters of records that generally reflect the Archives' mission. Based on 
their provenience as well as their focus OSA holdings are divided into three 
main groups that cover history of Communism and the Cold War, Human 
Rights related issues, and the activities of the Soros foundation network. 
However, the full list of OSA holdings discloses the fact that, because of the 
strong interconnection between region's recent history, related human rights 
dimension and the Soros foundations' specific interest in the matter, listed fonds 
frequently surpass the structure imposed. 
The specific nature of OSA's profile is also being stressed through its 
rapidly growing number of audiovisual materials gathered with the intention to 
establish an audiovisual research center and a non-circulating video library of 
regional propaganda, historical and feature films, as well as regional TV news 
programs and amateur footage. 
By far the most comprehensive fonds related to the history of Communism 
and the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe is that of the Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty22 Research Institute. These materials were accumulated 
during the 45 years of continuous activity, and are thus a major source of 
information about the region's post-war political, social and economic history. 
Of considerable importance are also Russian, Polish and Hungarian Samizdat 
materials. 
Main items of OSA fonds list: 
- Oral history interviews relating to the history of RFE Hungarian Desk 
- Hungarian Unit, 1949-1995 
- Collection Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
- Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 
1956-1996 
- Video materials relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
- Audio materials relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
- Records of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
Address: Goldberger House, 1051 Budapest, AranyJanosu. 32. 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 327-3250 
Hompage: http://www. osa.ce u. hu 
E-mail: archives(a).ceu. hu 
2.2. Archives of the Institute of the Political History 
The Institute of Political History is a company that is outside of the 
government's institute-system and it's a private research place. Besides the 
historical and societal research works, and the archives and the library, it hosts 
22 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty hereafter: RFE/RL. 
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scientific and cultural events as well. This is an intellectual center that is 
concentrating first of all on renewing and popularizing the social criticism 
thinking and the sociological work in the widest range. 
The Archives of the Institute of the Political History is public. They have 
collected the documents of the legal and illegal movements of the Hungarian 
Labour Movement before 1944; of the parties in the years after the WWII.; of 
the left-wing youth organizations ;and also about persons connected to these 
movement and organization. Since 1989 the archives have been trying to find 
and save the lasting valuable sources in private documents belonging to the 
history of the change of regime. 
It is open to all parties, organizations, associations and even to private 
persons who would file their documents or documentary legacy away here. 
Under the care of the archives there are 4000 running-meter of documents and 
also there are 284 rolls of film made of documents relating to Hungary and 
found in foreign archives. The Archives is open for inquiring researchers, when 
necessary they give information and supply data. Detailed information on the 
collections may be obtained by the catalogue of fond and substance purchasable 
in the Institute. 
Main collections: 
- Documents of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Social 
Democratic Party) 1890-1948 
- Documents of the communist movement and its parties 1919-1948 
- Documents of the National Peasants' Party 1939-1949 
- Documents of the trade unions, workers' and left-wing organization, 
movements 1753-1952 
- Documents of the social organizations 1945-1989 
-Documents of the youth organizations 1919-1989 
- Documents of several publications 1896-1989 
- Personal collections, remembrances 1839-1997 
-Collection of leaflets 1870-1958, 1990, 1994 
- Copies of documents relating to Hungary from foreign archives 
1949-1978 
Address: 1054 Budapest, Alkotmany u.2. Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 301-2022 
Homyase: http:/Avww. polhist. hu 
E-mail: vhistorv(a),axelero. hu 
2.3. Hungarian Broadcast Archive at National Szechenyi Library 
A duplicate set of the texts and recordings of the RFE Hungarian Service from 
1952 through October 1993 has been transferred to National Szechenyi Library 
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(NSL) in Budapest. The Budapest collection consists of a set of program scripts 
on microfilm and/or paper, selected audio recordings, and associated 
catalogues, indices, and editorial documentation. NSL is preparing a detailed 
index of these materials. 
Address: National Széchényi Library Budavari Palota „F" épület 
1358 Budapest Széchényi rakpart 19, Hungary 
Telephone: (+36 1) 224-3880 
Hompage: 
http: //www. oszk. hu/hun/publ/konferencia/konj2000/szer/szerJndexJni. 
htm 
E-mail: hanakg(cb,oszk. hu 
3. Others 
3.1. Archives of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Address: 1051 Budapest, Roosevelt tér 9., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 411-6143 
Hompage: http://w3. mtak. hu 
E-mail: mtak(a),mta.hu 
3.2. Budapest City Archives 
Address: 1139 Budapest, Teve u. 3-5., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 298-7500 
Hompage: http://www. bparchiv. hu 
E-mail: bparchiv (cp.budapest.hu 
3.3. Central Archives of Hungarian Parliament 
Address: 1055 Budapest, Kossuth tér 1-3., Hungary 
Telephone: (+361) 441-4248 
Hompage: 
http://www.parlament.hu/cgi-bin/insurl7pairhelp/irattar.htm 
E-mail: irattari-o(a)parlamenl. hu 
3.4. Central Archives of Hungarian Radio P. L. C. 
Address: 1800 Budapest, Bródy Sándor utca 5-7., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 328-8108 
Hompage: http://www, radio, hu 
E-mail: nki(a).radio.hu 
3.5. Collection in Social Theory and Contemporary History - University of 
Szeged 
Address: 6722 Szeged, Petőfi sgt. 30-34., Hungary 
Telephone: (+36 62) 425-109 
Hompage: http://primus, arts, u-szeged. hu/doktar/indexe. html 
E-mail: slaczko(5),bibl. u-szegedhu 
3.6. Hungarian News Agency, Data-bank 
Address: 1016 Budapest, Naphegy tér 8., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 441-9000 
Hompage: http://www, mti. hu 
E-mail: mtiadmin(a),mti. hu 
3.7. Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
Address: 1074 Budapest, Dohány u. 74., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+36 1) 322-5228 
Hompage: http://www.rev.hu 
E-mail: revl3199(a).helka.hu 
3.8. Library of Hungarian Police College 
Address: 1121 Budapest Farkasvölgyi út 12., Hungary 
Telephone (main): (+361) 392-3500 
Hompage: http://www.rtf.hu 
E-mail: Iibrary(a),rtf.hu 
3.9. Military Collection - Library of University of Szeged 
Address: 6722 Szeged, Ady tér 10., Hungary 
Telephone: (+36 62) 546-621 
Hompage: http://www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/bibl/mil/ 
E-mail: aranyi(cp,bibl. u-szeged. hu 
3.10. North Atlantic Information Centre at Hungarian Parliament 
Address: 1358 Budapest Széchenyi rakpart 19, Hungary 
Telephone: (+36 62) 268-6490 
Hompage: htty://www. parlament, hu/nato/index. htm 
E-mail: naic(a).mko2v.hu 
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II. 
THE CENTRAL ARCHIVES OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY21 
1. The dictatorial authorities' propensity for secrecy can be traced to their 
conspirative approach to regulating the state structure itself. From an archivist's 
viewpoint, the most important source in this regard is the highly classified 
Collection of Directives of the Central Archives of the Interior Ministry of the 
Hungarian People's Republic. At the moment, the Interior Ministry's currently 
applicable Rules and Regulations of Organizational Structure and Procedures, 
together with its Appendix, the Instructions for Handling Cases (Documents), 
regulates the handling of material not covered by Act LXVI of 1995.24 After the 
democratic transformation of the country, there were two principal 
organizational and institutional changes that determined the status of the archive 
materials of the Interior Ministry. Following the democratic changes, the 
documents relating to state security were mostly transferred to the newly 
established Bureau of National Security, Bureau of Military Intelligence and 
Bureau of Information.25 The Historical Office, which was established in 1997 
and later was renamed the Historical Archives of the State Security Services, 
received a large quantity of documents, mostly from the Documentation 
Department. 
From the point of view of organizational structure, the Central Archives of 
the Interior Ministry is subordinated to the Archive Department of the Bureau 
of the Under-Secretary of Public Administration. The Central Archives is a 
functional archive with a long history. Its current documents serve the smooth 
functioning of the Ministry, while the greater part of its material belongs to the 
„registratura antiqua." This explains the fact that although its documents 
primarily belong to the archive material of a public service organization, it still 
functions as a research archive - its material can be studied either in order to 
retrieve information or to assist in other forms of academic research. Until 
recently, the core material of the Central Archives consisted of documents 
produced at the ministerial offices by the under-secretaries and the deputy 
minister, as well as at the ministerial, collegial meetings and the meetings of the 
national police chiefs, and also at the Presidential Department and the 
Department of Public Order. Most of these documents have been transferred to 
the Hungarian National Archives. However, the legal fate of its most important 
23 Revised version of the study „Selected documents from the history of the Hungarian 
Ministry of Interiors. 1950-1989" made for the Open Society Archives Budapest in 2004-2005. 
24 Act LXVI of 1995 on Public Records, Public Archives, and the Protection of Private 
Archives 
25 Most of the documents covered by the Archive Act were transferred to the Hungarian 
National Archives. 
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and also most voluminous unit, the Collection of Directives, has not yet been 
settled.26 
The Collection of Directives basically serves as a list of commands, 
regulations, instructions, procedural rules and regulations about the organization 
and functioning of the Interior Ministry. These historical documents have been 
kept in the Central Archives since 1947, although access to documents 
produced after 1980 - under the Archive Law and the Interior Ministry's 
procedural rules - is still limited, with the revision of their classification taking 
place continuously. The Hungarian National Archives' repertory27 catalogue 
relating to the pre-1945 documents of the IM Archives was based on the 
previous subject headings of the Ministry's central archives. These failed to 
make provision for a separate collection of directives, just as the central 
archiving failed to set up a separate sub-division for the subsequent period. The 
Collection of Directives took its present structural form in the 1990s, with its 
live archival section continuously expanding, 
In addition to decrees, procedural rules, actions and memorandums, the 
directives are the Interior Ministry's orders: high-level administrative and legal 
instructions - not qualifying for the status of statute laws - issued by the 
divisions of the Interior Ministry. Generally speaking, directives are used to 
regulate official tasks and rules regarding military discipline and order, as well 
as dealing with enlisted personnel. Before 1990, directives could be issued by 
the minister, the under-secretary, the deputy ministers, the deputy departmental 
heads, the independent departmental heads and, within the scope of their 
specific authority, all commanding officers. But the Collection of Directives is 
much more inclusive than a mere catalogue of these commands. It also includes 
the ministerial directives with the status of statute laws. Ministerial directives 
are used to regulate the implementation of higher-level statute laws and to list 
the tasks of the organizations concerned, as well as the issues regarding the 
direction and management of the Interior Ministry's work and the execution of 
professional tasks. Before 1990, ministerial directives could be issued by the 
minister, the under-secretary, and the deputy ministers appointed by the 
minister. The so-called „legal guidelines", which did not have the status of 
statutory law, also belonged to the Catalogue of Directives. As principal 
guidelines, these related to the interpretation and execution of low-level 
statutory laws. Another specific area of the Collection of Directives was 
constituted by the joint commands, instructions and legal guidelines, which the 
Interior Ministry issued jointly with some other organizations - the Chief Public 
26 Nevertheless, it may be of some significance that already there is a designated place for 
the Collection of Directives within the fond and stock list of the Historical Archives of State 
Security Services under Section 4, Fond 4.2, although it is still left blank at the moment (2005). 
27 Repertories of Hungarian National Archives. 58, HNA, Bp., 1973. 
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Prosecutor, the Ministry of Defense and the Central Command of the Workers' 
Militia.28 
The Collection of Directives is not a comprehensive and coherent collection 
of documents. Sometimes documents that should have been placed in the 
Collection of Directives on the basis of their content have been kept with other 
materials, mostly ministerial or deputy-ministerial documents (the reverse can 
also be true), while others are missing altogether. While the principle of 
provenance is consistently applied, the archive referencing - usually due to a 
mistake made by the producer of the document - is often inaccurate, 
contradictory or incomplete. 
The Committee for Document Survey appointed by the Minister of Interior 
also called attention to the above mentioned problems in its report filed in 
1995.2' According to this, the Central Archives „was unable to fully execute the 
task in the manner required by the then existing regulations on the handling of 
documents. It took over, or may have taken over, the documents of the various 
organizational units irregularly, and the sorting and discarding of documents 
was done inappropriately". The report makes the additional remark that, despite 
the work carried out since 1990, the majority of the documents held there are 
not catalogued properly. In addition, there is a blatant deficiency of documents 
from the period between 1950 and 1960; the sequence of ministerial and 
deputy-ministerial documents is incomplete; and the documents issued by the 
main divisions and departments are missing. 
With regard to the historical preliminaries, the only point raised in 
connection with the changes introduced in the handling of post-World-War-
Two documents by the earlier mentioned Hungarian National Archives' 
repertory catalogue of the Interior Ministry's Archives in connection with the 
pre-1945 documents concerned the fact that „in the early 1950s the most 
important documents related to the working-class movement at the end of the 
First World War and during the subsequent Counter-Revolution were moved to 
the Archives of the HSWP's Party History Institute". In actual fact, the 
introduction of the Repertory makes the point - while the quoted section 
obviously refers to the HWPP Party History Institute - that no major changes 
had taken place in the archival system prior to the 1950s. This was, indeed, the 
case. Between 1945 and 1950, the main tasks of the Ministry included the 
28 Workers' Militia was a voluntary armed force designed to consolidate and protect the 
authority of the Kádár government. After a resolution had been passed by the HSWP Provisional 
Executive Committee on January 29, 1957, the Presidential Council issued a legal decree on 
February 19 (No. 13/1957) establishing the Workers' Militia. Direct party control was exercised 
through the Administrative Department and the Party and Mass Organizations Department of the 
HSWP Central Committee, and at local level by county party committees. The Workers' Militia 
remained a loyal supporter throughout the Kádár period, but its significance decreased as the 
regime consolidated and the militia members aged. Parliament disbanded it in October 1989 
without appointing a successor organization. 
29 The Report of the Committee for Document Survey. Central Archives, op. cit. 
n 
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direction of the apparatus of public administration and the management of the 
affairs pertaining to public security, law enforcement and state security. With 
regard to document handling, the Interior Ministry of the Provisional National 
Government effectively continued the traditions laid down by the Hungarian 
Royal Interior Ministry, in that the Ministry filed its documents in much the 
same manner. 
The first fundamental change took place in 1950 with the establishment of 
the State Security Agency30 as a separate department. This was when the various 
state security branches were amalgamated into one body; a ministerial directive 
was issued subsequently to establish the „Central Operative Registry of Anti-
Democratic Elements" and, parallel with this, to abolish all the other registries 
that had operated separately before. The directive also made provisions for the 
arrangement of the documents created during the investigative, intelligence and 
counter-intelligence work so as to form a single operative, hierarchical system 
of dossiers, to replace the filing system used earlier. This was accompanied by 
personal files placed in a central, operative registry. Within the department, a 
30 Államvédelmi Hatóság - State Security Agency's. Hereafter: SSA. The State Security 
Office (ÁVH) was set up in September 1948, under the control of the Interior Ministry. Its legal 
predecessors were the Political Security Department (PRO, 1945) and the State Security 
Department of the Interior Ministry's State Police (ÁVO, 1946), which had been headed by 
communist officials even in the coalition period. The PRO'S main task had been to purge Hungary 
of the remnants of Nazism. Its brief was extended after the November 1945 general elections to 
waging a struggle against „reactionary elements". Its headquarters were at Andrássy (later 
Sztálin) út 60 (6th District), which had earlier been the „House of Fidelity" where Ferenc Szálasi's 
fascist Arrow-Cross Party had been based. Later it moved to the tower block in Jászai Mari tér 
(5th District), popularly known as the „White House". The ÁVO and later the ÁVH played a 
decisive part in preparing and conducting show trials during the struggles accompanying the 
communist take-over. Its activity was supervised and controlled by members of the Soviet state 
security service, the NK.VD (later the KGB), acting as advisers to its leaders. After the 
communists took power in 1948, the ÁVH was treated as the army or „fist" of the ruling HWP. 
The ÁVH at the peak of its power (1949-53) functioned as a separate authority formally 
responsible to the Council of Ministers (government). However, its sole chief in reality was the 
party general secretary, Mátyás Rákosi. Apart from the security police, the ÁVH included an 
18,000-strong Army Border Guard (the „Green ÁVO") and the military intelligence. It also 
contained an Internal Force, a corps for keeping order within the service, established after the 
Soviet pattern. The ÁVH assumed the task of guarding important party and state buildings and 
several forced-labour and internment camps, including Recsk and Kistarcsa. Between 1950 and 
1953, the ÁVH took proceedings against about 650,000 people. The dreaded Gábor Péter, who 
headed the organization from 1945 until his arrest in January 1953, carried out faithfully every 
order from Rákosi. In 1953, Imre Nagy's first government attempted to place the ÁVH under 
Interior Ministry control again. During the 1956 revolution, the deep antipathy for the Stalinist 
system felt by Hungarian society manifested itself most of all in hatred of the ÁVH and the 
lynching of some „AVO" men. Some ÁVH units and officers fought against the rebels alongside 
the Soviet troops. The Nagy government fulfilled one of the main demands of the revolution on 
October 28, 1956 by disbanding the ÁVI-I. This was confirmed on 7 November by the Kádár 
government in an Interior Ministry order, although most of its members continued to work for the 
state-security (later the political investigation) department of the police until 1961. ZINNER, 
TIBOR: System of Kádár-repression. Hamvas Institute, Bp., 2001. 39-61. pp. 
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central, operative archive was created, to which the (already closed) documents 
produced either at the central state security agency or the counties' own state 
security agencies had to be submitted for archiving. Parallel with this, the 
operative registry department took over from the Ministry of Justice the 
documents produced by the people's tribunals between 1945 and 1949. 
Although the Interior Ministry was spared from the task of having to 
manage the operative archives before 1953, i.e. during the period that the SSA's 
functioned independently, later on the directives issued by the heads of the state 
security agencies between 1950 and 1953 were added to the Collection of 
Directives; what is more, even the documentation of the transfer has survived. 
By contrast, the fact that the documentation of the transfer refers to 
considerably more items than the archives actually contain, poses a serious 
problem. The directives are mostly related to the organizational procedures of 
the SSA, the changes in the rules and regulations, as well as personal files and 
disciplinary measures, while information about the activities of the SSA is 
rather scarce. 
In 1953, the Interior Ministry's tasks traditionally associated with the 
management of the public administration were gradually dwindling; at the same 
time, the process, which began in 1949 with the structural independence of the 
state security apparatus, came to a full circle with its re-affiliation to the Interior 
Ministry in 1953, in the course of which the Interior Ministry effectively had 
become a ministry of policing. As a result, the various organizational divisions 
- in reference to the growing need for alertness and secrecy, as revealed by the 
Collection of Directives itself - became more and more reluctant to exchange 
information even „within the house", while the number of qualified staff with a 
comprehensive grasp of the entire ministerial structure rapidly declined. It is 
understandable that not even the Interior Ministry's Secretariat was in a position 
to take advantage of its legal licenses laid down in the rules and procedures 
regulating the handling of documents after the 1950s; in other words, it was 
unable to carry out the work of the central organization, direction and 
supervision of document handling itself. 
By issuing directive No. 25 of August 29, 1956, the IM's (Interior 
Ministry's) deputy minister in charge regulated the tasks related to the archiving 
and discarding of documents found at the IM's central state security agencies, 
which was extended to the documents held by the various IM branches with 
directive No. 25/1. According to the instructions, the large volume of archived 
documents „only imposed a burden, at the time when paper was such an 
important commodity from the viewpoint of the people's economy."31 
According to the instructions, the files deposited in the archive by the state 
security organizations between December 31, 1945 and December 31, 1955 
were to be revised first - with the exception of those documents which had been 
placed in the operative files. In the case of the other IM branches, the timeframe 
31 IM CA 41. box. (Hereafter b.) No. 10-2200/1956. 
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for the revision would have been set between January 1, 1947 and December 
31, 1953. In both cases, the process of discarding documents was scheduled to 
take place between October 1, 1956 and January 1, 1957. The IM Secretariat 
was entrusted with the tasks of managing and supervising the process; however, 
the events of the 1956 Revolution obviously foiled the execution of the plan. 
In his communiqué dated July 12, 1958," the head of the IM Secretariat 
disapprovingly noted that according to the findings „several IM branches have 
failed to comply with instruction no. 185/1951. (X. 23) ordering the storing and 
discarding of documents, issued by the Council of Ministers". The person 
issuing the communiqué furthermore concluded that there were no archives set 
up at the IM and its affiliated branches, which led to inappropriate practices in 
the handling and the storage of documents. To cap it all, at several branches „a 
large number of documents have been destroyed in an irresponsible manner 
after the counter-revolutionary events: documents that had survived the events 
and the protection of which had been made compulsory by the above mentioned 
directive of the Council of Ministers." 
In the interest of registering, sorting and discarding the documents, the head 
of the IM Secretariat ordered the reorganization of the Central Archives' work 
in 1959, drawing up the guidelines of the Archives' operation for the entire 
length of the period under discussion". According to this, the IM Central 
Archives undertook the handling and storage of all the IM documents, which 
were indispensable to the operation of the IM branches, or which had 
significance from a historical or academic viewpoint. For this purpose, the 
Central Archives was designated to handle and store all the documents that the 
IM central organizations had deposited in their archives for more than three 
years - a time window later modified to ten years - and had revised for 
discarding; the Central Archives was also appointed to direct and supervise the 
archiving and discarding work of the IM branches. 
At every central organization of the Interior Ministry, the IM Secretariat 
ordered the periodical revision of all the documents that were more than three 
years old - in some cases even more recent ones - for the purpose of weeding 
out unneeded material, which would then be handed over to the Central 
Archives. The documents that were not filed in the central registry, along with 
the papers of the secretariats of the minister and the deputy ministers, as well as 
of the documents produced by the political police, were to be sorted out 
according to different subject headings before the handover; the transfer of the 
documents classified as „Top Secret" was preceded by an item-by-item check. 
The documents deposited in the Central Archives also had to be filed according 
to different subject-headings - „in the interests of ease of retrieval". The central 
branches were also required to send to the Central Archives one copy of each of 
the newspapers, magazines, announcements and brochures that they had 
32 IM CA 56. b. No. 10-2502/1958. 
33 IM CA 63. b. No. 10-762/2/1959. 
Documents on the dictatorship and the cold war in the Hungarian archives - 27 
ordered, which would then be sorted branch by branch and according to date of 
publication. 
The Secretariat ordered the maintenance of two different types of 
catalogues. One cataloguing system was according to subject-matter for every 
branch on a year-by-year basis, accompanied by a list of contents and an index-
card for every item. This cataloguing system was used for the following 
documents: 
- directives, instructions; 
- minutes of national conferences; 
- annual, monthly, etc. reports on the work accomplished and the execution 
of various assignments; 
- background reports; 
- reports on inspection results; 
- statistical reports; 
- e d u c a t i o n materials (professional, political); 
- materials related to the elections; 
- documentation of the construction projects; 
- architectural documentation of IM buildings; 
- the papers of the secretariats of the minister and the deputy ministers; 
- the documents of the political police. 
The other cataloguing system was based on a registry book. In this case, the 
documents were filed according to the same system that had been used for their 
original processing. In the Central Archives the documents were filed according 
to their serial number, arranged in an annual breakdown - complete with the 
registry book and a list of subject-headings. This system was mainly used for 
personnel files, disciplinary procedures, police supervision cases, internment 
cases and rehabilitation cases. 
In addition to managing the documents stored there, the Central Archives 
was burdened with the extra task of having to supervise the documents of the 
IM central organizations handled and stored outside the operative departments; 
on top of that, it had to handle the IM documents deposited at the Hungarian 
National Archives and the Institute of the Workers' Movement. As if that was 
not enough, it had to organize the shipping of the documents discarded by the 
IM organizations to the paper factory for recycling. Access to documents 
deposited at the Central Archives was only allowed to people who were able to 
show an official permit signed by the Head of Department - a time limit on the 
length of loans had to be negotiated by the parties. In the case of civil 
organizations, access to, or borrowing of, the documents required a permit 
signed by the Head of the Secretariat. 
The other sensitive area in external relations was manifested in relation to 
the Central Archives and the archival work, most notably in the acquisition of 
documents. Statutory rule 27 of 1969 on the organizational structure and on the 
protection of archive material was also extended to cover this particular area of 
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archival work. This statutory rule required that all legal corporations producing 
documents had to devise procedural rules and regulations regarding the 
handling of documents, accompanied by a plan scheduling the tasks of 
archiving, which together formed the basis of document handling procedures. 
The archival schedule specified the period of storage and, in the case of 
documents that could not be destroyed, also the time of archiving. It was on this 
basis that the handling and storage of the documents had to be organized, the 
supervision of which was assigned to the Hungarian National Archives in the 
case of the IM Central Archives. In principle, this authorization would have 
guaranteed a strict regulation in the case of documents designated for archiving, 
and would also have preserved them from destruction before their archival 
deposition. However, in practice the execution of this task turned out to be less 
well organized, owing both to the inadequate training of the personnel and to 
the lack of appropriate technical conditions. On the one hand, there were not 
enough archivists qualified to do this work, and on the other hand the storage 
capacity turned out to be insufficient. 
The above mentioned report by the Committee for Document Survey shed 
light on a number of strange anomalies. After the end of the 1960s, the Interior 
Ministry flatly rejected any suggestions made by the National Archives, 
opposing almost every attempt by the latter to establish any sort of working 
relationship. Although in 1972 the National Archives described as ineffectual 
the Ministry's rules and regulations for document handling, its criticism turned 
out to be completely wasted in view of the fact that the Ministry of Education 
finally decided to approve it. Later on, the representative of the Archives was 
received only after drawn-out negotiations, and in the best of cases was „able to 
get as far as Head of the Document Handling Sub-Department, but never 
allowed to go even near the archives." It turned out that in its procedures of 
discarding documents the Interior Ministry not only disregarded the statutory 
rules, but occasionally failed to observe even the rules laid down in its own 
internal regulations and circular memorandums. In such procedures they failed 
to take into account the viewpoints of archivists, which was manifested in the 
fact that the opinion of the relevant archives were not sought out beforehand; 
presumably, „they gave priority to the requirement of vigilance, which, 
although not always a consistent policy, fitted in with the official political line 
and system of management of the period". Regardless of all that, the possibility 
cannot be excluded - the report continues - that occasionally a qualified 
archivist also took part in the work of supervising the discarding of documents, 
although „that person generally was appointed at the explicit request of the 
Interior Ministry". 
2. By now it has become patently clear that such methods of legal regulation 
infringed the citizens' right and the fundamental principles of law even 
according to the then existing Constitution. In accordance with that 
Constitution, „The People's Republic of Hungary guarantees the personal 
w 
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freedom and privacy of its citizens and respects the sanctity of private 
correspondence and private home." After the democratic changes, the 
Constitutional Court put a definite end to the central administration's aspirations 
to establish norms through non-legal means. It rejected in principle the legality 
of the practice of laying down norms with the help of decrees and authoritative 
statements as being a method of regulation that crosses various types of 
organizations.34 
Known as ,,IM directives," the commands issued by the Interior Ministry 
constituted the highest-level administrative and legal means for the direction 
and management of the IM branches. Before 1990, the right to issue such 
directives was basically reserved for the minister, the under-secretary, the 
deputy ministers, the deputy department heads, the head of the IM Secretariat, 
the national (Government Guard) commanders and the departmental heads. 
However, the Collection of Directives also contained other types of commands. 
These include ministerial decrees, which - unlike the directives - counted as 
statute laws. Usually ministerial decrees served to regulate the manner of 
implementing higher-level legislation and to define the tasks of various 
branches, along with addressing questions pertaining to the direction and 
management of the work at the IM and the technical execution of tasks. Before 
1990, only the minister, the under-secretary and the deputy ministers 
specifically appointed by the minister were entitled to issue ministerial decrees. 
Also included in the Collection of Directives were the so-called „legal 
guidelines," which did not have the status of statute laws. These guidelines or 
statements of principles were published in order to aid the interpretation and 
application of lower-level statute laws. The directives, instructions and legal 
guidelines issued jointly with other organizations - such as the Attorney 
General, the Ministry of Defense, and the National High Command of the 
Workers' Militia - formed a separate group within the Collection of Directives. 
In order to obtain a better insight into the internal structure of the Collection 
of Directives, we must take a closer look at those legal instruments which are 
referred to as „legal sources" in the ministerial decrees, legal guidelines and IM 
directives. On January 13, 1976, the Interior Ministry issued a decree which 
determined the procedural rules relating to the issuing of such documents of 
legal force35. This covered the entire range of ministerial decrees, legal 
guidelines, and IM regulations. A ministerial decree constituted a statute law. 
The aim of the legal guidelines, which did not qualify for the status of statue 
laws and were formulated either as guidelines or as statements of principles, 
was to assist in the interpretation and the application of statute laws, either 
comprehensively or on specific points. 
The crucial significance of issuing the above mentioned decree lay in the 
fact that Statute Law 24 of 1974 on the proclamation and promulgation of 
34 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary No. 60/1992. (XII. 17.) 
35 IM CA 174. b. No. 10-21/1/1976. 
3 0 - BÉLA RÉVÉSZ 
statute laws, along with the ministerial decree 1063/1974 (XII. 30.) on the 
technical details of implementation, pressed for the introduction of standard 
procedures at the various ministries. The instruction applied to ministerial 
instructions, legal guidelines and IM directives, replacing the ministerial 
instruction 01/1965 on the same subject.36 
During the period in question, a ministerial decree had the status of a statute 
law; its purpose was to normalize the mode of execution of legal acts of higher 
order, as well as to regulate various other areas, such as the tasks of certain 
organizations and the questions relating to the direction and management of 
work at the Interior Ministry and the technical execution of the tasks. The 
minister, the under-secretary and the deputy ministers appointed by the minister 
were entitled to issue such decrees. Within their own sphere of authority, the 
under-secretary and the deputy ministers issued ministerial decrees to regulate 
the questions relating both to the Interior Ministry as a whole and to the work of 
the organizations under their control. 
De iure, the legal guidelines issued in connection with the interpretation and 
application of statute laws, which took the form of either guiding principles or 
statements of principles, did not qualify for the status of statute law. Guiding 
principles were issued by the minister, the under-secretary and the deputy 
minister, whenever it was necessary to provide either a comprehensive 
interpretation of a statue law or a definition of the main principles in the 
application of the law. 
Besides the persons occupying the above mentioned posts, the list of people 
entitled to issue statements of principle included the deputy heads of the main 
divisions, the head of the IM Secretariat, the national (Government Guard) 
commanders, the deputies of the high command, the divisional heads and the 
heads of independent departments, whenever the need arose to interpret parts of 
a statue law (rather than the whole) or to define standard procedures in the 
application of the laws. The IM's legal means to direct and manage the Interior 
Ministry - directives, regulations, procedural orders, actions, memorandums -
did not qualify for the status of statute law. 
As we have already mentioned, the Collection of Directives was not 
comprised entirely by directives in the strict sense of the word. As the most 
general form of executive commands, these directives also included instructions 
regarding duty service, military discipline and order, as well as the personnel. 
From the minister down to the heads of independent departments, every leader 
had the right to issue directives. 
A code of procedures regulating the IM duty services had to be drawn up, 
which also covered the rules of conduct for IM personnel, along with their 
fundamental rights and duties; in addition, it also specified the general tasks of 
duty services, as well as some general rules regarding the activities of the 
36 IM CA 91. b. No 10-22/1/1965. 
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various ministerial branches, the invocation of which itself required a separate 
directive. 
The code of procedures defined the role of the IM branches within the 
organizational structure of the Interior Ministry, along with their professional 
competences; it also listed the tasks and the authority of the heads of department 
within that particular branch." 
The specific organizations were ordered to implement a statute law or an 
IM directive, or any action to be taken in a given case, by the departmental 
heads or commanders in a decree; memorandums were used to notify or inform 
the different branches and to assign tasks in connection with the actions to be 
taken. 
For special cases or war situations, the instruction specifically ordered that 
the decrees, legal guidelines and IM directives had to be prepared by the ,,M"38 
and the Organizational Division of the Interior Ministry. 
In the autumn of 1989, a decree by the Ministry of Culture gave clearance 
to all the documents which had been created more than thirty years prior to that 
time; at the same time, it defined the right to research in public archives as a 
natural right of every citizen. When the state archives were opened, the party 
archive of the then still one-party state followed suit, along with the army 
archive. Naturally, the decree did not affect those documents which had not yet 
been transferred to the archives, but stayed in the government offices where 
they had been created. The two largest collections of such documents belonged 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior Ministry. The former partially 
handed over its documents to the National Archives, although the restrictions on 
research have not been lifted. As for the Interior Ministry, it began to hand over 
documents on a massive scale in 1996. 
Department III of the IM's state security (III) division, designated to fight 
„internal reactionary subversion",39 was abolished in the spring of 1989. 
However, the intelligence, counter-intelligence, military counter-intelligence 
and technical departments were merged into the Bureau of National Security 
and the Bureau of Information, subordinated to the government, rather than the 
Interior Ministry. The new organizations took over tens of thousands of files 
containing the surviving documents of the IM, the possession of which they 
deemed „necessary for the operative work" - including nearly ten thousand 
already closed operative files and several thousands of recruitment files and 
work files. Although the Interior Ministry got rid of the tasks of state (or 
national) security after 1990, it inherited the complete registry of the state 
security services, as well as the documents that had survived the destruction of 
papers and had been declared to be worthless by the new national security 
37 Being voluminous by their nature, the codes of procedures were usually published in book 
format. 
38 ,,M": (military) mobilization. 
39 The Organization Chart of the State Security Service see Appendix 1. 
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organization. Taking up about 3,000 meters of shelf-space, this material 
constitutes more than a hundred thousand files. When the law on security 
screenings was modified in 1996, the way to the establishment of the History 
Department with the task of storing the former IM papers was opened. In the 
name of „information restitution," the law obliged the department to satisfy the 
public's demands. It also required the department to assist in the work of 
scientific research. 
A research group primarily dedicated to the institutional and organizational 
history of state security services was formed within the History Department. 
The Budapest-based Institute of 1956 launched a several-year-long research 
program to study the history of state security during the Kádár period. In 
addition, a number of diverse research programs dealing with particular aspects 
of the problem have been under way at various archival institutions such as the 
Archives of Military History, the Capital Archives of Budapest, the Archives of 
Political History and Trade Unions, and the Central Archives of the Hungarian 
Radio, the Central Archives of the Parliament, or the Archives of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. 
III. 
STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF RADIO FREE EUROPE IN HUNGARY40 
1. The era of a spectacular technological breakthrough in mass communications 
after the Second World War coincided with the period when the demand for 
Cold War ideologies and the war of doctrines was born. On both sides, direct 
political expectations were served by the media, voluntarily or otherwise. The 
opposing ideologies tried to win popular support for the unquestionable 
superiority of their own system of values both at home and abroad, in the 
broadest circle and with the greatest possible effectiveness.41 Throughout the 
Cold War, the task of winning „hearts and minds" around the world was of 
great importance to Soviet and American leaders. Both sides fought a cultural 
Cold War via radio waves, (later) television transmissions, propaganda, and 
other forms of psychological pressure. 
Of the various branches of the media, it was the currency of radio 
broadcasting that rocketed sky-high in particular; in theory, broadcasting 
stations could reach an unlimited number of listeners in the target countries, 
quickly and risk-free, and also, last but not least, in a relatively cost-effective 
way. With a slight exaggeration, we could even claim that this was the reason 
40 Revised version of a background study „Research Agenda for Studying the Effects of 
Radio Free Europe in Hungary" made for a conference on The Impact of Cold War Broadcasting 
was organized in October 2004 by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in the U.S. 
41 NELSON, MICHAEL: War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the 
Cold War. Syracuse University, 1997. 
u 
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why the 1950s were seen as the golden era of radio broadcasting.42 The number 
of programs broadcast over the borders multiplied. Each country was at the 
same time a target country for other states' radio stations and an active 
participant in this strange propaganda war through its own broadcasting 
activities. 
At the end of the 1940s, Hungary, bent on building the dictatorship of the 
proletariat at home, was actively engaged in this media war - in both capacities. 
The authorities tried to inform their potential audience, in Hungarian as well as 
in other languages and in countries near and far (from the Far East to South 
America), of the glorious achievements of both the people's democracies and 
the „camp of peace-loving nations". The foreign radio stations broadcasting in 
Hungarian were equally busy disseminating the news of the free world in 
Hungary. A memorandum prepared for the Politburo of the HWPP in late 1954 
summed up the situation as follows: „At the moment, we receive propaganda 
broadcasts from Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, London, Paris, the 
Vatican, Rome, Ankara, Madrid and Tel-Aviv. Broadcasting on 110 to 120 
different frequencies, the enemy wages a propaganda war against us in a total of 
150 to 160 hours a day."43 
Radio Free Europe, which had been on the air since the autumn of 1951, 
caused serious headache to the one-party state, and not just for the almost 
round-o-clock broadcasting on a large number of frequencies. The prime reason 
why this particular radio station was thought to be especially dangerous was 
that - save its direct propaganda - Radio Free Europe was able to present real 
news in the language of ordinary people. In an age when internal news 
broadcasting and public access to information were limited by the authorities, 
every alternative source of news - merely by the virtue of its existence -
questioned the unconditional acceptance of absolute and total power. It was 
even more dangerous, when the listeners' everyday experiences directly 
reconfirmed the authenticity of the alternative news of the „free world". 
Throughout the four decades that the Hungarian department of Radio Free 
Europe was broadcasting its programs, it attracted the closest attention of the 
political leadership of Hungary. In their efforts to discover what information 
had been leaked out about the internal affairs of Hungary's top leaders, the 
authorities relied on the media screening services of the Hungarian 
Broadcasting Bureau first and the Hungarian News Agency later. Furthermore, 
they also wanted to know about the events, information and facts that the public 
was able to learn, despite all the efforts by the state to retain information and 
spread disinformation. 
During the fifty years of one-party-rule in Hungary, the authorities 
developed and employed various strategies to counter the effects of hostile radio 
42 The phrase see BARNOUW, ERIK. A History of Broadcasting in the United States. New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1966. 167-170. p. 
43 Hungarian National Archives (hereafter HNA) M - K S - 2 7 6 . f. 54/350. o. e. 
broadcasting. These attempts included jamming the radio signals, putting spies 
on show trials and effecting the wholesale Marxist indoctrination of the public. 
a) In the 1950s, the authorities' aim was to completely block out radio 
broadcasts from the West with the means of technology. By the end of 1948, 
they had stopped the production, import and sale of radio sets capable of 
receiving hostile radio broadcasts, as they only allowed the production of the 
so-called „people's radio" suitable for the reception of the existing Hungarian 
radio programs.44 In the early 1950s, the government embarked on a program to 
build up a cable network. By the mid-1950s, there had been roughly half-a-
million households in Hungary, where the only program people could listen to 
was transmitted through the central receiver set up at either the local 
Communist party headquarters or the local government office.45 
Despite all these efforts, roughly one-third of the approximately one and a 
half million privately owned radio sets in Hungary were suitable for the 
reception of western radio broadcasts - mostly transmitted on short waves. In 
order to put an end to this, and to cover the entire range of hostile radio 
broadcasts, the people's democracies joined forces to set up a powerful 
jamming station in Eastern Europe.46 
b) From the mid-1960s, the party leadership stopped the jamming of radio 
broadcasts in Hungarian. Instead, they decided to launch a full-scale ideological 
offensive to combat the „enemy's subversive actions" with the help of political 
agitation and propaganda. A contemporary document issued by the Communist 
party distinguishes between four different forms of hostile propaganda by RFE: 
- destructive propaganda: designed to raise doubts as well as hostile, 
nationalist and anti-Soviet feelings; 
- thunderous propaganda: instead of dealing with fundamental issues, our 
politics and aims are attacked indirectly, in a blatant, repetitious and 
loud manner; 
- whispering propaganda: in order to generate an atmosphere of distrust, 
fabricated stories are spread as inside news before important events, 
often about the imminent replacement or appointment of public figures; 
- objective information: although this form of propaganda may contain bits 
and pieces of factually correct information, it is accompanied by hostile 
commentary; its aim is deliberate disinformation. 
Against such a coordinated strategy directed from the top and mobilizing 
substantial intellectual and material resources „we must act in every area with a 
44 HNA M-K.S-276. f. 55/18. o. e. 
45 HNA M-K.S-276. f. 54/119. o. e. 
46 HNA M-K.S-276. f. 89/256. 6. e. 
Documents on the dictatorship and the cold war in the Hungarian archives - 35 
well-planned, coordinated and scientifically well-founded program",'17 the 
contemporary party document concludes. 
c) On the third level of countering the effects of these radio broadcasts, the 
authorities resorted to the methods of criminal prosecution. The administrative 
measures and the weapon of criminal prosecution came to be used in the fight 
against the western radio broadcasting station at a time, when these radio 
stations were classified en masse as cover agencies for the intelligence services 
of western imperialist states. After that, any association with them - including 
the act of listening to them in a group - was made punishable under criminal 
law. Albeit with varying severity, the criminalization of the listeners of western 
radio stations continued all through the four decades.48 
The situation is faithfully illustrated by a document produced by the 
Ministry of Interior in the mid-1950s: „To measure directly the effectiveness of 
the RFE broadcasts, or to put a figure on the number of their listeners, would be 
difficult. Indirect estimates could be inferred from the fact that there are very 
few people in Hungary who have never heard of RFE; also, in almost every case 
of unlawful association, incitation, illegal border-crossing and spy 
investigations, references to the RFE broadcasts come up. It can also be 
concluded from the investigation of unlawful association cases that the 
reactionary or the wavering social groups regularly listen to the broadcasts, 
quite often in group. On the basis of all this, we must conclude that the RFE is a 
powerful weapon in the hands of the imperialists and, therefore, we must 
increase our activities against it in the area of both state security and 
propaganda."49 
Further research work in the fields of political sciences, media history and 
sociology is needed to uncover hidden facts and information germane to any 
studies about the activities and programs of Radio Free Europe and the relevant 
opinions and attitudes of the audience. Possible sources for such studies would 
include reports, accounts and interrogation transcripts produced by the Ministry 
of Interior in the course of investigating people charged with listening to the 
enemy's propaganda broadcasts and passing on the news. Despite their apparent 
biases, the documents produced by various top-level party organizations, as 
well as the regularly compiled reports on public morale for the party leadership, 
would be of paramount importance. 
Any study attempting to clarify the above mentioned problems would 
initially necessitate research fieldwork of the sources; held in various archives, 
these sources usually have not yet been researched; also, they are incomplete 
and only occasionally appear in registries. Through a number of documents 
selected from the few sources already researched, we wish to illustrate the more 
47 HNA M - K S - 2 8 8 . f. 5/401. ő. e. 
48 RÉVÉSZ, BÉLA: Criminalization of Proletarian Dictatorship's Ideological Function. Acta 
Jur. et Pol. Szeged, 1997. 
49 ÍM CA 36-213/1954. 
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important tendencies of this research, indicating that the first steps towards a 
comprehensive and systematic research have been made.50 
2. The most important institute for studying the history of RFE in Hungary is at 
the Open Society Archives.51 The prehistory of OSA started in 1949 with the 
post-war division of Europe. The local communist parties seized power in all of 
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe which were controlled and/or 
occupied by Soviet troops in 1944-45. Central and Eastern European emigrants 
- former politicians and influential public figures, once members of the 
domestic political, social, and cultural elite who had to leave their own 
countries due to these post-war political developments - decided to form a 
common organization, the Free Europe Committee (originally founded as the 
National Committee for a Free Europe). The initiative was approved and subtly 
encouraged by the US government. Thus, at the beginning the Free Europe 
Committee presented itself as a private organization. The activists tried to raise 
funds among people within the American upper and middle classes, and also 
among well-to-do emigrants who believed that the struggle against communism 
was of crucial importance. The declared aim of the Committee was to promote 
the „containment" doctrine of US foreign policy as well as to advance the 
liberation of the people under Soviet rule in Central and Eastern Europe by 
peaceful means.52 The Committee had a double task: it aimed to keep alive the 
public interest in the West towards the problems of their homelands, and at the 
same time they strived to maintain and reinforce the spirit of hope and 
resistance within the oppressed countries. Therefore, the Committee specialized 
in organizing research projects and conferences, accumulating information from 
behind the iron curtain from all available resources, and editing and publishing 
books, essay collections and information bulletins for the academic audience 
and for the broader public. The Committee set up an information center in New 
York which consisted of a small library and an archives that was continuously 
updated and enlarged." The archival center aimed to serve both the emigrant 
organizations and Western scholars, experts and decision-makers. However, the 
mere collection of information did not seem efficient, and was unsatisfactory 
for the founders. It became clear very early that the Committee had to find and 
50 An important step towards a complex and systematic research was a conference on cold 
war broadcasting impact organized by Hoover Institution and Cold War International History 
Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, with support from the Center for East European and Eurasian 
Studies, Stanford University in Stanford, California, October, 2004. in the following issues: 
- Goals and Content of Western Broadcasts - VOA, BBC, RIAS. 
- Impact of the Broadcasts: Estimating Audiences 
- Impact of the Broadcasts in Eastern Europe: Evidence from the Archives 
- Impact of the Broadcasts: Regime Countermeasures 
5 1 LESZEK PUDLOWSKI a n d IVAN SZEKELY: o p . c i t . 
52 See HOLT, ROBERT, T.: The Origins of Radio Free Europe. In Holt, Robert, T.: Radio Free 
Europe. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958, 9 -16 . pp. 
53 National Committefor the Free Europe. June I, 1949. ibid. 23. p. 
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take advantage of other means that might produce the desired effects upon the 
communist world. The real task was to break the information monopoly of the 
communist propaganda machinery within the Eastern bloc. Under the aegis of 
the Free Europe Committee several actions and projects were started that tried 
to spread information and propaganda among the people who lived „beyond" 
and were completely cut off from sources of real news and information - even 
about themselves and about their own lives. Two ways seemed feasible. The 
traditional type, widely used during the Second World War, involved dropping 
leaflets and other propaganda materials from jets or balloons. 
The experts and staff - editors, speakers, political analysts, archivists and 
librarians - were primarily recruited from among natives, many of whom were 
newcomers to the West. Former politicians, famous journalists and scholars 
who had left, or rather were forced to leave their own countries gravitated 
toward the Radios. The newly established national editorial desks of the Radios 
enjoyed a wide range of sovereignty in determining the structure and the 
content of their programs.54 Yet, the ultimate professional and political control 
still remained in the hands of the American supervisors, who were politically 
responsible and accountable for what was put on the air. The Directory Board 
regularly issued strategic and tactical guidelines that basically followed the 
actual directives of the US State Department. 
Radio Free Europe targeted the Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern 
Europe - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and (shortly) 
Albania - while Radio Liberty broadcast toward the Soviet Union. RL had 
services in most of the languages of the Soviet republics - in Baltic, Moldavian, 
Belarusian, Ukrainian and also in Caucasian languages and Turkic languages of 
Central Asia. In addition, they had services in Tartarian and Baskhirian as well. 
The embryonic forms of the various national research sections that were 
merged into the RFE/RL Research Institute in 1990 were established parallel 
with the Radios ' editorial desks in the early 50s. In 1959, the „research" 
function of the RFE news department was separated and the management 
established independent units reporting to each of the broadcast desks. As for 
Radio Liberation, the research section, which became the Soviet „Red" 
Archives, started working in 1953 and later remained administratively under the 
jurisdiction of the Radio Liberty.55 
The idea was that the research sections would serve the programming and 
editorial work of the national desks. Thus, some of the research units, for 
instance the Hungarian Unit, started functioning even a few months before the 
first programs were put on the air. The research activities were divided into 
national sections, which roughly meant that each national editorial desk was 
supported by native analysts and archivists who collected, arranged, interpreted 
54 Organization, personnel, and setting. Ibid, 30-56. pp. 
55 MICHIE, ALLAN A.: Voices through the Iron Curtain; the Radio Free Europe Story. New 
York, N. Y. Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963. 304. p 
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and transmitted the necessary up-to-date information for the editors. However, 
these units were not intended to operate indefinitely. Like the Radios 
themselves, they were supposed to be temporary establishments, which would 
operate until the collapse of communism within the Soviet satellite states. The 
prevalent opinion was that the collapse would come soon. This was why the 
founders of the research sections had not considered the establishment of a 
uniformly regulated archival machinery. At the beginning, the research staff 
worked on a day-by-day basis. Even rules for mandatory preservation had not 
been laid out. Without having a unified system and processing rules the national 
sections existed and functioned separately, but still parallel to each other. The 
lack of unified organization meant that the processing and organizational 
principles, the archival methodology, the code systems, the finding aids and the 
accessories of the national departments were almost accidental and 
differentiated slightly from each other, although some general features and 
characteristics could be detected.56 
In most cases the research units were separated into two independent parts: 
the research and analysis sections and the evaluation sections. The first worked 
directly for the Programming Section and for the national desks, and elaborated 
actual press analyses of domestic and Western publications on the political, 
economic and cultural issues of the target country. From 1952 (in some cases 
from 1956), the Evaluation and Research sections started to regularly publish 
Background Reports, which consisted of longer essays about actual events and 
about the political and social situations in several countries. Soon each country 
had its own Background Report bulletin written in English, making the 
information available for everybody at the Radios. 
In the beginning, the Background Reports were written on an ad hoc, 
irregular basis and concerned not only the five countries to which RFE 
broadcast but also Albania, the GDR, Yugoslavia, the non-ruling communist 
parties of the West, and East-West political relations. Later, the periodicals 
were prepared with an increasing frequency, until they became monthly, then 
bi-weekly periodicals, Situation Reports that were written separately for each of 
the eight countries. 
During the early period, the work of the Evaluation Sections seemed to be 
more important than research on printed and electronic sources. Their task was 
to analyze and evaluate reports and interviews sent to Munich by the local Field 
Offices. The series of these reports became known as Items. The Items were 
recorded in Western refugee camps and immigration offices by the agents of the 
field offices located in several European capitals and major cities. On the 
letterhead of the Items Roman numbers identified the office from which the 
report was sent to the center in Munich: I. was Munich, II. was Stockholm, III. 
was West Berlin, IV. was Paris, V. was Athens, VI. was Rome, VII. was Linz, 
VIII. was Salzburg, IX. was Vienna, X. or XI. was Istanbul and XII. was 
56 Policy formulation and programing. HOLT: op. cit. 57-62. pp. 
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London. The best and most reliable reports not surprisingly arrived from the 
field offices located in Linz, Salzburg and Munich, where the biggest refugee 
camps functioned and the most effective information control could be exercised. 
Unlike pre-elaborated questionnaires, the Items contained complete stories as 
told by the „source". The structure of each information Item was as follows: 
source, date, evaluation summary, evaluation comment and text." 
The idea was quite interesting: the field offices surrounded the communist 
bloc like „military bases" and conducted information warfare. On the other 
hand, it was even more characteristic that the Radios tried to base the 
information acquisition on „independent" sources. But the within communist 
countries which all operated a centralized propaganda machine, only the 
information received from average people, i.e. the refugees, seemed to be 
independent and reliable. That practice could also be interpreted as a 
demonstrative gesture of the democratic commitment of the Radios: while the 
communist regimes used politics and propaganda against their own people, 
RFE/RL based its work upon and in favor of the very same people. 
These stories were not taken completely at face value, The primary task of 
the evaluation sections was to control them: the experts tried to compare details 
of these stories to the information received from other sources (domestic radio, 
official press or other Items). They also tried to filter out the elements of 
exaggeration, personal revenge etc. At the national research units, the reports 
were carefully checked for accuracy and plausibility. Only those reports which 
passed the various filtering systems were recommended as subjects to be used 
in producing radio programs. Collection of the Items went on until 1972, when 
the scandal over RFE/RL broke out in the US Congress.58 Then the Radio 
leadership, urged by the higher authorities in the US, decided to destroy them. 
In the early period the Items were among the most important sources of 
information. The other main source was the Monitoring Department, also 
established at the beginning. Every day the Radios' staff monitored and 
recorded the programs of the official state radios of the target countries. The 
recorded broadcasts were transcribed, and the editors found a copied selection 
on their desks each morning. 
It was quite natural that the Radios acquired information from other radios, 
and the daily reports compiled from the Radios' monitoring served as a source 
of information, though not exclusively or primarily, since those were produced 
from totalitarian propaganda. They rather served as references: they contained 
the „facts" that RFE and RL had to know in order to battle communism 
effectively. The monitoring provided a clear picture of the elements and 
57 See SEBODE, GERHARD: Hungarian Refugees in Germany. IM CA 1-a-950/1964. 
58 The right to know: report of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio 
Broadcasting. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973. 91 p. Quoted by 
BORBÁNDI, GYULA: Magyarok az Angolkertben: a Szabad Európa Rádió története. Európa, Bp. 
1996, 365. p. 
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phenomena that the official propaganda in the Eastern bloc wanted to 
emphasize on the one hand, and what it wanted to hide on the other. RFE/RL 
particularly concentrated upon just these elements. In this little game of 
propaganda and counter-propaganda, RFE/RL and the communist radio stations 
always responded, reflected, and even indirectly edited each other's programs.59 
During this period the traditional archival work of collecting and arranging 
information from the printed and electronic media perhaps was not a focus of 
the Research and Evaluation Sections of the Radios (although the situation was 
probably different in the various national sections). However, these kinds of 
archival activities had started from the beginning, and became increasingly 
systematic and important. The processing of written sources, Western and 
Eastern newspapers, and news agency reports was initially based on a Card File 
system covering various subjects, including institutions and persons. The basic 
references were recorded cards that indicated the original sources, which could 
be traced back with the help of the cards. 
In the 50s the collection of news clippings was rather accidental.60 The 
archivists and researchers mostly relied upon the cards, together with the 
material in the newspaper and periodical collection cited by the cards. But soon 
a more sophisticated subject clipping system was requested, and this enabled 
the archives to fulfill demands of the national desks much more rapidly.61 
After the first few years the management of the archives became more and 
more professional. The experiences of the Hungarian and Polish uprisings in 
1956 brought about the major changes in this respect. These historic events 
made clear both the importance and the responsibility of the Radios in the 
region, and also proved that this venture would not be merely a temporary one. 
It became clear that communism would stay in these countries, and the division 
of Europe was a long-term historical phenomenon.62 This new recognition 
invoked the reorganization of the Radios and the research units as well. 
From 1958 on, the structures of the latter were reorganized step by step, as 
the traditional archival work became more and more important in information 
acquisition. This shift of emphasis from accidental sources to regular ones 
required a much more organized system for processing information. The various 
national sections elaborated their own filing system (the Subject Code system), 
according to which they clipped, arranged and processed the documents and 
data coming from printed and electronic media. Additionally, at this time the 
operational structure of research and evaluation was unified, and the systematic 
collection and processing of the Subject Files and biographical clippings really 
50 CRITCHLOW, JAMES: Radio hole-in-the-head/Radio Liberty: an insider's story of Cold War 
broadcasting. Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1995. passim. 
60 It was more systematic in the case of the archives of RL, the „Red" Archives. 
„The Hungarians have worked out a special rotation system of handling important 
speeches so that programing can have them immidiately." HOLT: op. cit. 99. p. 
62 „The most serious charge that has been made against RFE is that it has incited listeners to 
suicidal action.". Ibid: 206. p. 
— — 
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started. The general policy was to file the same article under all of the relevant 
subject titles as well as in the Biographical Files if the article concerned a 
relevant person. The result was an extremely effective and sophisticated 
network of information in which data and problems could be identified and 
approached via divergent routes. This was also the time when the separate 
national archives gained a predominantly similar structure. The same elements 
could be found in all of the national subfonds: Subject Files, the series of 
Background Reports and Situation Reports, Biographical Files, Press Surveys 
and Monitoring Files.63 
The research units64 operated until the mid-90s. During 45 years of 
continuous activity, they accumulated an archives of millions of documents 
both in paper and micro-format about the Soviet Union and the former Eastern 
bloc. The amount of archival materials exceeds 2,500 linear meters, despite the 
unfortunate fact that the research sections regularly sorted out parts of the 
collections that were supposed to be irrelevant in the future. After more than 
four decades the archives became the major source of information about the 
post-war history of the region. In the meantime, communism collapsed with an 
unexpected rapidity, and this changed the role of the RFE/RL Archives and 
redefined its function and mission.65 From an information database that served 
the programming needs of an electronic medium with the ultimate purpose of 
undermining the communist regimes, the materials of the Research Institute 
became an archives, a historical collection of the bygone communist regimes, a 
product of and a memorial to communism. 
The core collection of the Open Society Archives, the documents and 
records accumulated by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are the residue of the 
Cold War, remnants of the longest propaganda war in modern history.66 The 
documents in part were produced and collected in order to aid and cover a large 
covert operation of the agencies that stood behind, and at the same time helped, 
the work of the Radios. 
The holdings of the Open Society Archives are both smaller and more 
extensive than the Radios' original archive.67 Not everything came to Budapest 
from Munich and New York when, after the end of the Cold War - when the 
Radios had fulfilled their original mandate and made themselves obsolete - the 
US Congress decided to downsize the operation and cut the budget. The final 
destination of the „Corporate Archive" - the administrative documents, the 
correspondence between the Radios and the different offices of the American 
63 MICKELSON, SlG: America's other voice: the story of Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty. New York: Praeger, 1983. passim. 
64 From 1990 the unified Research Institute 
65 See Arch, Puddington: Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty, University of Kentucky, 2000. 
66 See LINDAHL, RUTGER: Broadcasting across borders: a study on the rote of propaganda in 
external broadcasts. (Goteborg studies in politics 8.) Goteborg: C W K Gleerup, 1978. 
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government, as well as the directives sent to the Radios - was the Hoover 
Archive at Stanford. OS A does not have the still-classified, partly CIA 
documents, which could testify about „one of the [CIA's] most successful 
covert operations" as a well-informed insider addressed the Radios 
retrospectively. The core of the collection under the ground in Budapest is a 
typical product of the Cold War period: it does not directly reveal much about 
the organization that produced the documents, but one can learn much 
inferentially by studying the materials the Radios and the agencies behind them 
had collected and stored. 
The programs, or „production tapes" the different desks of the Radios had 
produced did not come to OSA, but instead remained for the time being at the 
Radios, which moved to Prague in 1995. A large number of the copies of the 
Polish and Hungarian radio programs were later donated to Polish and 
Hungarian national archives,68 and a plan to copy the Russian language 
programs and donate the copies to an institution in Russia has not yet been 
abandoned. The destination of the transcripts of the so-called „monitoring 
tapes", however, was Budapest. 
Besides collecting clippings from Central and Eastern European official 
newspapers, diplomatic post reports, interviews with refugees from the region, 
descriptions by tourists and sensitive and clandestine information with the help 
of different intelligence agencies, the Radios closely followed the events in the 
so-called „target countries" by listening to and recording the official radio 
broadcasts coming through the air from the communist world. The broadcasts 
were then transcribed during the night, and by the time the programs resumed in 
the early morning, the transcripts were already on the tables of the people in 
charge of the political and ideological direction of the programs.69 The Radios 
immediately reacted to the news coming from behind the iron curtain, where, at 
the same time, agents working for the other side, for the communist 
jamming/monitoring stations, listened attentively to the broadcasts of the 
„enemy stations" like Radio Vatican, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, Radio 
Free Europe, Radio Liberty and, later, Radio Tel-Aviv, Radio Tirana, Radio 
Peking and others as well. 
Monitoring the „enemy broadcasts" was made difficult by the political need 
to jam the very same programs at the same time. Jamming took either the form 
of transmitting a continuous noise on the same frequency as the „enemy 
station", or broadcasting a mixture of speech, music, and atmospheric noise 
designed to overwhelm the incoming broadcast. According to the one-time 
director of the Hungarian secret jamming agency, right before 1956, each day 
218 hours of enemy broadcasting trespassed the Hungarian airwaves on 214 
A duplicate set of the texts and recordings of the RFE Hungarian Service from 1952 
through October 1993 has been transferred to NSL in Budapest. See I. Chapter, 2. 3. 
69 „Monitoring can be looked upon as the 'ear ' of RFE - a large, sensitive, mechanical ear 
that picks up the voices from behind the Iron Courtain." HOLT: op. cit. 98. p. 
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frequencies. The jamming agency, with the modest code-name „Post Office No. 
118", did not have the capacity to jam all incoming programs, and even if it had 
possessed the necessary technical means, it would not have been allowed to do 
so, as a consequence of the need to monitor the enemy broadcasts.70 During the 
night, while the transcribers worked at RFE/RL, scribers were busy transcribing 
the recorded programs of the enemy stations inside secret offices in the 
communist countries. The transcripts were delivered in due time to desks in the 
ministries of interior, the offices of the secret police and the propaganda and 
agitation department of the party headquarters. Orders and directives were sent 
in turn to the official media including the radio stations: how to respond to the 
propaganda of the enemy, 
Looking at the archives of the national news agencies of the former 
communist countries or the archives of the former secret police, one would find 
the recorded or transcribed versions of those program tapes that did not come to 
Budapest with the core collection. OSA and these secret archives together form 
a full and peculiar picture of the way the Cold War, communism, the West, and 
the East were jointly fashioned and produced by the enemy Radios and the 
national radios of the „target countries". There was a constant, ongoing dialogue 
in the air with both sides reflecting on the recorded, transcribed and analyzed 
propaganda of the other. What the secret listeners, who tried to comprehend the 
broadcasts behind the constant curtain of noise perceived about their world, 
about communism, was in large part supplied by the descriptions they gathered 
from the „enemy radios", RFE/RL being most prominent among them. RFE/RL 
conceived its programs largely as a response to the programs produced behind 
the iron curtain. 
OSA acquired a few amateur tapes with records of RFE programs recorded 
inside the „target countries", that preserved the noise of the jamming. 
Superimposed on the voices in the programs, covering the message, is the noise 
that was transmitted in order to neutralize, to eliminate and to erase all meaning. 
Instead of erasure, instead of an acoustic black hole, however, the result turned 
out to be noise as message, as meaningful information: „for despite the death it 
contains, noise carries the order in itself; it carries new information. This may 
seem strange. But noise does in fact create meaning: first because the 
interruption of a message signifies the interdiction of the transmitted meaning, 
and signifies censorship and rarity; second, because the very absence of 
meaning in pure noise or in the meaningless repetition of a message, by 
unchanneling auditory sensations, frees the listener's imagination... The 
presence of noise makes sense and makes meaning. It makes possible the 
70 Author's interview with Gusztáv Gogolyak on 26 March, 1996. See BÉLA RÉVÉSZ: 
Political Persuasion in the First Period of „Cold War". Hungary and the „Radio Free Europe" 
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 6 . Acta Jur. et Pol., Szeged, 1996. 5 8 - 6 4 . p. 
Noise: The Political Economy of Music. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
1985. 33. p. Quoted by István Rév. Just Noise. A lecture given at a conference on The Impact of 
Cold War Broadcasting was organized in October 2004 by the Hoover Institution at Stanford 
University in the U.S. (Manuscript). 
72 See LÉVESQUE, JACQUES: The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern 
Europe. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997. 
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creation of a new order on another level of organization, or a new code in 
another network."71 
The Open Society Archives houses thousands pieces of carefully assembled 
information, obtained, collected and smuggled out in clandestine ways from 
countries with rulers who tried to hermetically seal them and isolate them from 
the other side, from the outside world. Most of the information stored 
underground, on levels minus-1 and minus-2 in Budapest, is blatant and obvious 
lies: forged election results, forged production statistics, forged birth and death 
rates, doctored maps and photographs and censored descriptions of events that 
never happened. Analysts at the Radios frantically searched for meaning behind 
the stereotypical topoi, trying to decode the allegedly coded messages, since it 
was difficult to imagine that anyone of sound mind - even in a completely 
boring totalitarian regime - would produce such unbelievable stories, news and 
information. But the cryptanalysis was in most cases done in vain: there was 
nothing behind the message; the message, as in the case of the noise, was the 
information itself. 
Communism was built on, and eventually ruined by, such metatruths: on 
noises that warned the listeners that the jamming agency, the Party was there -
even in the air, controlling not only the propaganda of the enemy but the eager 
listeners as well. Yes, the Party was there but paralyzed; capable only of making 
a cacophony in the air, merely creating the appearance of being there. If one 
wants to learn the truth about communism, the truth about the Cold War, the 
world of propaganda and appearances, and the most important reason for the 
Fall, an informed choice is to study this fake world, and the files and documents 
of which OSA is the guardian. 
Not all the documents in the holdings of the Open Society Archives testify 
about paralysis and impotence: the Russian, Polish and Hungarian samizdat 
collections prove that there were some who questioned the lies, who chose not 
to remain silent, who under the dark sky had hopes even against hope. The 
Archives however houses documentation not only of individual dissent but of 
open resistance, the sometimes naive, romantic, but nevertheless heroic 
attempts: the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956, Prague in 1968 and 
Poland, the strikes along the Baltic coastline, Solidarity.72 The documents from 
the Fall, the peaceful revolutions, the transition, the End, which resulted in the 
Archives move from Munich and New York to Budapest, to the basement of the 
Central European University which is itself a product of the abrupt and 
unexpected changes. 
m 
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OSA is not an archives frozen in time. It actively collects, solicits and 
acquires important collections and documents on the afterlife of communism 
and issues connected to human rights. This is why OSA houses the archives of 
Index on Censorship,73 this is why the records of the UN Expert Commission on 
war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia74 found a place in the Open 
Society Archives; this is why the decision was made to continue the monitoring 
activities of the Radios and systematically record the nightly news programs of 
Serb, Croat, and Bosnian television during the war in Yugoslavia.75 OSA has a 
growing collection of new materials, but like the core collection of RFE/RL, 
most of the newly acquired documents testify about despicable acts, cruelty, the 
breach of democratic rules of law and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other international humanitarian law. 
3. The radios came into being after World War II in response to the thousands 
of displaced persons throughout Western Europe, a large number of whom were 
housed in refugee camps in West Germany, while others had fled to Paris, 
London, New York, and Washington from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
in advance of the Red Army or as the result of communist takeovers. Many had 
been incarcerated in POW76 camps and refused to be repatriated to lands 
controlled by the Soviets after the war ended. 
As communist governments took over in Eastern Europe, the U.S. 
government realized that these émigrés represented a powerful force against 
their communist-controlled homelands and it recruited them as writers, 
speakers, and in other capacities to facilitate the return of democratic 
governments. 
George Kennan of the State Department asked Ambassador Joseph C. Grew 
to enlist prestigious civilians to lead an anticommunist organization dedicated to 
returning democracy to Eastern Europe,77 using the talents of the refugees. This 
organization, the National Committee for a Free Europe,78 later the Free Europe 
Committee, was established in 1949 with several objectives: find work for the 
democratic émigrés from Eastern Europe; put émigré voices on the air in their 
own languages; and carry émigré articles and statements back to their 
homelands through the printed word. These objectives were realized through the 
73 Records of the Index on Censorship OSA Fonds HU OSA 301. 
74 Records of the International Human Rights Law Institute Relating to the Conflict in the 
Former Yugoslavia. OSA Fonds HU OSA 304. !• j 
75 Video Recordings of the Proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. O S A Fonds HU OSA 319. J 
7 6 Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Servicemen. f j 
77 Letter from George Kennan to Joseph C. Grew, February 4. 1949. Quoted by HOLT: op. j j 
cit. 10. p. j; 
78 National Committee for a Free Europe (hereafter: NCFE). j 'j 
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establishment of a publishing division, Free Europe Press, and a broadcast 
division. Radio Free Europe.79 
The Crusade for Freedom 
Funded primarily by Congress through the CIA until 1972, the NCFE 
maintained a public identity as a private corporation of freedom-loving 
American citizens. A separate organization, the Crusade for Freedom, was 
formed in 1950 to promote the NCFE and to raise money for its activities. 
President Dwight Eisenhower announced, in a nationwide radio address: „The 
Crusade for Freedom will provide for the expansion of Radio Free Europe into a 
network of stations. They will be given the simplest, clearest charter in the 
world: Tell the truth.'"80 
The Crusade for Freedom took as its symbol a bell resembling the 
American liberty bell, designed by Walter Dorwin Teague of New York. It had 
a laurel wreath symbolizing peace encircling the top and a frieze of five figures 
representing the five races of humankind passing the torch of freedom. An 
inscription quoted Abraham Lincoln: „That this world under God shall have a 
new birth of freedom."81 
The 10-ton bell arrived from the British foundry of Gillett and Johnston to a 
ticker tape parade in New York City. The bell then visited 21 American cities, 
and people in every state were encouraged to sign Freedom Scrolls and 
contribute money for RFE. The bell then traveled to West Berlin, where it was 
permanently installed on United Nations Day, October 24, 1950. More than 
400,000 Berliners filled City Hall Square to witness the dedication ceremonies. 
General Lucius Clay, chairman of the Crusade for Freedom, gave a speech, then 
pushed the button that started the bell ringing. Its deep tones were heard 
throughout East Berlin and into East Germany. The East German Communist 
Party denounced the Freedom Bell, with Politburo member Hans Jendretsky 
warning, „The rope of the death bell will become the gallows rope for those 
who ring it."82 
Although the Crusade for Freedom never raised enough money to fund 
more than a small part of the RFE budget, its ubiquitous advertising, along with 
79 See National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., „Portion of Introductory Statement to the 
Press by Joseph C. Grew", June 1, 1949. (mimeo.) 1-2 . pp. Quoted by HOLT: op. cit.l 1. p. 
80 Quoted by BROADWATER, JEFF.: Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade. Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1992, 48. p. 
81 Lincoln never let the world forget that the Civil War involved an even larger issue. This he 
stated most movingly in dedicating the military cemetery at Gettysburg: „that we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain - that this nation, under God. shall have a new 
birth of freedom - and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth". Speech at Gettysburg, Nov. 19, 1863. Quoted by HELEN COTHRAN: 
Abraham Lincoln. San Diego, Calif. Greenhaven Press, 2002, 87. p. 
82 Quoted by CISSIE DORE HILL: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hoover 
Digest. 2001 .No. 4 .45 . p. 
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parades, public forums, and slogans such as „Fight the Big Lie with the Big 
Truth" and „Help Truth Fight Communism", served to mobilize American 
support for the Cold War.83 
The Early Broadcasts 
RFE initiated broadcasting when a 7.5-kilowatt shortwave transmitter, 
nicknamed Barbara and formerly used by the Office of Strategic Services 
during the war, was installed in West Germany at Lampertheim, near Frankfurt. 
On July 4, 1950, the first 30 minutes of news, information, and political analysis 
was sent to Czechoslovakia, to be followed later that year by programs to 
Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.84 
A larger transmission facility was completed the following year at 
Holzkirchen, near Munich, with the official inauguration on May 1 celebrating 
11.5 hours of daily broadcasting to Czechoslovakia. This inaugural date was 
chosen because May 1 - May Day - was a widely celebrated communist 
holiday honoring workers. According to C. D. Jackson, the president of the 
NCFE, „We thought that would be a good day to launch our station and to let 
some people know out loud, and quite loud, the difference between workers and 
slaves."85 Although the rhetoric moderated over the ensuing decades, the 
purpose of RFE and its sister station, Radio Liberty (RL), remained the same: to 
act as uncensored national media, offering an alternative to the highly censored 
Radio Warsaws and Radio Moscows of the communist world. 
RFE's broadcasts were produced in New York, sent to Europe, and 
transmitted from Lampertheim and Holzkirchen in West Germany. A European 
production site, however, was essential if broadcasts were to be timely. West 
Germany, sharing a border with Czechoslovakia, had the best location and was 
still occupied by American forces; Munich, the second-largest city within the 
U.S. zone, was a center for East European émigrés, many of whom had 
experience in writing, editing, broadcasting, and the technical aspects of radio. 
In November 1952, at a site on the edge of Munich's English Garden, RFE 
opened a complex with 22 studios, six control rooms (including master control, 
editorial, and technical spaces), and a maintenance service. 
Balloon Warfare 
While RFE programming was getting under way, the publishing arm of the 
NCFE was also busy. In 1951, Frank Wisner, the head of the Office of Policy 
Coordination, that section of the CIA responsible for RFE, inherited a stockpile 
of weather balloons left over from World War II. He immediately imagined a 
83 Ibid. 39. p. 
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flotilla of balloons dropping millions of leaflets produced by the Free Europe 
Press, whose job it was to produce documents about Eastern European affairs.86 
A trial project took place over a two-week period in 1951. The prevailing 
west to east wind patterns carried the hydrogen-inflated balloons sailing over 
the border of Germany, where they dropped their payload of more than 11 
million leaflets on Czechoslovakia.87 
Following Stalin's death in 1953, a series of demonstrations by factory 
workers in several eastern bloc countries encouraged the NCFE to try a 
coordinated four-day radio/balloon campaign called Operation Prospero. 
German civilian laborers readied 6,500 balloons and 12 million leaflets at 
launching sites near the Bavarian border village of Tirschenreuth. As leaflets 
fell, the Prague regime ordered jet fighter planes to shoot down the balloons 
(they hit only three). Meanwhile the leaflets dropped on isolated villages, where 
radios were rarities, as well as population centers. 
In 1954, RFE, calling itself the „voice of the opposition," urged regime 
leaders to give Czech and Slovak citizens a way to veto that year's election. 
Operation Veto developed a platform and 10 limited demands, all possible 
within the constraints of a communist state. Gummed stickers with the number 
10 were dropped by balloons, turning up on government walls, telephone 
booths, and the doors of police buildings. When voting took place, at least 5 
percent voted against the single slate of candidates by putting the number 10 on 
their ballot.88 
A Hungarian version of Operation Veto, named Operation Focus, was 
carried out in 1956; it was the last balloon project. A total of more than 300 
million leaflets had gone over the Iron Curtain.8' 
The first balloons were launched in August 1951 in an open field only 3 
miles from the Czechoslovak border, when the Free Europe Committee used the 
Free Europe Press (FEP) to print up millions of propaganda leaflets. This test 
operation was on a stand-alone basis, i.e., the balloons were not part of a 
coordinated programming effort with Radio Free Europe, The leaflets contained 
86 Projects was created in 1948. Soon afterwards it was renamed the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Wisner was told to create an organization that concentrated on „propaganda, 
economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and 
evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground 
resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of 
t h e f r e e w o r l d " . Q u o t e d b y NELSON, MICHAEL: o p . c i t . 3 7 . p. 
87 HOLT, R. T.: Operation from the Berlin to the Poznan riot. In HOLT. R. T. op. cit. 145-165. 
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such slogans as „A new hope is stirring," and „Friends of Freedom in other 
lands have found a new way to reach you".'0 
Famed American newspaper correspondent Drew Pearson was a major 
proponent of the balloon launching program in his US newspaper columns. He 
and C.D.Jackson, President of Free Europe Committee, and other prominent 
guests were in attendance. Weather research balloons, about four feet in 
diameter carrying „friendship" leaflets were launched into Czechoslovakia over 
a two week period. Each balloon carried about 3000 leaflets, and when the 
weather was favorable, about 2000 balloon were launched each night. In total, 
over 11,000,000 leaflets were dropped. Both the regime and citizens seemingly 
ignored the leaflets.91 
Though not politically successful, the FEC (and the CIA) gained valuable 
practical experience in balloon launching. Ballooning had become a cost-
effective means of delivering printed propaganda. FEP used different types and 
sizes of helium filled balloons from round to pillow shaped. Pillow balloons, for 
example, used a remarkable timing device: dry ice. Cartons filled with leaflets 
were attached to the bottom of the hydrogen-filled balloons. The loosely-
covered cartons were held upright through the use of envelopes containing dry 
ice. As the dry ice evaporated, the cartons tipped over, thus dropping the 
leaflets, To try and hit an intended population target, the balloon launchers 
developed an ingenious system that calculated the weight of the dry ice, the 
amount of hydrogen, weight of the leaflets, direction and velocity of the wind. 
FEP estimated that 500 balloons carrying 2 to 7 pounds of leaflets could be 
filled and launched hourly at the stations. 
The balloon launching, with coordinated Radio Free Europe programming, 
operations that followed were called „PROSPERO, „VETO," „FOCUS," and 
„SPOTLIGHT". Three major launching sites were constructed in Bavaria to 
launch the balloons in round-the-clock operations in good weather. The balloon 
launching station at Freyung, Bavaria, for example, had a plaque that read, in 
part, „Free Europe Press...permitting the addition of the written word to Radio 
Free Europe's spoken communications with the people behind the Iron Curtain." 
PROSPERO was the code name for the RFE balloon program in the 
summer 1953, when in a time span of only four days, 6,500 balloons with over 
12,000,000 RFE leaflets were launched into Czechoslovakia. The balloon 
launching started approximately at midnight on 13 July in the small Bavarian 
town Tirschenreuth. RFE broadcast news of the launching during the first news 
broadcasts at 6:00 AM. This was the first time balloons were launched in 
conjunction with specific radio programs. RFE was critical of the regime's just 
installed currency reforms. Included in the leaflets were aluminum replicas of a 
newly-introduced Czechoslovak coin. The Freedom Bell and the inscription, 
*il ii | 
11 
90 A leaflet illustrated is from „Operation Focus'' see Appendix II. 
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„Ali Czechs and Slovaks for Freedom - all the Free World for Czechs and 
Slovaks" were stamped on the coin replicas. 
The regime responded to PROSPERO by using military aircraft and anti-
aircraft weapons along the border to shoot down the balloons the day after the 
first launching. In fact on July 15, the FEP staff actually saw the military 
aircraft shooting down the balloons as they first crossed the border into 
Czechoslovakia. Police cars in Prague and elsewhere used loudspeakers 
ordering citizens to turn in all the leaflets. Both the Czechoslovak and Soviet 
media attacked this balloon program. Because of the violent reaction and the 
media attacks, RFE inadvertently discovered that the balloon program was more 
successful than first planned and paved the ground work for even greater 
balloon efforts with specific programming in the following years. 
For the first time, PROSPERO proved the value of combining the spoken 
word of RFE and written word of FEP for effective propaganda.02 
4. Jamming,93 as a radio protection tool 
4.1. E. H. Gombrich, one of the most influential art historians of the 
twentieth century, one-time director of the Warburg Institute in London, worked 
as a so-called monitor and later as a monitoring supervisor, between 1939 and 
1945 at the „Listening Post" of the B.B.C. In his Creighton Lecture in 1969 he 
summarized his experiences, later published under the title Myth and Reality in 
German War-Time Broadcasts. Gombrich claimed that „I am not sure that 
German home broadcasts ever got away from the basic conception of the 
loudspeaker as an amplifier of the political meeting. Throughout the first year of 
the war its professed highlights were the carefully managed relays of Hitler's or 
Goebbels' speeches which were invariably held in front of responsive and well-
drilled audiences".94 
Until the early 1960s the propaganda machinery of the Communist world 
tried hard to follow the German example: „People were encouraged to listen in 
groups, in factories and barracks, for the idea of the hearer alone in the privacy 
of his room and able even to switch off was anathema to this theory."95 In the 
first half of the 1950s in East and Central Europe, governments and local party 
bosses aimed at preventing private, solitary listening, and organized instead 
communal, compulsory listening events at work-places, before, after, and even 
during working hours, in order to prevent even half-overheard critical remarks, 
93 „Guidance during this period out explicitly that all scripts should be written int eh light of 
RFE's basic policy. Listening audience were reminded that liberation could be achieved only by 
the operation of the confluence of forces." HOLT, R. T.: op. cit. 168. p. 
93 Jamming as an electronic warfare a technique to limit the effectiveness of an opponent's 
communications and/or detection equipment. 
94 E. H. GOMBRICH: Myth and Reality in German War-Time Broadcasts. London, 1970. The 
Athlone Press, 1970. Quoted by István Rév: op. cit. 12. p 
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to provide opportunities for trained expert agitators to interpret the official voice 
of the regime. The public loudspeaker was a familiar object in the streets and 
squares, not only in small villages but even in Budapest.''6 
A few years later, however, Marshall McLuhan in his Understanding Media 
recognized that „Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, 
offering a world of unspoken communication between writer-speaker and the 
listener...That is the immediate aspect of radio. A private experience".07 The 
voice coming from the air, entering the solitude of the silent room, well before 
the beginnings of the television programs had peculiar and dangerous effects on 
the listener: „It is very far from the material world, so one does not apply 
material standards to it. The eye alone gives a very complete picture of the 
world, but the ear alone gives an incomplete one. So at first it is a great 
temptation for the listener to 'supplement' the broadcast from his own 
imagination, to add what is so obviously lacking in the broadcast".1'8 Radio 
stimulates fantasy; it feeds hope. 
To measure the impact of the private experience of listening to international 
broadcasts, especially before the terminal weakening of the Communist 
regimes, was the constant preoccupation of politicians, broadcasters and 
researchers as well. Leo Lwenthai, a former member of the Frankfurt School, 
Research Director of the Voice of America, first in his talk at the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research in 1951, then in a paper in the Public 
Opinion Quarterly, reflected on the methodological problems „posed by the vast 
populations who are politically inaccessible to systematic polling."0'' To 
overcome the barrier of the Iron Curtain, analysts, pollsters and researchers had 
to rely mostly on interviews conducted with recent immigrants, unsuspecting 
tourists, volunteer helpers, and undercover agents. In order „to obtain accurate 
information about large populations without systematic use of the populations 
themselves",100 analysts at the Office of International Broadcasting used two 
methods as compensatory approximations in the absence of more reliable 
techniques: the so-called „most like" approach, which „consists of using 
respondents who, while not actually members of the inaccessible group are of 
all available people 'most like' the subject group [this was the method used in 
interviewing refugees]...to obtain information about groups behind the Iron 
Curtain; ...and the 'qualified judge' approach [in the course of which] a person 
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believed to know the group in question is asked to make certain estimates about 
the inaccessible group".101 
Probably the most ambitious use of both the „most like" and the „qualified 
judge" indirect approaches was the analysis of several hundred interviews 
conducted in 1951-52 with Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian refugees. The 
unclassified version of the study, written by Siegfried Kracauer, one of the most 
important twentieth century theorists of visual culture, photography and 
German cinema, and Paul L Berkman, was than published by the Bureau of 
Applied Social Research at Columbia University.102 
Kracauer and Berkman tried to overcome the limitations of the existing 
literature on „Satellite mentality", which either reflected on the general 
situation, the system itself or, based on subjective eye-witness report, with its 
„foreshortenings, super-impositions and omissions, on life within the system", 
leaving the comprehensive characteristics of the system itself out of the 
picture103. By focusing on the inconsistencies of the answers, on the slips of the 
tongue, reading in-between the lines of the interviews, the analysts attempted to 
outweigh the inherent biases of the interviewees. (In most cases the tourists and 
especially the recent emigrants - waiting for their residency permits - tried to 
please the interviewer and said what was - according to their anticipation -
supposed to be expected of them. The interviews made with recent migrs reveal, 
primarily, the notions the East Europeans from behind the Iron Curtain had 
about the supposed image of Communism in the West. It is also apparent, both 
from the hundreds of interviews Karacauer and Berkman analyzed and also 
from the „information items" in the Open Society Archives, originally from the 
archives of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the remnants of a collection of 
thousands of interviews with East Europeans, that the overwhelming majority of 
the interviewees had been, at least sporadically, listeners of RFE/RL. Their 
views about the West, their circular presuppositions about the Western image of 
Communism, - especially in the case of the Soviet migrs - had typically been 
formed by listening to the programs of the Radios. The Soviet Area Audience 
and Opinion Research Department of Radio Liberty periodically conducted 
systematic research on reactions to broadcast. In turn, the programmers at the 
Radios made use of the interviews when broadcasting anti-Communist 
propaganda to the East. The stories which were told in reply to the sometimes 
suggestive questions of the interviewers - who had good reasons to presuppose 
the anti-Communist learning of the refugees, testified to the effectiveness of 
101 Ibid. 659-660. p. 
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self-fulfilling prophesies of Western broadcasts based on the information 
distilled from the severely biased „information items".104) 
Subsequent studies have tried to test and make use of both the „most like" 
and the „informed judge" approaches, and came to the half-tested conclusion 
that „it can be assumed with some confidence that the opinions of recent 
refugees... are not greatly different from the opinions of the home populations if 
we except from the latter the Communist minority...There is little ground left 
for doubt that these respondents, even allowing for some bias in their 
statements, are essentially reliable and valuable indicators of certain areas of 
opinion of their parent populations".105 
The interviews, the opinion- and audience researchers, and analysts focused 
primarily on the private listener in his (the overwhelming majority of the 
refugees were young, single males) private - mostly not-owned but sublet, 
shared, communal - and crowded - home environment, listening secretly, mostly 
in the evening hours, to the voice of the Free World, be it the Voice of America, 
the Voice of Free Hungary, the Hungarian broadcast of the Israeli Radio, the 
Vatican, Monte Carlo, Radio Tirana, or whatever. The researchers concentrated 
on the solitary listener, who was worried, with very good reason, when the 
voice from the radio - the only secret connection to the world beyond the Iron 
Curtain - loudly announced more than once every hour: „This is Radio Free 
Europe on the 16th, 19th, 25th, 31st, 41st, and 49th short-wave bands". This 
was the moment when the listener, in horror, was almost convinced that he had 
been uncovered: the eavesdropping co-tenant in the shared bathroom of the 
communal apartment had certainly overheard the call-sign of the enemy radio 
station from the adjacent room. Judging from the „information items" 
collection, quite a few interviewees complained about indiscreet and loud 
announcements on the Radios, which were unusually audible despite the 
constant noise and jamming.106 
Early communication theory considered noise the antithesis of message; the 
source of the difference between the transmitted and the received signal. 
Jacques Attali came up with a different notion: „A network can be destroyed by 
noises that attack and transform it, if the codes of the place are unable to 
normalize and repress them. ... Although the new order is not contained in the 
structure of the old, it is nonetheless not a product of chance. It is created by the 
substitution of new differences for the old differences. Noise is the source of 
these mutations to the structuring codes. For despite the death it contains, noise 
104 SIEGFRIED KRACAUER, The Challenge of Qualitative Analysis. In The Public Opinion 
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carries order within itself; it carries new information. This may seem strange. 
But noise does in fact create meaning: first, because the interruption of a 
message signifies the interdiction of rarity; and second, because the very 
absence of meaning in pure noise or in the meaningless repetition of a message, 
by unchanneling auditory sensations, frees the listener's imagination.'"07 
The sound that the East European jammers generated did not simply aim at 
making the enemy broadcasts inaudible; the noise also established and 
confirmed the presence of the Communist authorities in the air, and thus in the 
private sphere of the secret listener. The interviewees do not leave the jamming 
unmentioned: they return to it, sometimes several times in the course of one 
single interview, as if they had tried to decipher, retrospectively, the exact 
meaning of the noise even to themselves. The noise generated by Soviet noise 
generators did not just overwrite the message coming from the West but 
constantly reminded the listener of the continuous surveillance, of the fact that 
he was not alone even behind the closed doors of his apartment. Jamming meant 
negating the possibility of privacy, and aimed at establishing the appearance of 
the omnipresence of the Communist authorities: „The absence of meaning is in 
this case the presence of all meanings...The presence of noise makes sense, 
makes meaning. It makes possible the creation of a new order on another level 
of organization or a new code in another network".108 Listening to the barely 
audible broadcast behind the noise, the listeners could see themselves as 
resistors, who manage to outfox the earsplitting but impotent authority. 
When on 24 October, 1956, on the second day of the revolution, Gusztav 
Gogolyak, head of „Post Office No. 118", the covert site of the technical 
headquarters of the jamming operation in Budapest, ordered the radio 
technicians all over the country to immediately close down all the facilities, 
shred the documents, and lock the doors of the jamming stations, surprised 
listeners were able for the first time to listen to the voice coming from Munich 
without to the signal of the presence of the Communist authorities.'09 The lack 
of intentionally generated noise in itself amounted to a clear statement: „we are 
here, and they have gone". In this unforeseen moment the (lack of) noise was 
the immediately decipherable message, as unconditional promise. The 
disappearance of the noise of jamming was probably one of the most reassuring 
radio propaganda tools: there was no real need for other promises to convince 
the inhabitants of the country that help was on the way; the audible voice was 
already in the living rooms, and through the open windows, in the streets as 
well. It was difficult to imagine that western soldiers would not soon follow. 
But they did not. 
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4.2. When after the defeat of the 1956 revolution, in the Spring of 1957 the 
ominous noise reentered the dilapidated apartments, it announced the return, the 
restoration and consolidation of the post-revolutionary Communist regime. On 
1 May 1957, barely six months after the defeat of the revolution, János Kádár 
waved to the marching two-hundred-thousand-strong crowd from the tribune 
built on the site of the former Stalin monument."0 The noise became once more 
the message: Communism was here to stay, the agreement that had allegedly 
been made in Yalta, had to be taken deadly seriously. It was sensible to comply. 
Jamming continued until 1964, and was briefly resurrected after the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August, 1968. As a result of the success of 
social conditioning, when jamming was replaced by undirected atmospheric 
noise after 1972, listeners continued to attribute the poor quality of reception to 
the deliberate countermeasures of the Communist jammers. It was hard to 
believe that the authorities were not responsible for all the noise coming from 
the ionosphere. 
The meeting of the (HSWP) Politburo on October 8, 1963 have got a report 
on the situation concerning the protection of the hungarian language enemy 
broadcasts,1" first of all RFE by Ministry of Transportation and Postal Services 
István Kossa."2 The Ministry endorses the first variant and proposes that the 
Politburo should adopt this position. „We do not see any sense in supporting the 
second variant. Even if the jamming capacity were to be concentrated in certain 
areas or at certain times, we could only jam fractions of the programs broadcast 
by Radio Free Europe and Patrol. We need to get the equipment ready, and if 
the Ministry of the Interior deems it necessary, we can start jamming the station 
periodically. By the way, even if we jam the station, most of the jamming will 
be concentrated on the Budapest and Pécs regions. Otherwise, even if jamming 
were to be maintained, the hostile radio programs could be heard freely almost 
in the whole of Hungary." 
János Kádár ' s first sceptical question was that does anybody have any 
information as to how this thing is handled in our friendly countries? What is 
the real difference between the first and the second variant from a technical and 
financial aspect? 
István Szurdi stated: some comrades in this office had a chance to monitor 
for a few days how jamming was done in some friendly countries. The results of 
monitoring are as follows: the broadcasts of state-owned radio stations are not 
jammed in the Soviet Union, but the programs of private stations, including 
Radio Free Europe, are. In Czechoslovakia every Western station is jammed, 
even hostile programs targeting Poland in cities near the Polish border. Bulgaria 
110 See RiPP, ZOLTÁN: The Legitimitalion of HSWP at the Beginning of the Kádár-era. op. 
cit. 
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also jams every Western station, so does the GDR, though they mostly jam 
broadcasts from West Berlin. In Poland only certain hostile programs are 
jammed that are broadcast in the Polish language. No broadcasts are jammed in 
the People's Republic of Romania. 
At the moment I believe the second variant is to be favored - said Gyula 
Kállai: „As for the arguments that are brought up by the comrades to support 
the first variant - our system is stable, the political atmosphere is good in the 
country. I agree, but I think we should not underestimate the effects of these 
hostile radio programs." The international political situation is rather unstable, 
and we need to take into account that they could cause some trouble. The Soviet 
Union, where the system is more stable politically and the people can resist 
more firmly than in Hungary, stopped the jamming of state-owned stations only. 
Whichever variant will be adopted by the Politburo, he propose the following 
two things to consider before one of the two variants is implemented: 1. They 
should consult with our friendly countries on this issue. What they are going to 
decide on is a very important political issue and it emerges as such in every 
country, as an extremely important political issue. The consultation he was 
proposing would be important also from the point of view of following a 
uniform procedure. 2. If the jamming of state-owned radio stations is going to 
be stopped, Hungary should perhaps start negotiations with the BBC and the 
USA; that is, they should not stop jamming their stations without a „price". 
They should tell them that they will stop jamming their stations, and in return 
they should give up broadcasting hostile programs to Hungary. Kállai though 
this is a feasible proposition. 
István Szirmai proposed that the Politburo should adopt the first variant and 
make a resolution of it. His arguments supporting this variant were as follows. It 
has been established that the efficiency of jamming in the periods most 
frequently listened to by people is 10% even with maximal efforts using all the 
apparatus at our disposal in our country, including foreign assistance. So 
anybody who wants to listen to these Western stations can do so even on a small 
radio. The whole thing has only political significance, and the Politburo should 
consider whether this political impact is positive or negative. In his view it is 
negative, so there is no point in jamming with an efficiency of 10% as far as our 
political power is concerned. The fact that the Soviet Union also jams stations is 
a different matter, for their efficiency is not 10% but much higher. However 
sophisticated technology were to be installed in Hungary, they would not be 
able to jam these station entirely. The territory of Hungary is small; this is why 
they made an agreement with the Czechs, the Poles and, the Romanians that 
they would jam the broadcasts from an appropriate distance. In case we decide 
to adopt the second variant - and here answering comrade Kádár's question - , it 
would not involve any budgetary deficit or require special austerity. It would 
simply mean that the available equipment would be used to jam only certain 
predetermined broadcasts. 143 wavelengths were used for such broadcasts but 
the available equipment is capable of jamming only 22. That means they could 
1 
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jam only 22 of the 143 wavelengths. They have eight jamming stations with a 
15 kW capacity and one with 100 kW. These were not used to jam broadcasts 
targeting Hungary but rather Russian language programs targeting the Soviet 
Union on the basis of mutuality. These stations must be maintained in the future 
too. However, if possible, it would be a good idea to free this middle wave 
station and use it for broadcasting their own programs. In this context he would 
like to call the attention of the Politburo to the fact that - as has been amply 
demonstrated in the introduction to the report - enormous technical 
development is taking place in Western countries, while Hungarian radio 
technology is lagging behind and the capacity of the available radio stations is 
fully utilized. They have two lOOkW broadcasting stations transmitting 
propaganda programs in 9 languages by the Hungarian Radio. So István Szirmai 
wanted to urge you to devote more attention to development. 
One more thing that he wanted to add: He also believed that if the 
Politburo, and as a result, the government adopts the first variant, they should 
call the attention of the editors and the owners of hostile radio stations to this 
fact. Perhaps they should not enter into negotiations with them, but they should 
let them know when jamming will be stopped and make it clear to them that in 
return they expect them to strike a more objective tone in their programs. The 
Poles were in the same situation, and the broadcasts targeting them are much 
more objective now. There was another proposal on the table that the jamming 
apparatus should be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. Szirmai believed 
this was not a political issue, and it should belong to the Ministry of the Interior. 
It would be important to involve the leaders of the radio and the television in 
this work. 
This proposal was submitted to the Politburo in 1957 - declared by Béla 
Biszku. The situation was different at that time. Then the apparatus was 
overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. He suggested that they should conduct 
consultations before they make a decision. They have to inform the relevant 
friendly states that such a problem arose in Hungary and that he would like to 
consult with them on this issue. They should not underestimate this problem 
even if efficiency is only 10%. Whenever the situation gets more difficult, the 
enemy broadcasts immediately jump on rumors and it costs more to the country 
than the HUF 40 million mentioned in the report. He proposed that they should 
adopt the second variant. 
There are at least two reasons why we need to consult with them - stated 
Miklós Ajtai. On the one hand Hungary should ask them of their opinion about 
the situation, and on the other they should ask them what to do with the 1 OOkW 
station if we stop using it for jamming, since it practically works for them at the 
moment. Another question that they should work out a proposal by the middle 
of next year to develop the technical background for foreign language programs 
together with the leaders of the Hungarian Radio and Television and the 
Ministry of Transportation and Postal Services. He did not think the Politburo 
should accept this proposal in its present form. The preparation of a complex 
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development plan of the Hungarian Radio and Television is underway which 
also includes the development of domestic and foreign language programs. This 
issue should be dealt with in this framework rather than separately. Final 
decision can only be made when the third five-year plan is approved, for extra 
investment is not feasible in the remaining two years of the current plan. 
Rezső Nyers endorsed the first variant. The adoption of the second variant 
would entail that the situation would be maintained, and this is inconsistent. At 
the moment they capable of jamming the stations in the central areas of 
Budapest, but even in such areas there are broadcasts that can be easily tuned to 
and freely listened to by anybody. He agreeded with negotiating their plan with 
the socialist countries, though they have not conducted any such negotiations 
before. The Soviet Union did not discuss the issue with them either when it 
decided to partially stop jamming. The way the second variant is described is 
rather inaccurate, for the efficiency of jamming can not be enhanced without 
investment. The adoption of the second variant only makes sense if they make a 
decision on some investment. If they fail to do so, they can still say that any 
capacity that can be freed should be used to strengthen the existing caapcity, but 
that will not make jamming any more efficient. 
„All the time I was thinking how ignorant the Politburo is of some very 
important issues" - pondered János Kádár. The things contained in the report 
are an integral part of their propaganda campaign. When he read the report he 
was amazed to see what is going on in this respect. And he was sorry to had to 
say this - to comrade Szurdi - but instead of tapping phone lines for getting the 
required information negotiations should have been conducted with the friendly 
countries. He cannot comment on this issue because the actual situation is very 
different from what they all believed to be the case. This issue was raised first 
in 1957, and then they were told that they should jam these stations. They voted 
for it because that was proposed to them, though it cost a lot of money. Now it 
turns out that practically they are not jamming their stations. The present 
situation is - and this is the political significance of this issue - that listening to 
foreign radio stations is not forbidden by law in Hungary. However, the 
common view is that these broadcasts should better be listened to in secret. 
What they need to decide on was whether they are going to maintain the current 
situation or not. The comrades are telling them that it essentially involves only 
Budapest and Pécs; that is, they can only jam the stations in these regions. 
Making jamming more effective in the Budapest region would really be a 
substantial development, for it is a long-lasting lesson from the past that if they 
can have a hold over Budapest, they can control the whole country. „Budapest 
is the center, and everything starts from here." There is another thing that he do 
not understood. He wonder why the results of surveying the efficiency of 
jamming show that the least effective period is from 3 PM to midnight, right 
when the most people listen to these programs. 
István Szirmai answered, that is because external assistance is stopped 
during this period, for they are all engaged in doing their own jamming. János 
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Kádár replied, Szirmai mentioned how intensive a development was carried out 
in the West. This should caution them, for if it is worth for them spending so 
much on it, it would also be worth for them being able to jam their broadcasts. 
So the issue is that either they jam the stations, and allocate the required money 
to it, or they do not continue with jamming. Common sense tells him they 
should not. 
But there was another issue concerning Hungarian radio programs targeting 
foreign countries. These programs should be improved and developed, it is a 
good thing. But it is a totally different issue. In principle they should endorse 
the expansions of these broadcasts, for their sister parties also say that they are 
useful for them. However, they cannot make a decision on this issue now. 
Consultation should be given priority in the resolutions. The Poles stopped 
jamming at the end of 1957 but they asked Hungary to continue jamming. They 
should consult with every country with which Hungary collaborate: the Soviet 
Union, the Poles, the Czechs and the Romanians. They have to tell them 
honestly: the Politburo discussed a report on jamming and concluded that 
hostile stations could only be jammed - even with external assistance - with an 
efficiency of 10% in the most frequented periods. It incurs enormous costs and j j j 
it seems that there is no point in continuing with the jamming. Therefore, as of 
January 1, 1964 jamming will be terminated and Hungary will no longer need 
the assistance that they provided for us. At the same time they are ready to 
provide assistance for them in the same framework in the future too. The issue 
of political supervision has also been raised. If the resolution of the Politburo 
holds the above, then it is only of secondary importance. The apparatus, the 
technical equipment should stay where it was at that time, and political 
supervision should be provided by the press subdivision of the party center. 
Hungary should talk with England and the USA, or rather they should send 
them a statement in which they say they have decided to terminate jamming 
temporarily, and if they are willing to broadcast programs with at least some 
sings of objectivity, Hungary will not resume it either. The consultations should 
be conducted within six weeks and the results should be brought to the 
Politburo for further discussion. "The Politburo should then confirm its position 
and the statement should follow!" - closed the issue István Szirmai. 
I 
5. The western analysts were primarily interested in the effect of the broadcast 
on the target audience, narrowly defined as the groups of listeners and their 
relatives, friends, colleagues, and close acquaintances, who might be indirectly 
influenced through communication with the listeners. Besides these groups 
there was another, numerically modest, but politically very important, cluster of 
people, who were not able to ignore the impact of the enemy broadcasts. The 
public opinion experts rarely ventured to investigate these individuals, despite 
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the fact that they were regularly exposed to the programs of Radio Free 
Europe."3 
MTI, The Hungarian News Agency, was already making use of the 
information acquired from foreign radio programs during World War II. The 
News Agency monitored the Hungarian, and even the Rumanian language 
broadcasts of the BBC (which started immediately after the beginning of the 
war, in the fall of 1939) and the programs of Radio Moscow. After the war the 
monitoring activities were extended to the Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, 
Radio Ankara, Vatican Radio, the English language broadcasts of the BBC, on 
so on. After 1953 monitoring took place in the building of the new headquarters 
of the News Agency, but in 1959 the monitoring department moved to Gödöllő, 
just outside Budapest. Here reception was ten times better than in the center of 
the city, where besides constant jamming, the equipment used at the Photo 
Agency of MTI also contributed to interference. The secret monitoring service, 
which reported to a special department of the News Agency under the control of 
the Ministry of Interior, transcribed the recorded programs and between 
1951-1989 produced summary transcripts of the RFE Hungarian language 
broadcasts for the so called „daily confidential information bulletin", distributed 
among the select members of the highest leadership of the party. Between 1981 
and 1991, besides the programs of RFE, the daily confidential bulletin included 
selected material from the programs of Voice of America, the BBC, 
Deutschlandfunk, Deutsche Welle, Radio Beijing, Radio Vatican and Israeli 
Radio." Each issue contains about 30-40 mimeographed pages, half of which 
are usually verbatim transcripts of RFE programs. 
According to the directives, the technical personnel working at the 
monitoring station had to transcribe the recorded program word by word, 
without corrections, without adding or deleting anything from the recorded text. 
Until the beginning of the 1980s the transcripts were not edited; the Foreign 
Policy Desk, which was nominally in charge of publishing the daily bulletin, 
hired an editor to take charge of the transcripts only at the beginning of the 
decade. The transcripts show the signs of difficulties of comprehension, the 
distorting effects of jamming and atmospheric noise, and the spelling problems 
of the transcribers. Even obvious misunderstandings and misspellings had to be 
kept in the final text; sometimes only a (sic!) mark referred to an obvious 
distortion in the edited bulletin, unaccompanied by remarks, commentaries, or 
interpretations. The monitoring apparatus was instructed to transmit the 
verbatim text of the daily broadcasts directly to the political leadership. 
The technical staff was directed to pay special attention to the following 
programs."4 
113 The first measure the effectiveness of RFE and of audience response to RFE see 
DESSEWFFY, GYULA: The Voice of Free Hungary. (A Szabad Magyaország Hangja) Látóhatár, 
München, 1953.2. 
114 IM International Dept. 41-Sz-1017/1976. HASSS 1-11-12. NK.0 48/1/1997. 
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1. Hungarian domestic issues and their foreign reception; 
2. The activities of the opposition and the churches; 
3. Interviews with and statements by the representatives of Hungarian 
emigration; 
4. The life of the Hungarian minority in the neighboring countries; 
5. Internationa! news and commentaries relating to Hungary (in the spheres 
of the economy, social policy, international statistics), 
6. Reflexions on the publications of the Hungarian press (domestic issues, 
the economy, the activities of the government and the parliament, 
statements by Hungarian political leaders); 
7. Opinion of foreign experts about the most important issues of Hungarian 
political and economic life; 
8. The role of Hungarian-born businessmen; 
9. Comparative international information programs, talkshows; 
10. Presentation of Hungarian firms, companies, and economic actors. 
The list was extensive and covered wide areas of contemporary political, social 
and economic life. Until the early 1980s the transcribers were instructed not to 
include texts about the private or even the public life of either Hungarian or 
other Communist leaders. It was explicitly forbidden to include texts, - even in 
the strictly confidential internal bulletins - which dealt with the problems of 
succession in Communist countries. According to the internal instructions, 
certain types of text had to be transcribed in full. These included manifestos and 
open letters by opposition groups, migrs and civil organizations, sent to RFE or 
to the BBC. 
It is definitely not an overstatement to say that the Communist party 
leadership was far better informed about the programs of RFE than the most 
devoted subversive, anti-Communist private listener. His difficult situation can 
be seen is the resolution of the Politburo of HSWP on the experience of the 
fight against imperialist propaganda and its intensification in May 22, 1973:"5 
I. 1. The regular monitoring and evaluation of hostile propaganda targeting 
our country has been conducted by the Central Committee since the third 
quarter of 1969 on the basis of the resolution of the Politburo."6 Since that time 
15 quarterly reports and 5 thematic evaluations have been prepared. The 
materials are prepared by the so-called Evaluation Committee that works as a 
115 HNA M-KS-288 f. 5/611 6. E. - Printed copy. The resolution adopted on May 22, 1973 -
as can be seen at the at he top of the first page - was declared invalid ten years later by a 
resolution made on October 11,1983 
116 The resolution that set up the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and 
defined its organization, tasks and working methods was adopted by the Politburo on March 10, 
1969 (HNA M-KS-288. f. 7/323 o. e.). The evaluation Committee was set up later. The first 
report of the Evaluation Committee was discussed by the Politburo as part of the „Miscellaneous" 
item on the agenda on December 16, 1969 (see HNA M-KS-288 f. 5/507 o. e.) 
— • ^ ^ m m 
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body coordinated to the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee. 
The Evaluation Committee is made up of members representing the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Public Administration, the Department of 
Science, Culture and Public Education of the Central Committee and also 
includes representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the Hungarian Press Agency, the Institute 
of Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian Radio. The six state bodies mentioned 
above analyze hostile propaganda along their own line and provide their own 
reports, which then make up the final report. This final report is sent to the 
members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, the heads of departments of the 
Central Committee and the leaders of the affected state organs. 
This work has become an integral part of the political activities of the 
above-mentioned bodies, constituting an established system today. It is 
especially the reports prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Hungarian Press Agency, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the 
Interior that show clear signs of regular data collection and deep analysis. The 
Hungarian Radio and the Institute of Foreign Affairs have been able to find the 
most suitable method only recently. 
The evaluation in these reports is aimed at pointing out the main tendencies 
and changes. Therefore they can provide the political leadership with useful 
quarterly summaries concerning hostile propaganda and at the same time call 
the attention to possible tactical changes, based on the comparison of data in 
recent and earlier reports. The reports also provide good grounds for drawing 
the necessary conclusions. 
However, one shortcoming of these reports is that the collection of data is 
not comprehensive enough (it does not even utilize fully the technical capacity 
of the monitoring station installed in Gödöllő) and the analyses are not deep 
enough. They often fail to amply show how the division of labor is managed by 
the various outlets of hostile propaganda, they do not call attention to the 
characteristic features of bourgeois propaganda that impact the various classes 
and layers of the society - especially the youth - and they do not investigate 
thoroughly as to how the policy of disintegration conveyed by this propaganda 
becomes manifest in the area of tourism. The level of synthesizing work is not 
satisfactory. Several of the bodies concerned are still trying to find the most 
suitable methods to participate in the analysis of hostile propaganda and they 
replace their representatives engaged in such work all too often. Most of the real 
work is done at the end of quarters, it is not operative enough and there are very 
few evaluations prepared in between the quarterly reports. 
2. The main goal of the analysis of hostile propaganda has so far been to 
provide information for the leaders of the party and the state. As a result, 
information flow was directed upwards and we failed to devote ample attention 
to two important tasks: providing information for the lower party organizations, 
which should be somewhat different from the reports sent to the highest 
n 
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leadership, and to the utilization of our experience gained through our fight 
against hostile propaganda in our political work, especially in our own 
propaganda activities. 
3. Our sister parties show a genuine interest in learning more about our 
experience in the evaluation of hostile propaganda. For instance, the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has ordered the counselor of 
embassy of the Soviet embassy in Budapest to gather information at the Central 
Committee about our quarterly evaluation reports. Similar regular information 
is provided for the German Socialist Unity Party, and the Polish and Bulgarian 
diplomats are given occasional information. It would be practical, however, to 
send our sister parties a biannual report and request a similar evaluation from 
them. 
II. 1. The main methodological and substantive experience gained through 
nearly four years of evaluation work shows that the hostile propaganda targeting 
our country intends to achieve the same goals by means of changing methods 
and tools with a view to the conditions of peaceful coexistence and the ongoing 
ideological fight. This propaganda is less sharp in its tone today but much more 
extensive in its scope. 
Some of the methodological and substantive changes can be demonstrated 
by the following: 
- It was a striking feature of the period in question that in general the 
hostile propaganda was not trying to incite the people directly to overthrow the 
system instantly. It took great pains to be viewed as an „opposition" rather than 
an „outsider" or an „enemy", which criticized the system form the „inside", so 
its tone pretended to be more „loyal." It intended to relate very closely to the 
everyday problems of our public life, to exaggerate our troubles and to support 
their messages by referring to facts and events of our daily life. These 
endeavors are manifest e.g. in their intention to incite dissatisfaction towards the 
policy of the party, to attack the leading role of the party, to turn the various 
classes and layers of society against each other, and to extol apolitical 
technocracy. They also try hard to frustrate our endeavors by trying to push our 
policy to the right, e.g. urging „capitalistic" reforms in the economy and 
„liberalizing" reforms in extending socialist democracy. 
- Open, anti-Communist propaganda is more and more often replaced by 
campaigns heralding the „improvement" of socialism in which important issues 
of Marxism are also discussed, often using Marxist terminology. At the same 
time it frequently propagates so-called new models of socialism, 
overemphasizes the importance of the divergent national features of socialist 
development, incites nationalism and turns the socialist countries against each 
other. It also maintains - often with an openly anti-Soviet tone - that there 
exists a so-called Hungarian model. 
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- The foreign propaganda paints a distorted picture of the domestic 
situation also by setting domestic and foreign policy sharply against each other. 
It suggests that Hungary can continue to conduct its „liberal, reformist" 
domestic policy at the expense of an „orthodox, Soviet-friendly" foreign policy. 
It recommends the same to other socialist countries too. In this context its aim 
was to instigate distrust among our allies, and even the cooked-up potential 
clash between the „conservatives" and the „reformists" was represented as a 
„proof of the instability" of the socialist system. It talked about a „Hungarian 
dilemma", a „crisis in the leadership", and when - after the November Central 
Committee meeting"7 - the desired „disintegration" did not materialize, it 
started speaking about „a tightening domestic policy", „shifting the points" and 
„putting the brakes on reforms." It sticks to the same attitude even today. At the 
same time it takes a good stock of the tactical situation, which is illustrated by 
its reaction to the events of March 15'18 or to those that took place in 
Balassagyarmat. It is also to be noted that it speaks differently about Hungary to 
the audience of capitalist countries than to a Hungarian audience. 
- Within nationalist incitement the main goal of the propaganda has 
become to instigate anti-Soviet sentiments and to break away from the Soviet 
Union. A standard topic of this propaganda is the „Soviet pressure" on our 
domestic policy, „distrust on the part of Moscow", the „superpower interests of 
the Soviet Union" and the „Brezhnev doctrine" as far as foreign affairs are 
concerned. It urges to challenge this doctrine and sets the Romanian foreign 
policy as an example. It describes the advantages of a possible „stronger 
orientation towards the West" and Hungary's ability to „play the role of a 
bridge." The fact that most of the propaganda broadcast to Hungary talks about 
the internal situation of other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, 
also demonstrates that the main goal is to set us against our allies. 
- Imperialist propaganda pays increasingly more lip service to ultra-leftist 
views. It uses Maoist, Trotskiyte „new leftist" ideas to demonstrate the „internal 
crisis of socialism" and speculates on making the most of the conflicts in 
international labor movement by exaggerating and sharpening them to an 
extreme degree. It encourages openly or potentially anti-socialist trends, various 
extremist groups and the pluralism of Marxism."9 
- Utilizing the potentials of wide-ranging contacts between the East and the 
West it creates a lot of illusions about the capitalist system and Western 
lifestyle, and promotes the system of values prevalent in the capitalist world. 
The changes that have taken place in the policy of some capitalist countries as a 
117 The November meeting of the Central Committee can indeed be regarded as the prelude 
to counter-reforms. In a wider context it was this development in domestic policy that underlay 
the procedures against some philosophers and sociologists in 1973. 
118 In 1972 young people started to commemorate the anniversary of March 15. On March 
15, 1973 the people commemorating the event clashed with the police. Several people were 
beaten, detained and dismissed from their job. 
119 The debates over the pluralism of Marxism can be found in earlier documents. 
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result of the changes in the balance of powers are represented as if the nature of 
capitalist policy itself had changed, thereby giving rise to illusions about certain 
countries or politicians. This propaganda does everything it can to make the 
bourgeois mass media more appealing to a growing number of people. 
2. The reasons for the changes in the content and methodology of hostile 
propaganda: 
- the achievements of our domestic and foreign policy and the 
strengthening position of socialism which shattered any hope for a 
direct overthrow of the socialist system; 
- the general crisis of the capitalist world and the decreasing appeal of it as 
a direct consequence of this crisis; 
- accommodation to the tactics of disintegration and „selective gap-
bridging"; 
- social changes in our country and the recognition of developing socialist 
mentality; 
- utilization of the potential of wide-ranging contacts between Hungary and 
the capitalist world. 
3. Among the various tools of imperialist propaganda the mass media continue 
to try to expand the range of people who tune in on their programs especially by 
playing the role of acceptable and trustworthy channels of information. Though 
their messages are essentially the same, there appears to be a certain division of 
labor among them in that for instance certain things that the radio of 
Washington is reluctant to say for political reasons are conveyed through the 
BBC or the Radio of Free Europe. 
In addition to the mass media an increasingly important role is played by 
the propaganda conveyed through cultural relations. The embassies of 
developed capitalist countries are becoming more and more active, and 
occasionally we also witness the propaganda activities of the right-wing 
emigration. The hostile propaganda makes use of the potentials in tourism 
through the training of western tourists visiting our country as well as by trying 
to exert an influence on the Hungarian tourists visiting their countries. 
The tools used by the imperialist propaganda have undergone intensive 
modernization. The United States is already planning to introduce the use of 
satellites to broadcast television programs to socialist countries and the Federal 
Republic of Germany is going to install new, high-capacity radio stations. 
4. The evaluation of hostile propaganda targeting our country is an extremely 
complex task. Our society is constantly exposed to a wide range of concurrent 
effects. When weighing the impact of bourgeois propaganda, our essential 
starting point is that Hungarian public opinion is largely influenced by the 
achievements of socialist development and the major elements of socialist 
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public thinking. However, we should not ignore - and overestimate or 
underestimate - some impact of bourgeois propaganda. 
Bourgeois propaganda can achieve some results 
in issues related to some 
internal tension or problems in the country. For instance they have tried to give 
rise to some uncertainty and raise some concern over the future of our economic 
reforms and the correctness of our foreign policy. This propaganda also makes 
use of the weaknesses of our information policy. For instance, it wasted no time 
to grasp the opportunity when we were rather silent about the Vienna 
negotiations for quite a long time. 
Its impact can be observed in three areas: 
- some unfavorable features of public sentiment and attitude - nationalism, 
cynicism, adoration of the West, disparagement of the achievements of 
the socialist countries - can partly be attributed to the impact of western 
propaganda; 
- hostile influence occasionally manifests itself in providing misleading 
information for the people; 
- imperialist propaganda - as a major tool of ideological subversion -
disseminates bourgeois ideas, conserves and revives bourgeois 
ideology. 
This impact can be explained by the more intensive contacts between the two 
world systems, the ideological situation in our country, and our objective 
difficulties and subjective mistakes. The weak points of our work play an 
important role in its success: the shortcomings of our analyses and the failure to 
utilize our past experience. For this very reason priority should be given to a 
more offensive and active fight against hostile propaganda in the proper 
framework in addition to the currently ongoing evaluative and reporting 
activities. 
Resolution 
1. The Politburo accepts the report.120 It states that the system of analyzing 
hostile propaganda has been established on the basis of the resolution of the 
Politburo and fulfills its tasks. 
2. It is the achievements of socialist development and the main aspects of 
socialist public thinking that play the most decisive role in shaping Hungarian 
public opinion. The fight against hostile propaganda - due to earlier party 
resolutions - has become more lively, argumentative, polemical and 
120 The resolution was based on the report prepared by the Department of Propaganda for the 
Propaganda Committee. The text was hardly changed in the resolution, so its publication is not 
justified. 
Documents on the dictatorship and the cold war in the Hungarian archives - 67 
sophisticated. The organs of the mass media have played a key role in this 
development both at home and abroad. However, due to the change in the 
balance of powers, the easing of tension and the widening range of contacts 
between the two world systems we expect that the ideological fight will 
sharpen, and hostile propaganda and bourgeois ideological subversion will 
intensify. 
3. The fight against bourgeois propaganda is part of our entire political and 
ideological work. We need to counter the effects of this propaganda by 
representing and convincingly arguing for our achievements, ideas and values, 
and by providing creative responses to questions raised in real life. Our work 
cannot be restricted to merely rejecting bourgeois propaganda, and the fight 
should be fought from an offensive, positive position rather than from a 
defensive stand, using every tool that is offered by our domestic policy and by 
the propaganda campaigns targeting foreign countries. 
In addition to the press and the radio we should make a better use of the 
television as a tool, provide verbal information for members and non-members 
of the party, and utilize political training and the mass organizations and 
movements so that our people can be amply protected both ideologically and 
politically against hostile propaganda. 
Investigations should be conducted as to how efficient our political and 
propaganda work is among the emigrants living in western countries. Efforts 
should be made to exert an influence on the intelligentsia of capitalist countries 
(especially in Western Europe) that shape public opinion by means of high-
quality publications (newspapers, books, scientific studies, etc.). 
4. In regard to the main lines of the offensive of hostile propaganda our political 
work lays emphasis on the following aspects at this stage: 
- The permanent and changing elements of our policy constitute unity; they 
can not be set into any opposition. 
- The socialist nature of our society is getting stronger in every area; 
the socialist elements of public thinking are constantly increasing. 
- The relationship between the party and the people is good and is based on 
confidence; the domestic political situation is stable. 
- We rely on cooperation and firm unity with the Soviet Union and the 
other socialist countries based on firm principles so that we can serve 
our national and international interests and protect our security and 
sovereignty; the Hungarian-Soviet friendship is unbroken. 
- Peaceful coexistence between countries with a different social system 
means cooperation as well as fighting at the same time. We are ready to 
act against any shortsighted, sectarian isolation but will never allow to 
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- We endorse the exchange of cultural values between nations living under 
different social systems and promote the expansion of tourism and 
information flow but we reject any endeavors that are based on the 
principles and practice of the cold war and the false theory of the free 
flow of information and ideas. 
- In regard to the developments in tourism we stress the importance of state 
discipline, responsibility and the obligations of our citizens, and we will 
firmly hold our citizens accountable for their behavior both at home and 
abroad. 
5. In order to strengthen our fight against hostile propaganda we intend to 
accomplish the following: 
a) establish a more coordinated and operative system of monitoring and 
analysis followed by drawing the necessary conclusions. The observations made 
at different places should all be used for the preparation of coordinated reports 
that include every possible aspects of monitoring work. 
The various departments of the Central Committee that take part in the 
analysis should summarize their work and ensure that their results are utilized in 
the reports in a systematic way. In the future the State Office of Church Affairs 
and the National Information Council should also prepare reports on any hostile 
propaganda efforts that can be observed in their sphere of activity, and if 
needed, other state and social bodies and organization should do the same 
concerning their experience in this respect. 
More thematic evaluations should be prepared in relation to certain 
important events. The bodies concerned should investigate the activities of 
hostile propaganda targeting the various classes and layers of our society, with 
special attention to the bourgeois propaganda targeting our young people. The 
analyses should investigate how the division of labor works between the various 
outlets of bourgeois propaganda (e.g. radio stations) and what sort of other tools 
this propaganda intends to utilize in addition to the outlets of mass media: 
tourism, relations with emigrants, propaganda among the national minorities. 
The quarterly reports should be continued, but it is also important to process 
the incoming reports and any other information on a daily basis. To that end the 
monitoring of hostile radio broadcasts should also be developed. The personnel 
problem that hinders the full utilization of the monitoring radio station in 
Gödöllő should be promptly resolved. The full content of monitoring should be 
sent to the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs. This isntitute should be 
turned into the scientific center of the long-term analysis of hostile propaganda. 
The information materials concerning hostile propaganda coining from 
different sources should be coordinated, such as the press reviews prepared by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the confidential materials of the Hungarian 
Press Agency and the various reports that process the materials published in the 
newspapers of the Hungarian emigration. 
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b) The experience gained from the analyses should be used more effectively 
in our domestic political work and foreign propaganda. By unveiling the 
slanders and false statements we should deprive bourgeois propaganda of its 
credibility. We should do our best to exert an influence on the public opinion of 
the capitalist countries by presenting our own arguments and facts. In the 
meantime we should be aware of the danger of letting the enemy to decide what 
questions and issues should be raised in our work. We should generally refrain 
from direct disputes and engage in arguments only if it is justified by our 
political interests. 
Taking into consideration all the experience gained through the analysis of 
hostile propaganda and building on the quarterly reports made for the leading 
bodies we should prepare materials which contain data, arguments and facts that 
can be used to refute any falsification and assist the fight against hostile 
propaganda and send them to lower-level party organizations through existing 
information channels. 
Regular recommendations should be made as to what sort of tasks should be 
performed in our political work in order to counter the effects of hostile 
propaganda effectively. We should specify concrete tasks in this respect for the 
mass media organizations working at home and addressing a foreign audience. 
The special tasks of each relevant area (such as tourism, political work 
concerning the emigrants, the national minorities, etc.) should be regularly 
analyzed in the fight against hostile propaganda. 
The Institute of Social Studies should take an active part in the analysis of 
hostile propaganda and point out the relationship between the bourgeois 
ideological subversion and this propaganda in its research studies and reports. 
c) We should expand our cooperation with our sister parties. This should be 
achieved gradually, in a sensitive manner, through bilateral negotiations with 
each party. We should offer the option to the parties of all the European 
socialist countries (except for Albania) that in addition to the use of our existing 
channels for the exchange of information verbally we are ready to send them a 
written biannual report on our experience with hostile propaganda. We should 
also urge similar cooperation with those of our western sister parties in whose 
countries this hostile propaganda against our country is very sharp (Italian 
Communist Party, French Communist Party, German Communist Party, the 
Communist Party of the US, Austrian Communist Party). 
6. The Politburo proposes that the Propaganda Committee should review the 
system and methods of the press-administration involved in countering the 
effects of hostile propaganda and take a position on its modernization. 
7. The Politburo deems it necessary to establish a new political post at the 
Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee with the function to 
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implement the provisions of the resolution and coordinate the analysis of hostile 
propaganda. 
8. A new report of Central Committee Department of Propaganda was 
discussed by the Secretariat of Hungarian Socialist Worker 's Party at its 
meeting on December 4, 1978. on the execution of the resolution of the 
Politburo made on May 22, 1973 concerning the strengthening of the fight 
against imperialist propaganda; proposal for future tasks.121 
I. The imperialist propaganda targeting our country - during the five years 
since the Politburo made a resolution on strengthening the fight against 
imperialist propaganda at its May 22, 1973 meeting - has not changed 
substantially in its basic goals and main line. Most of its efforts are still focused 
on attacking the socialist system from the outside while trying to disintegrate it 
internally. At the same time it incites anti-Soviet sentiment, tries to turn the 
people against the other socialist countries and our sister parties and gives rise 
to illusions about capitalism. The hostile propaganda that intends to exert an 
influence on Hungarian public opinion is no different in a strategic sense from 
the imperialist propaganda that targets the other socialist countries. 
However, the propaganda campaign of imperialism has found itself under 
new circumstances, both due to our internal development and as a result of 
geopolitical changes in world politics. International ideological fighting has 
received priority and become more complex. The imperialist power centers 
have decided to intensify their anti-socialist propaganda and the ideological 
tension between the two world systems. In certain issues - such as issues of 
human rights and democracy - they have even managed to take the initiative 
temporarily. The propaganda offensive that has emerged recently can not be 
traced back to the endeavors of some capitalist circles only, or to the transitional 
functioning of a particular government. What we should expect is that the 
offensive behavior of the imperialist propaganda centers will remain a lasting 
component of the struggle between the two world systems. 
II. There have been significant tactical changes in the imperialist 
propaganda targeting our country - while the strategic goals are still maintained 
- as a result of the concurrent impact of changing interna! and external 
conditions of the ideological fight. The essence of these changes can be 
summarized as follows: the propaganda campaign has become more complex in 
its content, more extensive, versatile in its methods and more focused in using 
various tools. It paints a very distinct picture of Hungary, giving a semblance of 
a country which 'maintains a system that is more acceptable than that of the 
other socialist countries, distancing herself from the Soviet model. ' 
121 HNA M-KS-288.f. 7/566. ő.e. 
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The hostile propaganda campaign attacking Hungary relies heavily on the 
everyday problems of the people, practically 'building on ' the practice of 
developing socialism and its existing conflicts. The propaganda campaign that 
was initiated in relation to the so-called new Hungarian model in our economic 
management system has gradually been extended to all aspects of domestic 
policy, using it as a tool to set our country against the rest of the socialist 
countries. The bourgeois propaganda centers take great pains to make it appear 
as if they were true representatives of the interests of our people. 
These endeavors manifest themselves mostly in the campaign concerning 
human rights and national minority issues. Our country is not the main target of 
the campaign that was launched on the pretext of safeguarding human rights, 
but recently it has become more intense even in relation to Hungary. Nationalist 
incitement has intensified in the ethnic minority issue, because this is area is 
regarded by the imperialist propaganda as the most suitable to turn part of the 
people against the policy of the party and incite conflicts among the socialist 
countries. These hostile propaganda centers are also busy working on 
establishing 'an opposition' in Hungary. They want to argue that the 'Hungarian 
opposition' is also part of the 'Central European opposition movement' . As a 
result of the stable internal situation and the political decisions made in concrete 
cases this imperialist propaganda could not fulfill its expectations. It is quite 
likely though that it will try to make the most of our economic problems in 
widening the scope of those who could act as 'the opposition' to our socialist 
system. 
The imperialist propaganda organizations have undergone several structural 
changes in the past few years. In order to enhance their efficiency they want to 
use all their tools directed towards this aim on the one hand, and they intend to 
introduce new methods on the other. 
As a new feature, the hostile radio stations broadcasting in Hungarian do 
their best to get official recognition in Hungary. Radio Free Europe announced 
that it would be willing to air critical opinions of their own programs. 
There is a new development in the area of radio propaganda. The Radio of 
Beijing has started a Hungarian language program speaking sharply against the 
Soviet Union and détente, though poor technical conditions make the reception 
of its broadcasts difficult for the time being. 
As far as propaganda through the television is concerned, the United States 
is currently broadcasting experimental programs through satellites. This means 
that within a few years Western television programs will probably be received 
easily in the socialist countries, including our country too. 
III. The hostile propaganda, which mainly targets the intelligentsia, young 
people, the lower middle-class and those with a petty bourgeoisie mentality, can 
not influence public opinion, political thinking and the frame of mind of the 
people in the country in any significant way. Hungarian public opinion is 
I 
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largely shaped by the results of socialist development, the policy of our party 
and the constantly strengthening elements of socialist public thinking. 
The decrease in the listening rate of the programs of Radio Free Europe, 
and in general, Western radio broadcasts, is due - in addition to the stable 
political situation in Hungary - to the fact that the work of the mass media in 
the country is much more efficient and up-to-date, and the level of providing 
information for the people has improved significantly. However, the viewing 
and listening rate of hostile radio stations and television programs that can be 
received easily in the western and southern parts of the country may temporarily 
increase in relation to some domestic or international events that are ignored by 
the national mass media for some reason, or their reaction is somewhat subdued 
and late. 
Wrinkles in socialist awareness, a still existing instinctive sentiment, 
remnants of bourgeoisie views and habits and their reproduction, occasional 
instances of intensifying individualism and acts and behaviors that violate the 
norms of socialist morals all create potentially favorable conditions for the 
imperialist propaganda campaigns. To some extent these factors, coupled with 
insufficient political-ideological vigilance and lack of effective propaganda, 
help maintain non-socialist view in public thinking, prejudices and a moral 
standing inherited from societies of the past, and manifestations of anti-social 
behavior. However, it should be admitted that sometimes real mistakes and 
shortcomings are criticized, which are then attributed by many exclusively to 
the results of hostile propaganda. 
Closely related to bourgeois propaganda is the intensification of 
nationalism, a still strong anti-Soviet sentiment, the occasional desparagement 
of the achievements of socialism, the entertainment of illusions about the 
capitalist system, the dissemination of false information and the overstatement 
of our internal and external problems. The hostile propaganda is especially 
efficient in making use of the shortcomings of our information system in 
relation to issues concerning the situation in each socialist country, to the 
position of the sister parties and the way in which relations among the socialist 
countries and the sister parties are viewed. 
From time to time we give a head start to the bourgeois propaganda 
campaigns by failing to recognize the imperialist endeavors in time, due to 
subjective and objective reasons, by wasting time in drawing the necessary 
conclusions or by not making use of the right conclusions in our national and 
international propaganda. In certain cases there are international obligations that 
restrict our ability to provide the necessary information. 
IV. On the basis of the resolution of the Politburo dated May 22, 1973 the 
fight against bourgeois propaganda has become an organic part of political and 
ideological work. The need for this fight has been confirmed by the lllh 
Congress of the party and by several resolutions of the Politburo and other party 
organs on information and emigration policy. As a result of the resolution of the 
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Central Committee dated October 26, 1976 - specifying the current tasks and 
the further development of party propaganda - more emphasis has been given to 
a more effective ideological training of activists at local party organizations, 
which is a prerequisite for acting against the hostile views propagated by 
bourgeois propaganda. 
Our national and international propaganda and information policy takes up 
the fight against hostile propaganda and ideology by representing our general 
policy in a more convincing fashion, by painting a more appealing picture of 
existing socialism, and by unveiling the true nature of imperialist policy and the 
reality of capitalism. We respond to western campaigns launched against us and 
the entire socialist community in specific issues in a very cool and principled 
manner by providing positive arguments. With certain exceptions we refrain 
from entering into direct disputes with outlets of bourgeois media. 
In the past five years a harmonized and operative system of observing, 
analyzing and evaluating hostile propaganda has been established. The state 
organs responsible for monitoring foreign propaganda provide regular and 
scheduled reports. The Central Committee of KISZ (Communist Youth 
Organization) has recently started the regular monitoring and evaluation of 
bourgeois propaganda targeting the youth of our country. 
The four departments of the Central Committee of HSWP involved in this 
work - the Departments of Propaganda, Public Administration, Foreign Affairs 
and Science, Culture and Public Education - and six other state bodies - the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the Institute of Cultural 
Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hungarian Radio, the Hungarian 
Press Agency - set up an evaluation team which fulfills its tasks well. The team 
constantly monitors hostile propaganda materials and broadcasts, and prepares a 
comprehensive evaluation report in every quarter. 
Based on this well-established system the Department of Propaganda of the 
party conducts an up-to-date monitoring and evaluation of the hostile 
propaganda targeting our country. The data are utilized in the following five 
ways: quarterly summaries are prepared on the main tendencies; thematic 
summaries are prepared on the bourgeois reception of our political measures 
and statements; weekly reports are made on the hostile evaluation of events that 
influence public opinion in the country; occasional information on certain 
specific bourgeois propaganda campaigns; the various departments of the 
Central Committee are continuously informed of the bourgeois commentaries 
that are relevant to their work. As a result, the level of providing information for 
the leaders has improved significantly. However, the utilization of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from these analyses for our domestic and foreign 
propaganda work is still not sufficient. 
In the past few years the members of our party have become more prepared 
and trained for the fight against hostile propaganda. The most important 
element of this increased competence is that they show ideological and political 
unity, they are well trained and informed about the propaganda targeting our 
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coun t ry , and t hey a re p r o v i d e d w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n m a t e r i a l s t h a t con ta in some 
good a r g u m e n t a t i o n . H o w e v e r , t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e p a r t y , e s p e c i a l l y t h e activists 
w o r k i n g at t h e local o r g a n i z a t i o n s cal l f o r a m o r e p r o m p t r e s p o n s e t o the rumors 
of hos t i l e p r o p a g a n d a at e v e r y level o f t h e h i e r a r c h y o f t h e p a r t y and require 
tha t t h e y shou ld b e p r o v i d e d w i t h a m p l e i n f o r m a t i o n m a t e r i a l s on a regular 
bas is by t h e c o m p e t e n t pa r ty c o m m i t t e e s and t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y information 
shou ld b e m a d e a v a i l a b l e v e r b a l l y to all t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e p a r t y . 
The work of the radio tapping station that monitors most of the propaganda 
against our country does not meet the increased requirements, mainly due to 
technical problems, the lack of political selection and personnel problems. The 
information about hostile propaganda is still not comprehensive enough, e.g. 
information concerning the experience that could be gained in areas like the 
churches, tourism and social organizations is still lacking. Furthermore, there is 
no evaluation or analysis that could predict the possible future tendencies of 
imperialist propaganda. 
As a result of the work conducted in the scientific institutes of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Foreign Affairs there has 
been some progress recently in the scientific analysis of the propagandistic 
machinations of bourgeois ideology. The institutes mentioned above have 
established extensive relations with similar institutes of our friendly countries. 
However, the coordination of their work at home is still not ensured, and there 
is no rational division of labor among them. Although it has prepared very 
valuable materials concerning certain important issues, the Institute of Foreign 
Affairs has not yet become a scientific center that can provide long-term 
analyses of hostile propaganda. Another unresolved issue is the investigation of 
the impact of hostile propaganda. 
The system of press-administration that is used to protect our country from 
hostile propaganda works quite efficiently. Its tasks have multiplied by now, so 
the staff in this area is working under a lot of pressure. The technical and 
personnel background supporting their versatile work in organizing and 
selecting information requires considerable development. 
The work concerning the protection of our country from hostile radio 
broadcasts should be revised. As a result of the resolution of the Politburo dated 
October 8, 1963 the jamming of the programs of western radio station in the 
Hungarian language was terminated as of January 1, 1964. However, the 
resolution also stipulated that the technical system used for jamming should be 
maintained and re-installed, if necessary, within 48 hours. The transmitters, 
antennas and accessories that were installed 26 years ago are by now totally out-
of-date, and for technical reasons some of them had to be eliminated. Under 
such circumstances, the system is only partly capable of fulfilling its task, if the 
need should arise for it. Without overall reconstruction and the replacement of 
missing devices, within a few years the whole system will become unable to 
meet any of the requirements set forth by the resolution of the Politburo. Full 
reconstruction and replacement would require significant financial resources. 
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Since 1968 our jamming stations - upon a Soviet request - j am western 
programs broadcast in the Czech and Slovakian languages. We have no 
information at all as to how efficient the jamming of these stations is, or 
whether jamming is still needed. 
The exchange of views concerning hostile propaganda has become part of 
the ideological cooperation among the sister parties of the socialist countries. 
The party delegations visiting our country and the Budapest embassies of our 
friendly states regularly request and are provided with information about our 
experience gained in dealing with imperialist propaganda. We also receive such 
information from some of our sister parties through their embassies. We have 
also exchanged ideas on this issue with several western sister parties, such as 
the Italian Communist Party, the French Communist Party, the Austrian 
Communist Party and the German Communist Party. The relevant state bodies 
of socialist countries have also established a similarly comprehensive 
framework of cooperation. However, international experience is not utilized 
efficiently in our everyday work." 
The Secretariat accepted the report. It establishes that as a result of the 
execution of the resolution made by the Politburo at its meeting on October 8, 
1963 the fight against imperialist propaganda, as an organic part of ideological 
and political work, has become more oriented towards its main goal and more 
argumentative and organized in its character. 
The impact of propaganda targeting our country should continue to be 
countered - on the basis of the resolution of the Politburo - by firmly 
representing our policy, by presenting an authentic picture of our problems and 
accomplishments and by taking the initiative and the offensive in issues that 
demonstrate the advantages of a socialist system. The preparedness, disciple 
and alertness of party members, the provision of ample information within the 
party and the development of verbal propaganda are all of primary importance. 
To achieve this goal, regular information materials and recommendations 
should be worked out on the basis of the monitoring of hostile propaganda so 
that the activists of the party, the state and social organizations that are involved 
in propaganda work targeting the masses could argue more convincingly for our 
interests, position and policy and respond to hostile views more instantaneously. 
It is especially important to provide a better training for those who are involved 
in giving information to foreigners who visit our country, especially for tourist 
guides. The recommendations prepared quarterly or in relation to certain 
important events, which are meant to assist political work, should become in 
integral part of analyzing and evaluating hostile propaganda. When analyzing 
the attitude of the people on a regular basis the party organizations in Budapest 
and the counties should pay special attention to the views that reflect the actual 
presence and impact of foreign propaganda. On this basis they should draw the 
necessary conclusions for their own propaganda work. 
The scientific basis for the long-term analysis of hostile propaganda should 
be strengthened considerably. Since the strategy of hostile propaganda is 
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unlikely to change and its tactics can be monitored by systematic methods, there 
is no need to set up a new and big staff for the long-term analysis of this 
propaganda. Instead most of the attention should be focused on a better 
utilization of the existing bodies and institutions and on establishing more 
effective cooperation among them. To this end, the Institute of Social Studies of 
the Central Committee should continue to investigate the trends of bourgeois 
ideology, while the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should ensure that the Hungarian Institute 
of Foreign Affairs continues to analyze the strategy and tactics of imperialist 
propaganda as part of its research activities. Building on the work of these two 
basic institutions our work should be concentrated on the systematic analysis of 
the relations between bourgeois ideology and propaganda, making use of 
information and experience that we gain through our party and state relations. 
The Mass Media Research Center of the Hungarian Radio and Television 
should be provided with all the conditions that are necessary to conduct 
research into the effects of hostile propaganda by using tools of opinion surveys 
on a regular basis and with due care. 
There is no need to further enhance the range of bodies and institutions that 
are involved in the analysis of imperialist propaganda campaigns. The main task 
is that the bodies and institutions of the party, the sate and various social 
organizations involved in monitoring hostile propaganda should cooperate in 
their activities much more efficiently in the future. To this end the State Office 
for Church Affairs, the People's Patriotic Front, the National Council of Trade 
Unions, the Communist Youth Organization and the bodies supervising tourism 
should, in every quarter, make available all the information that they have to the 
team that is engaged in evaluating hostile propaganda. 
In addition to periodica! reports, special reports should also be prepared 
which investigate how a significant event related to Hungary has been received 
by hostile propaganda. In the future evaluation work should also be extended to 
the Chinese propaganda that targets our country. It should be ensured that the 
information on hostile propaganda campaigns provided for the highest party and 
state leadership is more to the point and coordinated. Monitoring work and 
evaluation should be followed by processing relevant information and 
experience and by drawing the necessary conclusions. 
The network of jamming and monitoring hostile radio broadcasts targeting 
Hungary should be brought up to a level that can meet the new requirements 
today. The reception center of the Hungarian Press Agency stationed outside 
Budapest should gradually be developed into a high-capacity radio-monitoring 
center by installing modern devices in accordance with our available financial 
resources. In this way a new service should be set up that can meet the special 
demands of all the state organizations involved in monitoring hostile 
propaganda at a high political and technological level. In addition to monitoring 
hostile broadcasts, this center should also be responsible for recording the 
broadcasts of press agencies transmitted through radio waves and, very soon, 
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through satellites as well as the Hungarian language programs broadcast by 
neighboring socialist countries. The Department of Propaganda, the Department 
of Public Administration and the Department of Foreign Affairs should consult 
with the affected bodies (National Defense Committee, Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Office, 
Hungarian Press Agency) and based on these negotiations a development plan 
which takes into consideration the realities of our economic possibilities should 
be made to set up a modern radio center - in several phases, if necessary - that 
can be used in several ways. The development plan should be submitted to the 
Secretariat by the Department of Propaganda in the second half of 1979. 
The broadcasts of the Austrian Television that can be received in a 
significant part of the country and those of other western television stations 
received through Austria should be put on the list of programs to be monitored 
regularly, and the leadership should be informed of any aspects of these 
broadcasts that may involve Hungary. The Secretariat commissions the 
president of the Hungarian Television to work out the necessary system of 
monitoring in cooperation with the state bodies concerned. The party 
committees of the counties by the Austrian border should provide regular 
information on how these programs affect the people in their county. 
Investigations should be conducted to assess the possible impact of 
broadcasting television programs directly through satellites, and the political 
and technical tasks in regard to this new development should be specified 
without delay. 
The working conditions of the system of press-administration that is 
involved in protecting our country from hostile propaganda should be improved 
considerably. A short-term and a long-term plan of what measures should be 
taken to achieve this goal in accordance with our current financial possibilities 
should be submitted to the competent state bodies by the president of the 
Information Office, after consulting with the leaders of the Hungarian Post. 
The Secretariat deems it. justified that relevant sections of the resolution 
made by the Politburo on the protection of our country from hostile radio 
propaganda on October 8, 1963 be revised. To prepare for the necessary 
decisions, the Secretariat commissions the Department of Propaganda, the 
Department of Public Administration and the Department of Industry, 
Agriculture and Transportation of the Central Committee to make a report for 
the Politburo on this issue. Together with the Department of Industry, 
Agriculture and Transportation of the Central Committee the Department of 
Foreign Affairs should discuss the efficiency of and the need for jamming 
western radio programs broadcast in the Czech and Slovakian language. 
Besides the „strictly confidential" mimeographed daily news-bulletin, the 
special section of the Hungarian News Agency internally published other 
regular, confidential information-bulletins about the programs of the foreign 
radio stations: „Appendix to the daily news-bulletin", „RFE-Western radio 
stations weekly-bulletin", „Weekly bulletin about the Hungarian language 
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programs of the Western radio stations", „Addendum to the Weekly bulletin 
about the Hungarian language programs of the Western radio stations", Military 
bulletin - Hungarian language programs of Western radio stations", „ S p e c i a l 
editions", and „Expert editions". 
Departments of the Central Committee, ministries and the Information 
Office of the Council of Ministers had the right to order special monitoring 
services. The Information Office regularly ordered transcripts of Hungarian 
news-survey programs of the Western radios, while the Ministry of the Interior 
acquired the full text of all programs which were based on the letters or 
messages sent by Hungarian listeners. (In this way the Ministry tried to follow 
the changes of the mood of the population as they were represented in 
correspondence with the western stations, in order to complement the heavily 
biased internal population attitude polls and the reports of party functionaries 
and professional and so-called „informal" secret agents.) The Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministiy of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers, were all entitled to give special 
assignments to the monitoring section and to order specialized thematic 
bulletins.122 
The list of those members of the nomenclature who were to receive the 
confidential bulletins was kept in a safe in the headquarters of the MTI. After 
the political transition the list was allegedly lost, but according to former 
employees of the News Agency, while at the beginning only a few dozen 
functionaries were on the list, later on the mimeographed daily news-bulletin 
was internally published in between 150 and 300 copies, while the weekly 
editions reached a much wider audience.123 These are not insignificant numbers: 
it is safe to state that the wider leadership of the Hungarian party received 
regular, almost objective information about all the politically significant 
programs of RFE; the information was not intentionally distorted, was not 
commented upon, and the most important issues were covered extensively, with 
full-text versions of the transcripts. 
7. On 24 March, 1969 the Politburo of the Hungarian party decided to set up a 
„Foreign Propaganda Sub-Department" inside the Agitation and Propaganda 
122 MÁRTA SZOMOR: Radio monitoring and its publications at the MTI (Rádiófigyelés 
Kiadványai az MTI-ben). Budapest, Mimeo. July, 2004. 5-6. p. 
123 The members of the nomenclature were the so-called „cadres". This military term is 
usually applied in communist parlance to young workers or peasants brought to work outside their 
trade in the communist-party bureaucracy or state apparatus, and therefore strongly dependent on 
the party for their livelihood. This made cadres averse to reforms and strongly supportive of the 
existing party leadership. For the party, cadres became all-purpose officials ready to accept any 
post to which they were assigned. They would often serve successively in the state apparatus, in 
production and in the party apparatus. They provided one of the broadest and most important 
bases for the communist party. 
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Department of the Central Committee.124 The Sub-Department was instructed to 
monitor and regularly evaluate the „enemy propaganda directed against our 
People's Democracy" and to set up an „evaluating committee" with 
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Interior, as 
well as delegates from the Institute of Cultural Relations (an important 
intelligence cover organization), the Hungarian News Agency and the 
Hungarian Radio. The committee had to prepare quarterly reports about the 
recent tendencies of „enemy propaganda". The first report covered the third 
quarter of 1969. The reports were sent to the members of the Politburo, the 
Secretariat, to the Department Heads of the Central Committee and to a few 
other high-ranking officials, whose work was specifically related to either 
international or domestic propaganda, aud coutáev-ptop&gMvda. A»cc<Mdmg to a 
memorandum sent 6y the then head of the Agitation and Propaganda 
Department to János Kádár, First Secretary of the party, the work of the 
evaluation committee was not exceptional in the socialist countries, and the 
party leaderships of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union 
had suggested to the Hungarian Central Committee that they share experiences 
and exchange the evaluation reports. (In the spirit of mutual distrust, the 
Secretariat decided in the end to share the information only with the specialized 
agencies of the Soviet Union.)125 
Following the decision of the Politburo, from the third quarter of 1969 
onwards, the evaluation committee started producing and distributing its 
reports, thus supplementing the copious information already available about 
enemy radio programs. The evaluation reports quote extensively from the 
publications of the western press, from the programs of the „enemy radio 
stations", referring verbatim to the propaganda materials of western 
organizations. They employ only the minimal necessary markers to distance the 
stand of the evaluators from the views of the western media: they use quotation 
marks when referring to the „evaluation" and the „analysis" of the western 
„experts" and „specialists"; when quoting from the western media, the 
evaluators preface quotations with expressions such as: „falsifying the actual 
situation, western analysts state...", or „misinterpreting recent developments, 
they claim...", or „allegedly focusing on...", or „creating the illusion...". The 
Communist counter-propagandists refer to „the center of imperialist propaganda 
machinery", to „those who are interested in the loosening of control over the 
society"; to those, who use „objectivity" (in between quotation marks), who are 
careful to convey the „appearance of objectivity", who talk or write 
„objectively". 
124 See HNA M - K S - 2 8 8 . f. 5/486. Ő. e. 
125 Memo to Comrade János Kádár from Sándor Jakab, head of the Agitation and 
Propaganda Department for the meeting of the Politburo of the HSWP. 16 December, 1969. See 
HNA M - K S - 2 8 8 . f. 5/508. ö. e. 
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Still, compared to the transcripts of the programs, there were very important 
differences. The transcripts were verbatim full texts of broadcasts; the technical 
personnel had nothing to do with the content, they did not become involved in 
any possible way. The evaluation reports, however, were no longer impersonal: 
the members of the committee were known; the head or the deputy of the 
Agitation and Propaganda Department signed the report.126 Judged on the basis 
of both the style and even the content of the reports, these texts were more 
personal than the program transcripts. The tone of the reports was not very far 
from the voice of an attentive, cautious, somewhat uneasy observer. It is not an 
unfounded claim that, in a certain way, the evaluators, and to a certain extent 
even the readers of the reports, interiorized, in somewhat perverted way, the 
perspective and the actual content of the narrative. 
The evaluators no longer claimed that the other side aimed at overthrowing 
the Communist regime; they usually used the expression „their aim was to 
loosen up the control of the regime over society". Reading the report it is 
obvious that by the end of the 1960s the Communist experts had become 
convinced that the Western propagandists were not in the business of inciting a 
rebellion, On the contrary, those were the times of uncomfortable, involuntary -
if not peaceful, at least inevitable - coexistence between the two sides of the 
Cold War. 
The end of the 1960s significantly differed from the previous decade, 
especially from the voice of pre-1956 times, when the most popular RFE 
program was the so-called „Black Book", which exposed and named especially 
cruel Communist functionaries and petty officials at specific institutions, 
factories, firms and localities, thus creating the impression that the Radios were 
actually there, in the vicinity, inside the workplace, ready to uncover those who 
were responsible for the daily suffering of the local community.127 The „Black 
Book" program was based on the supposed quick collapse of the regime, after 
which those who had been named and singled out as responsible for the cruel 
repression would be dully punished. Before 1956 the time horizon was limited: 
the period was still considered to be transitory. Former aristocrats turned cab 
drivers were still addressed by the concierge of the nationalized apartment 
building as if they had managed to keep their former title and social status.128 
126 After 1973 the hard-liner Karoly Gr6sz, Deputy Head of the Department, later on the last 
Secretary General of the Hungarian Party, put his signature on the submitted documents. (The 
„hard-liners" in the HSWP leadership showed no inclination to make political changes or 
concessions.) 
127 Besides the „Black Book", according to the interviews, the other highly popular program 
was the regular broadcast of gypsy music - unauthentic, urbanized fake folk music - the favorite 
of the dclass middle class. See: A re-examination of the program-reference of Hungarian listeners 
of Radio Free Europe. Audience Reserach, RFE, July 1959, 
URBAN, GEORGE R. (1921-): Radio Free Europe and the pursuit of democracy: my war 
within the Cold War. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1997. passim. 
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The 1956 revolution, or its defeat - when the discrepancy between the 
„liberation theory" or the liberation rhetoric of the American administration and 
cruel reality became evident - in a strange and paradoxical way contributed to 
the world-wide stability of the divided world. The launch of the Sputnik 
signaled the end of the period of transition and the arrival of involuntary dtente. 
Both sides gave up their hopes of imminent victory, and tried to readjust to 
hopeless long-term coexistence.129 
The reports of the evaluation committee are characteristic traces of this 
period. It would be highly instructive to conduct a serious, laborious 
philological analysis and compare the language, the vocabulary, and the career 
of certain formulae in the course of the East-West dialogue on the air. 
Communism or its representation was a joint construct: the result of a not-so-
obvious but permanent dialogue between the strategists on the two sides. RFE 
monitored, recorded, and transcribed the broadcasts of the official East and 
Central European radio stations. The summary transcripts'30 with short English 
summaries, together with so called „situation reports" and background papers 
were sent as telegrams to Washington, where in the morning when the officials 
arrived at their offices in the State Department and in other specialized 
agencies, they found the daily transcripts on their desks. Responses were sent to 
the Political Analyst Department and to the programs of the Radios with 
instructions about how to respond to the Communist propaganda.13 ' And as we 
already know, in Budapest and in Gödöllő, in all the East European capitals, 
monitors and technical staff were busy listening, jamming, recording and 
transcribing verbatim the enemy radio broadcasts and sending daily bulletins to 
the select group of addressees at the Agitation and Propaganda Department of 
the Central Committee, at the Ministry of the Interior and at other covert or 
even not-so-covert agencies, which had to right to instruct the national radios 
about how to counter the „enemy propaganda". The evaluation team regularly 
analyzed the tone and content of the RFE programs and submitted suggestions 
to the Secretariat and the Politburo, about how to instruct the media, especially 
the national radio service in the foreseeable future. What the unsuspecting 
listener heard in the solitude of his room, while listening either to the national 
radio or secretly to the RFE programs was just one single voice, one side of this 
ongoing dialogue above his head between the programmers, the political 
strategists, the public opinion experts on the two sides. 
The possibility of perpetual alterations encouraged the perpetual hope of 
change. Even after the reforms had run aground - in the first half of 1968, 
129 MlCHlE, ALLAN A.: Voices through the Iron Curtain: the Radio Free Europe story. Dodd, 
Mead & Co., New York, 1963. passim. 
130 Which are strikingly similar to the Hungarian mimeographed daily news-bulletins, and 
which are stored - as mentioned above - in the OSA in Budapest. 
131 HART, HENRY 0 . : Emergent collective opinion and upheaval in East Europe and the role 
of radio communication: a further extension of basic models. Speech Communication, March 
1980. 
132 The sources which published the documents of the political transition are also significant 
for their examination of the international background of the Hungarian transition. See: The 1989 
Minutes of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi 
Bizottságának 1989. évi jegyzőkönyvei.) Vols. 1-2., Anna Kosztricz, János Lakos, Karola Vági 
Némethné, László Soós, György T. Varga, (eds.) 1TNA, Budapest, 1993, 
133 BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW: The Grand Failure: The Birth and Decay of Communism in the 
Twentieth Century. Charles Schribner's Sons New York. 1989. 
immediately after the introduction of the first reform measures - it was still 
possible to keep hoping that alterations would - one fine day - mean change. 
The alterations institutionalized ambiguity, uncertainty, and the institutionalized 
impossibility of foreknowledge. Nothing was what it purported to be, 
everything had became a sign of something else from which quite different 
conclusions could be easily drawn. The initiated claimed to discern battles 
between modernizers and conservatives, independents and adherents of the 
Soviet neo-Stalinists, between the forces of good and evil, progressives and 
régressives, whatever these categorized might have meant. 
In the meantime reform had become completely disembodied; its condition 
reduced to a ghostly state in which its own anti-thesis had become an element of 
its existence. The leadership was in need of support from the West, the help 
coming from (interpreters and evaluators of) the Western propaganda. They 
needed to show themselves up as martyrs of progression, who try the impossible 
in the face of the constant pressure coming from the inflexible East. They 
pretended that without the limits set by Moscow, Hungary, and socialism would 
move quicker and further in the direction of the envisioned end of history. By 
making good use of the consciously misperceived Western reactions they not 
only presented themselves as martyrs of the (whichever) faith, but started to see 
themselves in this light, under this new description as well.132 
At the beginning of the changes in 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
ended jamming, allowing Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty signals to reach a 
broader audience and allowing RFE/RL services to enter into a closer 
relationship with the people and journalists to whom they were broadcasting. 
RFE/RL's contribution to the end of communism in this region was 
acknowledged by virtually everyone.133 Polish leader Lech Walesa said its role 
was comparable to the one the sun plays to the earth. Former Estonian President 
Lennart Meri nominated Radio Free Europe for the Nobel Peace Prize and then-
Russian President Boris Yeltsin personally intervened to help create an RFE 
bureau in Moscow after the failed August 1991 coup. Former Czech President 
Vaclav Havel spoke for many when he said that „we need your professionalism 
and your ability to see events from a broad perspective". 
Because of Radio Free Europe's role in fighting communism, many thought 
that the radios had fulfilled their mission and could be disbanded. But officials 
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across the region stressed the continuing need for precisely the kind of 
broadcasts RFE has brought to this region. Radio Free Europe did cut back in 
some areas even as it expanded in others. It closed its Hungarian service in 
1993, and the Polish Service in 1997, while its Czech Service was substantially 
reduced and joined with Czech Public Radio to establish a new public affairs 
radio program. The Broadcasting Board of Governors in Washington ended 
funding for broadcasting to the Czech Republic September 30, 2002.134 
In January 1994, RFE/RL began broadcasts to the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia. In October 1998, the Persian Language (Farsi) Service began 
broadcasting to Iran, and Radio Free Iraq began broadcasting in Arabic to Iraq. 
In March 1999, RFE/RL started broadcasting to Kosovo in Albanian and in 
2001 the Latvian service launched a special bridge-building program in Russian 
for the Russian minority in Latvia. In September 2001, RFE/RL started 
broadcasting to Macedonia in both Macedonian and Albanian languages. 
Broadcasting in Dari and Pashto to Afghanistan began January 30, 2002. 
RFE/RL's newest language service, the North Caucasus, began broadcasting in 
Avar, Chechen, and Circassian on April 3, 2002. Currently (in 2005), RFE/RL's 
20 services broadcast programs in the following 28 languages: Albanian, 
Arabic, Armenian, Avar, Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Belarusian, Bosnian, Chechen, 
Circassian, Crimean Tatar, Dari, Georgian, Kazakh, Kurdish, Kyrgyz, 
Macedonian, Moldovan, Pashto, Persian, Russian, Serbian, Tajik, Tatar, 
Turkmen, Ukrainian, and Uzbek. With all these changes, the future of RFE/RL 
seems assured. Its services will continue to bring news and information to 
people who need them in the 21st century. 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has the same five goals, constantly. First, 
to provide objective news, analysis, and discussion of domestic and regional 
issues crucial to successful democratic and free-market transformations. 
Second, to help to strengthen civil societies by projecting democratic values. 
Third, to strive to combat ethnic and religious intolerance by promoting mutual 
understanding among all groups. Fourth, to establish a model for local media, 
assist in training to enhance media professionalism and independence and, when 
possible, develops partnerships with local media outlets. Fifth, to seek to foster 
closer ties between the countries of this region and the world's established 
democracies. '" 
Western broadcasts had a remarkable impact in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe in the circumstances of the Cold War. They reached mass audiences, as 
documented by traveler surveys at the time and confirmed now by evidence 
from the formerly closed Communist archives. They reached key elites, both 
134 See Removing of RFE. RFE/RL Review, Week of June 12-18, 2003. New address: 
Vinohradska 1, 110 00 Prague 1. Czech Republic. Tel.: 011.420.2.2112.1111, Fax 
011.420.2.2112.3002. 
135 A. Ross JOHNSON - R. EUGENE PARTA: Cold War International Broadcasting: Lessons 
Learned. Presentation to a seminar on „Communicating with the Islamic World" Annenberg 
Foundation Trust, Rancho Mirage, California, February 5, 2005. Mimeo, 6. p. 
8 4 - BÊLA RÉVÉSZ 
w i t h i n t h e C o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s a n d a m o n g r e g i m e o p p o n e n t s . T h e k e y s to the 
m a s s a n d e l i t e a u d i e n c e s w e r e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y a n d r e l e v a n c e o f t h e b roadcas t s . 
G o v e r n m e n t m e c h a n i s m s w e r e g e a r e d t o p r o v i d i n g p u b l i c f u n d i n g and 
o v e r s i g h t w h i l e e n s u r i n g m a n a g e m e n t a u t o n o m y a n d j o u r n a l i s t i c i n d e p e n d e n c e . 
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Appendix 1 
The Organization Chart of the Former State Security Service 
(Ministry of the Interior Section III) 




Deputy Interior Minister responsible 
for state security 
(also Chief of Section III of the IM) 
Dir I Dir II Dir III Dir IV Dir V Autonomous Depts 
Directorate I 
(Intelligence) 
Dept. 1: political and economic intelligence; USA 
Dept. 2: other foreign affairs 
Dept 3: West German affairs 
Dept. 4: Israel, the Vatican, Church émigré affairs 
Dept. 5: technical and scientific affairs 
Dept. 6: information and valuating 
Dept. 7: other Hungarian émigré groups 
Depts. 8: î 1 legali intelligence 
Depts. 9: operations 
Depts. 10: personal, methodology 
Depts. 11 : third countries 
Depts. 12: legal intelligence 
Depts. 13: secret codes 
I -X. Autonomous Department: operative connections 
I -Y. Autonomous Department: security of ambassadories 
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Direc tora te I I 
(Counterintelligence - Depts. 1 -5 : offensive work, 6-10: genera! defensive 
and investigative-screening work) 
Dept. 1 : countering the intelligence activities of the USA 
Dept. 2.; West Germany 
Dept. 3.: NATO 
Dept. 4.: others 
Dept. 5.: operative measures abroad 
Dept. 6.; defence industry, telecommunications, traffic 
Dept. 7.: international co-operation, secrets of state 
Dept. 8.: investigation of hostile intelligence agents 
Depts. 9.: information and valuating 
Depts. 10.: countering third countries 
Depts, 11.: secretariat 
Directora te I I I 
(Internal Protection) 
Dept. 1 : countering Church reactionaries 
Dept. 2: youth protection 
Sub-dept. A: universities, institutions of higher education 
Sub-dept, B: youth clubs, events 
Dept. 3: countering „hostile elements" (e.g. convicted political offenders) 
Dept. 4: countering of hostile cultural activities 
A. Autonomous Sub-dept,: Protection of political leaders 
B. Autonomous Sub-dept.: information and valuating 
Secretariat 
Direc tora te IV 
(Military Counterintelligence) 
Direc tora te V 
(Operative techniques) 
Autonomous Depa r tmen t s 
Dept. 1.: state security investigation (sub. depts: counterespionage, 
countering of internal reaction, military counterintelligence - including 
prison intelligence) 
Dept. 2: undercover surveillance and environment investigation, operative 
observers 
Dept. 3: secret checking of the mail (,,K"-checking Dept.) 
Dept. 4: tapping of telephones, operative-technical wire-tapping („X"-
checking Dept.) 
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Dept. 5: radio countermeasures and investigation (foreign broadcasts) 
Dept. 6: Personnel 
Secretariat 
Source: 1M CA 10-530/1972. 
J 




THE HARVEST OF 
NATIONAL SELF-DEFENCE 
WHO DOES THE HARVEST BELONG TO? 
The harvesting has started. Farmers are reaping the fruits of their year's labour. 
At this time, we must all ask ourselves a question: „On whose table will our 
grain end up?" Will it be the children who will eat pastry baked from the wheat 
you cultivated, will it be your wife who will slice bread baked from the rye 
which you sowed, will it be your relatives and friends who will receive a share 
from your crops? Or will it be the insatiable throat of the Soviet Union and the 
short-weighing state trade who swallow up the labour of your caloused hands? 
WE WILL NOT PAY FOR THE REGIME'S MISTAKES! 
Today you will decide what it will be like in winter. Remember that the recent 
Party Congress confirmed beyond any doubt that the regime's agricultural 
policy ends up in a total breakdown. Siroky had to concede that the U.A.C.'s 
struggle for bare existence, yields per hectare do not measure up to pre-war 
standards, cultivated area decreased by half-a-million hectares, milk production 
is dropping, there is a shortage of meat, young cattle die in droves. What does it 
mean? It means that the looting of the countryside by obligatory deliveries will 
be worse this year than ever. The regime will try to steal from our mouths what 
it has wasted in its irresponsible economy. 
It is up to us to upset the Government's plans for blackmail. Let us state: 
The harvest belongs to who has cultivated it. It does not belong to the 
blackmailing state apparatus which has led our agriculture into bankruptcy by 
nonsensical interventions. The People's Opposition must step in, it cannot wait 
for crumbs from the nobleman's table of the regime. 
Last year, in June, the people proved that the power of a totalitarian state 
has its limits and that the regime must take public opinion into account. It 
forced upon the regime lower delivery duties, higher purchasing prices and 
cheaper credit. Encouraged by these results, the people's opposition will realize 
further demands. 
THE PEOPLE IS NOT POWERLESS! 
Is it possible to fight the regime successfully in our field and meadows? True, 
an individual is helpless against tommy guns. But it is not necessary to run great 
risks. As you have, millions of harvesting farmers are finding this message, and 
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millions of farmers are listening to the Radio Free Europe. Everybody knows 
that this is the HARVEST OF NATIONAL SELF-DEFENCE. The silent unity 
of our people is in action. What you will do, millions of farmers will do, and 
there is nothing the regime could undertake against such unity of the People's 
Opposition. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE AND WHERE? 
Every village dweller and everyone who has to do something with the harvest 
constitutes a link of the People's Opposition. You yourself know best what 
possibilities are open to you in your surroundings. Use every chance you have 
in your position. 
Independent Farmers 
The Sixth Demand of the People's Opposition says: „If the prescribed delivery 
target is not fulfilled, it means that the state misjudged the harvest." Satisfy the 
needs of your family first. If this means that you cannot fulfill the delivery, it is 
the duty of the National Committee to revise it downwards. Nobody, too, has 
the right to force you to harvest together with a U.A.C. 
U.A.C. Members 
Distribute your wages in kind right at the thrashing machine! Bitter experience 
have taught you already that the regime will never give you your due unless you 
make sure to get it. Your families come first, the purchasing apparatus 
afterwards. 
Source: HOLT, ROBERT, T.: The Origins of Radio Free Europe. In Holt, Robert, T.: Radio 
Free Europe. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958. Appendix. 
9 0 - BELA REVESZ 
Appendix 3 
Report to the [HSWP]Politburo on jamming hostile radio stations 
Budapest, October 1, 1963. 
I. 
1./ The governments of capitalist countries have been developing their 
radio propaganda that target other, especially socialist countries, to a significant 
degree. Year after year they invest huge amounts in installing new broadcasting 
stations and in improving the reception of their programs. 
In 1959 the government of the United States used 85 stations with a total 
capacity of 2,000 kW to broadcast the programs of „The Voice of America". By 
1962 this capacity increased to 99 stations and 9,000 kW. Recently a new 
broadcasting station was opened with six 300 kW transmitters each. The 
construction of another six 250 kW and six 500 kW transmitters and 93 modern 
antennas is also underway. 
According to the Information Agency of the government of the United 
States the Congress has again approved of significant amounts to invest in the 
technical development of „The Voice of America." As part of this project the 
broadcasting stations in Western Europe will be modernized and expanded, 
including the broadcasting capacity of „Radio Free Europe." A new radio 
station is being built on the island of Rodos in Greece on which the government 
has already spent USD 40 million. In addition, the US government has made an 
effort - with success - to lease the free broadcasting capacity of other countries. 
Though smaller in scope and size, the investment and development efforts 
of England, Western Germany and other capitalist countries with the same goal 
should not be underestimated either. For instance, the English government lias 
allocated GBP 4.5 million to improve the reception of the foreign language 
programs of the „BBC." 
2./ At present there are 11 capitalist countries broadcasting programs to 
Hungary on 143 wavelengths altogether 51 hours per day. Radio Free Europe 
broadcasts propaganda programs in Hungarian on 40 wavelengths. 
The largest number of wavelengths and the longest program times are used 
by the Voice of America and London. Radio Free Europe broadcasts programs 
in Hungarian on several wavelengths concurrently from early morning till 
midnight. 
3./ The foreign language programs of the People's Republic of Hungary 
have not been improved since 1950 - due to the lack of new stations. The 
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Hungarian Radio and Television currently broadcasts programs in 9 foreign 
languages136 through two 100 kW and one 135 kW medium wave stations. 
II. 
I./ The jamming of propaganda programs targeting our country from capitalist 
countries was organized by the Minister of Postal Services in 1952. At the same 
time a radio-protection agreement was made between the Hungarian, the Soviet 
and the Romanian posts. (Today Romania is no longer part of this cooperation.) 
The tasks related to the protection of Hungary from foreign radio programs 
is performed by the Central Telecommunications Office, while the stations are 
developed, run and maintained by the Technical Department of the Hungarian 
Radio and Television. Both organizations are supervised by the Ministry of 
Transportation and Postal Services. 
The Central Telecommunications Office carries out its function to protect 
the country from hostile foreign radio programs through running so-called local 
jamming centers and through assistance from our friendly countries. Thus it 
performs a dual tasks: 
a./ It oversees the work of the local jamming centers. These stations are 
installed in Budapest and Pécs. There are 22 stations at its disposal now, most 
of which have a capacity of 1 kW or smaller. Only one of them has a capacity 
of 15 kW, and the total capacity is 35 kW. The average monthly running time is 
3,000 program hours. 
b./ It organizes and coordinates protection work with our friendly 
countries. In this framework we receive assistance from the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia amounting to 4,050 and 480 transmission hours respectively. 
On our part we transmit 4,330 hours to the Soviet Union and 714 hours to 
Czechoslovakia. 
There are eight 15 kW stations and part of the capacity of one 100 kW 
station at our disposal to provide assistance to our friendly countries. These 
stations are installed in Székesfehérvár, Diósd and Szolnok. 
Except for the 100 kW station these transmitters are not capable of 
broadcasting radio programs and are thus used exclusively for jamming. 
The technical condition of these stations, due to their strain and overuse, is 
not satisfactory, and some of them do not even meet essential safety 
requirements. 
Protection is funded by the central budget, which costs HUF 40 million per 
year. 
As part of the cooperation with our friendly countries the costs of 
transmitting are mutually invoiced by Hungaiy and the Soviet Union on the 
136 (handwritten footnote) app. 22 hours per day. 
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basis of an accepted tariff. There is no significant difference between the 
number of transmission hours broadcast by each party. Still, there is a 
difference in the settlement of the accounts to the benefit of the Soviet U n i o n 
that amounts to HUF 20 million per year '" because the Soviets use stations with 
a bigger transmission capacity. At the moment our cooperation with 
Czechoslovakia does not include financial settlement of accounts. 
2./ The efficiency of jamming in the whole country is as follows: 30% 
between 5 - 9 in the morning, 80% between 9 AM - 3 PM, and 10% from 3 PM 
to 1 AM. (Handwritten insertion) The efficiency of jamming changes from 
region to region. It is the most efficient in Budapest and Pécs. It is quite 
efficient in the center of Budapest, but much less so in the outer districts. (End 
of handwritten insertion) The above percentage figures show that our protection 
work is not satisfactory at the moment. The foreign propaganda programs can 
be received in the whole country in the early morning and in the evening, when 
most people are at home, and even during the day people can easily find a 
wavelength that is not jammed. So listeners who know the program times and 
the wavelengths of these broadcasts can find a wavelength they can tune on 
practically any time during the day. 
Reasons for unsatisfactory performance: 
Unlike in our friendly countries, we have not developed our local jamming 
stations to the required extent. The existing transmitting stations are out-of-date 
and lack the required capacity. The antennas are also rather outdated. 
The assistance received from our friendly states is restricted to certain 
periods of the day, especially during daytime. 
Lack of political direction. The programs are not jammed with a view to 
their political content. Thus, the programs of Radio Free Europe are jammed the 
least. 
As a result of significant investment and development the propaganda 
programs of capitalist countries are broadcast by increasingly more powerful 
stations concurrently on several wavelengths. 
III. 
Based on the above assessment of the situation it is now time we revised the 
current practice of jamming foreign propaganda programs. Revision is justified 
by the following: 
As a result of the right policy the confidence towards the party and the 
government has grown significantly, and the political atmosphere in the country 
is positive. 
137 (handwritten footnote) included in the above mentioned HUF 40 million. 
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The tone of state-owned capitalist radio programs has changed recently; 
they are no longer as sharp as they used to be. 
To our knowledge the Soviet Union has terminated the jamming of 
American and English state-owned radio stations. 
Due to the way in which radio waves are transmitted on the one hand, and 
to the significant development of radio stations performed by capitalist 
countries on the other, one hundred percent jamming is impossible, or it would 
require investments that far exceed our present capabilities. (Based on the 
current situation 80% efficiency of jamming in the morning and evening hours 
would require an investment of HUF 5-600 million.) 
In our view the present international and domestic political situation makes 
it possible to terminate, partially or entirely, the jamming of foreign propaganda 
programs. 
In the case of partial termination the jamming of state-owned stations could 
be terminated. The existing jamming stations and the assistance received from 
our friends could then be devoted to a more effective jamming of the programs 
of „Radio Free Europe" and „Patrol." (Handwritten insertion) In this way we 
could enhance the efficiency of jamming but it still would not result in any 
substantial improvement. (End of handwritten insertion) 
Even in the case of full termination of jamming we believe the jamming 
capacity should be maintained and put on reserve. 
Since the Central Telecommunications Office is an administrative and 
executive body, political control and supervision should be made much more 
efficient and organized, for the Ministry of Transportation and Postal Services 
is neither competent nor capable of attending to this task. (Handwritten 
insertion) Therefore state supervision concerning the jamming of foreign radio 
stations should be rendered by the Ministry of the Interior. (End of handwritten 
insertion) 
In the interest of popularizing the results of our socialist development and 
cultural life it seems desirable to develop our foreign language radio programs 




\ J Alternative II (proposed by the Administrative Department of the 
Central committee) 
The present international and domestic situation makes it possible to 
partially terminate the jamming of foreign propaganda radio programs. 
Therefore the Politburo orders the Minister of Transportation and Postal 
Services to terminate the jamming of state-owned stations broadcasting in 
Hungarian from capitalist countries. At the same time the Politburo orders the 
minister to see to a more efficient jamming of the propaganda programs of 
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„Radio Free Europe" and „Patrol". The minister should conduct negotiations 
with our friendly countries providing assistance in this matter concerning the 
exact transmission times and wavelengths of the jamming transmissions - as 
specified in the resolution - and include all the details in an interstate 
agreement. 
2./ Alternative I (proposed by the Department of Industry and the 
Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee) 
3./The present international and domestic situation makes it possible to 
fully terminate the jamming of foreign propaganda radio programs. 
Therefore the Politburo orders the Minister of Transportation and Postal 
Services to terminate the jamming of stations broadcasting in Hungarian from 
capitalist countries. The minister should conduct negotiations with our friendly 
countries providing assistance in this matter concerning the modification of 
cooperation in this matter - as specified in the resolution - and include all the 
details in an interstate agreement. 
The Minister of Transportation and Postal Services should ensure that the 
local jamming centers are put on reserve and maintained properly so that the 
technical facilities should remain in running condition. 
4./ The competence to supervise the jamming activities should be 
transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as of January 1, 1964. The Ministry of 
the Interior should issue orders to start jamming certain station, if the need 
arises, or to terminate jamming, as well as to make a decision as to what 
programs and at what times should be jammed. 
Received by: comrade Lajos Fehér 
comrade János Pap 
comrade István Kossá 
comrade László Orbán 
comrade Sándor Rácz 
comrade István Szurdi 
(Unintelligible handwritten insertion) After negotiating with the president of the 
Hungarian Radio and Television the Minister of Transportation and Postal 
Services should work out a proposal for the government to improve the 
technical background of our foreign language radio programs so that the results 
of our socialist development and cultural life could be popularized more 
effectively especially in capitalist countries. (Handwritten insertion) The 
proposal should be submitted to the government by June 30, 1964. (End of 
handwritten insertion) 
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(Handwritten insertion) The Minister of Transportation and Postai Services 
and the Minister of the Interior should be made responsible for the execution of 
the above resolution. (End of handwritten insertion) 
Source : H N A M-KS-288 . f . 5/3 ló.ö.e . 
RÉVÉSZ BÉLA 
A HIDEGHÁBORÚ ÉS A DIKTATÚRA IRATAI A 
MAGYARORSZÁGI LEVÉLTÁRAKBAN 
(a Szabad Európa Rádió esete) 
(Összefogla lás ) 
A hidegháború-kutatás - bár az elmúlt évtizedekben a világ legkülönbözőbb 
országaiban számtalan tudományos és állami intézmény foglalkozott 
problémáival és szinte áttekinthetetlen mennyiségű szakanyag halmozódott fel 
akár elméleti akár olykor igencsak pragmatikus tevékenységük következtében -
csupán napjainkra került abba a helyzetbe, hogy mint sajátos interdiszciplináris 
és alkalmazott jellegű tudományterület igényt formáljon önállóságának 
tudományrendszertani elismerésére is. A hidegháború fél évszázada során 
ugyanis hiába alakultak sorra a kelet-, illetve nyugatkutató intézetek, hiába 
jöttek létre a globális konfliktuselemzés újabb és újabb műhelyei vagy éppen a 
gazdasági, katonai, biztonságpolitikai, ideológiai konfrontáció vizsgálatára 
hivatott hivatalos és nem-hivatalos intézmények, többségük nem tudott 
megszabadulni a történelmi helyzet okozta sajátos funkciózavarától. Ugyanis 
bármennyire hiteles, objektív kutatási eredmények születettek is a hidegháború 
egész folyamatára avagy annak egyes részjelenségeire vonatkozóan, mégsem 
lehetett eltekinteni azoktól a konkrét történelmi-politikai körülményektől, amely 
minden más társadalomelméleti, -történeti problematikánál közvetlenebbül 
tették a napi politika eszközévé az ilyen típusú - szándékaik és kutatási 
módszereik folytán esetleg ettől teljes mértékben elkülönülni kívánó -
kutatásokat. Azzal, hogy az ezredfordulóra - feltételezhetően végleg - lezárult 
korunk hidegháborúsként aposztrofált félévszázada, természetesen még nem 
alakultak ki automatikusan az elfogulatlanság, sokoldalúság és objektivitás 
követelményeit tartalmazó kutatási kondíciók. Az viszont kedvező előfeltétele a 
megindult vizsgálódásoknak, hogy a korszak viszonylagos zártsága miatt a 
történelmi előzményekből eredő politikai elvárások már egyre kevésbé 
befolyásolják ezen időszak tényeinek kutathatóságát. 
A kutatástechnikai feltételekre tekintettel nagy jelentőségű az a 
nemzetközileg is egyre általánosabb tendencia, amely az információhoz jutás 
szabadságát az egyéneknek és közösségeiknek saját történetükhöz, múltjukhoz 
•WJ 
9 6 - BÉLA RÉVÉSZ 
való jogaként határozza meg. Az ezen az állásponton kialakult szabályozás 
természetesen a kutatás szabadságát is egyre szélesebb körben garantálja. Mégis 
évtizedek múlva visszatekintve a rendszerváltás utáni időszakra, meglepőnek 
tűnhet, hogy az ezredforduló idején a tényleges kutatási eredmények körét 
mintha felülmúlná a kutatás feltételeivel illetve annak akadályaival foglalkozó 
írások és tanulmányok sora. Lényeges politikai és közjogi érdekek fűződnek 
ugyanis az egyes iratok napvilágra kerüléséhez, vagy éppen azok végieges 
megsemmisüléséhez. Pedig társadalmi értelemben nem kevesebbről, mint a 
hidegháború, a diktatúra korszakának megismeréséről, a rendszerváltás 
sikereinek és kudarcainak megértéséről van szó, amely így a „szocio-mentális 
feldolgozás" sajátos szerepét is betölti. A kellő önismeret kialakításához 
nélkülözhetetlen „információs kárpótlás" ugyanis a társadalom 
kiegyensúlyozott morális állapotának a létrejöttéhez is hozzájárulhat. 
Ma már Magyarországon a hidegháború- és a diktatúrakutatás alapvető 
dokumentumai, főként ami a „klasszikus" hidegháború 1947 és 1962 közötti 
korszakát illeti, elvileg hozzáférhetők. A gyakorlatban azonban számos, nem 
politikai természetű probléma is nehezíti ezeknek az iratoknak a elérhetőségét. 
Ezek közül az első helyen szerepel az iratanyagok rendezetlensége azokban az 
intézményekben, amelyek csak a legutóbbi időkben szabadították fel anyagaikat 
a nyilvános kutatás számára. Természetesen komoly feladat az egyes irattári 
anyagoknak nemcsak megőrzése, de magának az irattári rendnek levéltári 
renddé változtatása. Mindeddig a belső irattárak funkciói alapvetően az 
iratgazda-szervezet ügymenetének a kiszolgálása volt. Ehhez képest a kutatási 
igények megjelenésével egy új további, feladatot is el kell látni - még ha más 
intézmény is lesz a dokumentumok új kezelője - , amely adott esetben az 
iratrendszerezés újabb szempontjait is felvetheti. 
A magyar hidegháború-kutatás kutatóhelyeinek köre viszonylag pontosan 
meghatározható, de természetesen véglegesen le nem zárható. Iratképző 
helyként az adott korszak két, politikailag is kiemelkedően fontos intézménye 
játszott főszerepet: a Belügyminisztérium (benne a pártirányítás által 
meghatározott állambiztonsági szolgálatokkal) illetve a „másik oldalon" az 
Egyesült Államokból finanszírozott Szabad Európa Rádió. Ezek iratanyagának 
feltárása és feldolgozása a hidegháború időszakának valamint a diktatúra valódi 
természetének pontosabb megismeréséhez is közelebb viheti a már 
megkezdődött kutatásokat. 
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